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Kontakt/Contact

ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft/Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Düsternbrooker Weg 120
24105 Kiel (Germany)
E-Mail: [rights\[at\]zbw.eu](mailto:rights[at]zbw.eu)
<https://www.zbw.eu/>

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Introductory Chapter: Immigration and Economic Growth and Development

Tiago Sequeira and Marcelo Santos

Additional information is available at the end of the chapter

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1. Introduction

Recent anti-immigration policies coming out with the Donald Trump presidency as well as in some European Countries make the relationship between immigration and economic growth and development a crucial topic to be addressed. Moreover, climate change, poverty, and wars led to a huge number of refugees coming from Africa and Asia to Europe, leading to overwhelming and shocking loss of human lives.

The faster social sciences address this issue, the faster it can inform policy about the direction it should take to improve welfare in world populations.

The evidence on immigration flows is overwhelming. Focusing only on Sub-Saharan immigrants in the USA, the number of immigrants rose from 130,000 in the 1980s to almost 1.8 million in 2015 (see **Figure 1**, reproduced from Zong and Batalova [1]). The current flow of Sub-Saharan Africans consists of skilled professionals, individuals seeking reunification with relatives, and refugees from war-torn countries. However, this is still a small community of immigrants in the US, amounting to near 4%.

2. The effects of immigration on growth and development

Immigration should have an effect in growth and development through different channels: labor supply and unemployment, human capital, entrepreneurship, social security, public expenditures, and social integration. Those effects can also be different on the short and long run.

Labor supply increases with immigration. While this can lead to increases in the unemployment rate, it can also help the economy to fulfill job market vacancies in some low skilled jobs,




Figure 1. Sub-Saharan African immigrant population in the United States, 1980–2015. Source: Data from U.S. Census Bureau 2006, 2010, and 2015 American Community Surveys (ACS), and Gibson and Jung [2] (available online).

which most nationals in developed countries are not willing to fill. The overall effect on growth and unemployment rate is thus uncertain.

However, some of the emigrants are also highly skilled (examples are the immigrations flows from Eastern to Western Europe and of some highly skilled people in India and China to the USA). In this case, growth may benefit from immigration, through a human capital channel. High-skilled immigrants contribute to the added value and growth on developed economies.

The same positive effect can be obtained from the effect of entrepreneurship. International literature has discovered that immigrants show more entrepreneurial skills than natives in several countries, namely in the US. This may happen both because immigrants are idiosyncratically more adventurous and also because cross-cultural experiences increase entrepreneurial capabilities. This approach is linked to the idea that entrepreneurial features are determined by individual features [3, 4]. However, this approach has been seriously questioned recently [5]. The point is that the previous approach ignores the importance of the link between individual or social features and the environment in the reception country. More precisely, a successful entrepreneur in South Africa may not become so successful in Canada due to a worse fit between her/his own individual and social features and the market and social environment in Canada.

On the possible negative effects of immigration, people and politicians usually identify a pressure on the side of public expenditures and social integration. In fact, the increase in legal immigration may increase public expenditures linked to social integration expenditures (such as poverty relief, government-provided shelter, and medical assistance). This may divert resources from nationals to immigrants and even contribute to increase taxes to employed nationals. Even though the rise in expenditures due to immigration costs can be supported through public debt, through the Ricardian effect, future generations may be waived with more taxes. Besides this, it is important to consider the effects of immigration on the social cohesion of a given region or country. In fact, due

to different cultures and languages and even religions, without integration policies, immigrants may be segregated and if so, originate increases in social instability and crime.

Many of these effects can be different in the short and long run. Some of those effects are analyzed for Europe by a recent FMI staff research paper [6]. For example, while, firstly, immigrants may pose a pressure on the fiscal side, and thus put a pressure on the increase on taxes, which can deter growth, with the gradual integration of migrants on the labor markets of the receiving countries; they can contribute positively to production and productivity, depending on the tasks they can perform on the value chain of the receiving countries. Integration policies are thus crucial to emphasize the positive effects of immigration when compared to the negative effects. From those integration policies, training and apprenticeship programs on the language of the receiving countries are particularly useful for the integration of immigrants on the labor market. Thus, it is important to emphasize that the more successful are the integration policies, the more the positive effects overcome the negative effects of immigration.

Author details

Tiago Sequeira* and Marcelo Santos

*Address all correspondence to: sequeira@ubi.pt

University of Beira Interior, Covilhã, Portugal

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Welfare Dependency Among Immigrants to Norway: A Panel Data Study of Transfer Shares

Tom Kornstad and Terje Skjerpen

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Abstract

Using Norwegian panel data, we specify and estimate transfer share equations for immigrants belonging to different subgroups. The share measures how import transfers are relative to a gross income concept incorporating transfers and gross income coming from labor market participation. For both genders, we consider three types of immigrants: refugees, individuals immigrating for reunification with refugees and individuals immigrating because of work. The transfer share for an individual depends on different characteristics of it. The explanatory variables we consider are related to age, duration of stay in Norway, family composition, educational attainment and area of geographical residence in Norway. Unobserved individual-specific heterogeneity is represented by random effects. Of special concern, not at least from a policy point of view, is the effect of duration of stay on the transfer shares. For refugees and individuals reunifying with refugees we find, at least for a substantial number of years, that the transfer share decreases as the duration of stay becomes longer. An essential part of the analysis is that we compare the effects across gender. Among the refugees we find that the effect of duration of stay is quite similar for men and women.

Keywords: transfer share, immigrants, reunification, duration of stay, family composition, Norway

1. Introduction

We study self-support and welfare dependency among immigrants to Norway by looking at their transfers from the welfare state as a fraction of their total income, and how this fraction varies with duration of residence in Norway and other characteristics of the immigrants. This is an important issue, as modern economies including Norway are concerned about how immigrants, especially those arriving as refugees or with the purpose of reunifying with refugees, are performing after some years in the host country when it comes to welfare

dependency and self-support. Lack of relevant education and lack of relevant work experience upon arrival in the host country might reduce their labor market opportunities and increase welfare dependency. A fundamental question is then, as time elapses, will they assimilate into the society, increase their labor market participation, reduce their welfare dependency and become more equal to the native population? Or will they become increasingly dependent on the welfare system as they age? There are at least two reasons why this question is often posed. Firstly, one is occupied with the welfare of the immigrants themselves. Participation in the labor market either as employee or employer will tend to make the immigrants better off. Secondly, one is concerned with governmental budgets. If immigrants show a poor ability to assimilate, governmental budgets will be strained, eventually making an increase in taxes or a cut in other governmental expenses necessary. Such a development may change attitudes in the native population toward immigrants with potential implications for the political landscape. Income from the oil and gas industry has been rather important for the Norwegian economy the last decades. Financed with large incomes from the petroleum sector the Norwegian welfare system has boosted, and the welfare system is characterized by a high degree of universality and high levels of income compensation, known as the Scandinavian welfare model. What we are studying here is then the welfare dependency among immigrants living in a country with a generous welfare system. However, in the years ahead incomes from the petroleum sector will decrease. This feature together with an increase in the share of elderly people will no doubt put pressure on the governmental budget. Given this development, governmental expenditure related to immigration should be monitored closely.

Earlier studies of welfare dependency in western countries comprise among others [1–6]. These studies consider different types of immigrants, and host country also differs. Ref. [1] compares how Turkish immigrants or individuals of Turkish descent and natives in Germany perform with respect to welfare dependency. After controlling for compositional heterogeneity, they find that the difference in welfare receipt is statistically significant only for second generation immigrants. They also find that the policy reform in 2005 led to an increase in the welfare use among both immigrants and natives. As is the case with our analysis, [2] focuses on non-Western immigration and the years after 2000. He is occupied with how a boost in the Danish macroeconomy influences assimilation out of welfare dependence and how different policy changes aiming to get immigrants out of welfare, work. An important finding of his study is that a booming economy makes integration of immigrants in the labor market much easier than when the economy is in a recession. The study reports small effects of policy changes intended to increase economic incentives for labor market participation in existing welfare programs. Also, [3] studies the importance of business cycle variation for immigrants' use of welfare benefits. This study is occupied with immigrants from new EU-members to Ireland. By comparing the rates of receipt of welfare for immigrants and natives in Ireland they find that immigrants are more sensitive to business cycle variations, particularly at the outset of the recession, where there is a large increase in the number of immigrants receiving welfare. However, after some time the number of immigrants on welfare seems to stabilize, while there is still an increase in the number of natives on welfare.

Ref. [4] considers the Spanish economy, which is somewhat different from the Norwegian when it comes to eligibility of governmental welfare arrangements. She analyzes how immigrants are

represented in different welfare programs and how this is related to the duration of stay in Spain. Duration is important since a substantial part of the welfare is dependent on a conditioned access to pensions. Mainly due to recently arrived immigrants, benefit intakes among immigrants appear to be lower than among natives. However, the use of unemployment benefit is larger among immigrants with more than 5 years of stay in Spain than among natives. Also, [6] considers the German economy. They make a distinction between eligibility to welfare and the probability of welfare take-up given eligibility. The authors find rather small differences between immigrants and natives with respect to both being eligible for welfare and the probability of take-up given eligibility.

A study of substantial interest to us, as it employs Norwegian data, is [5]. This study considers three outcome measures, (i) employment during the observation year, (ii) log annual earnings and (iii) participation in disability insurance programs. Using longitudinal data from 1970 they find that refugees and family migrants had increasing employment rates the first years in Norway, but after a decade the rates declined and there was an increase in the social insurance rates. Labor migrants from low-income countries showed declining employment rates and increasing disability rates, while labor migrants from rich countries performed as natives. Another issue is related to the wage rate obtained by an immigrant relative to a comparable native citizen. In many countries, one typically finds some form of catching-up effect. As the duration of the stay increases, the discrepancy between the wages earned by immigrants and native citizens decreases.

In contrast to the studies mentioned above, we focus on the transfer share of immigrants, i.e. how important are benefits from the government¹ compared to the income obtained by the immigrant's involvement in the labor market? We are interested in how the transfer share varies with observed characteristics of the immigrants, among them how the transfer share varies with the duration of stay in Norway. Our expectation is that the transfer share decreases when the duration of stay increases due to increased integration in the society. In addition, we consider characteristics such as reason for immigration, level of education and area of geographical residence. We also touch upon how variation in land background affects the transfer share. Initially we distinguish between three world regions, but we also report some additional results where we utilize single country information. To consider that the effects might vary across gender, men and women are treated separately in the analysis.

An advantage of our analysis compared to most other analyses using data for countries outside Scandinavia is that we have access to registry data for the entire population. The analysis is based on (unbalanced) panel data for the years 2000 to 2014. This type of data enables us to follow the individuals over time, and we get a more reliable estimate of the integration effect compared to an analysis using cross sectional data only. Using panel data, we can also take account of unobserved heterogeneity between the observational units. Considering unobserved heterogeneity is particularly important in this type of study since the immigrants have a large variation in cultural background as they are from a wide range of countries. As most of the explanatory variables are time-invariant, we have found it more

¹Governmental transfers constitute the lion's share of total transfers to the individuals.

suitable to employ a random effects model than a model with fixed effects. By dividing our data into different subsets according to both gender and reason for immigration in the estimation of the models, we account for systematic variation in the transfer share among different groups of immigrants. Altogether we specify and estimate models for six separate subgroups.

According to our findings, the transfer share is larger among female immigrants than male immigrants. Labor immigrants have a relatively low share of transfers during their first years in Norway, but then the transfer share increases. The pattern is very similar for men and women. Refugees on the other hand have a larger transfer share when immigrating to Norway, but as duration of stay increases, the transfer share is being reduced. Also for this group of immigrants the relationship between the transfer share and duration of stay is quite similar for men and women. The relationship between transfer share and duration of stay for immigrants reunifying with a refugee resembles more the one for refugees than the one for labor immigrants. Having a partner reduces the transfer share, particularly among refugees and immigrants reunifying with a refugee. Higher levels of education are associated with lower levels of transfer shares. Among labor immigrants and refugees the effect of increased education is larger for women than for men except for individuals with low education. For low educated individuals as well as for individuals reunifying with a refugee, we do not find any significant differences across gender in the effect of increased education.

The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents model specifications, while Section 3 presents the data used in the analysis and, also summary statistics. Section 4 presents the results. To reduce the size of the tables and increase the focus of the discussion of the results, we report the results for blocks of explanatory variables in different tables. We also compare the marginal effects across gender in this section, and provide figures for whether the estimated differences are statistically significant. Finally, the main findings are summarized in Section 5.

2. Model specifications

We focus on the relationship between the transfer share and the duration of stay by immigrants in Norway. Immigrant groups of special interest are refugees and individuals reunified with refugees. As duration of residence in Norway increases we expect transfers to decrease because the immigrants get better integrated by time. Since there may be a non-linear relationship between the transfer share and duration time, it seems somewhat too rigid to assume a linear relationship between the transfers share and duration time. As a simple non-linear specification, we therefore specify a second order polynomial in duration of stay.

Since we have a comprehensive amount of data at hand, we divide the immigrants into subgroups. An advantage of treating the subgroups separately in the estimations is that one then, implicitly, avoids imposing unwarranted parameter restrictions. Altogether we have 14 groups, brought about by cross-classifying immigrants according to gender and reason for immigration to Norway. **Table 1** provides the number of observations and the number of observation units in each of the subgroups.

Reason for immigration	Gender			
	Men		Women	
	No. of obs.	No. of obs. units	No. of obs.	No. of obs. units
Work	527,333	130,863	162,330	41,491
Refugee	643,583	71,180	400,186	45,377
Reunifying with refugee	84,809	11,518	224,604	25,317
Reunifying with other immigrants	125,692	19,138	297,001	52,660
Education	52,530	14,659	79,515	24,039
Unknown reason	206,919	19,421	182,745	16,639
Other reasons	3726	805	4068	961

Table 1. The number of observations and observational units in different subgroups obtained by cross-classifying individuals according to gender and reason for immigration.

Model specifications include a rather long list of explanatory variables, where most of them are either binary or integer variables. They capture age effects, duration of stay effects, world region background effects, educational effects, regional effects, family composition effects and calendar effects. Formally, we may write the equation to be estimated (for a specific subgroup) in the following way

$$TV_{it} = \alpha + C_t\beta + B_i\gamma + D_{it}\lambda + F_{it}\theta + E_{it}\rho + R_{it}\xi + \mu_i + \varepsilon_{it}. \quad (1)$$

The indices i and t represent, respectively, individual and year. The left-hand side variable, TV_{it} , denotes the transfer share variable for individual i in year t . It is bounded on the interval from 0 to 1. The symbols C_t , B_i , D_{it} , F_{it} , E_{it} and R_{it} are all (row) vectors with observed variables. Note that whereas the variables in the vector C_t are common to all individuals and the variables in the vector B_i are time-invariant, the variables in the vectors D_{it} , F_{it} , E_{it} and R_{it} vary both across individuals and years. An overview of the detailed content of these vectors are given in **Table 7** in Appendix A, but in short, C_t includes dummies for calendar year, B_i includes dummies for world region, D_{it} can be associated with duration of stay, F_{it} includes the number of children in different age groups, E_{it} includes dummies for educational attainment level while R_{it} includes dummies for regions in Norway. The reason we introduce different symbols for the vectors D_{it} , F_{it} , E_{it} and R_{it} is that we present the estimates of the effect of these variables in separate tables. The symbol α denotes an intercept, whereas β , γ , λ , θ , ρ and ξ are (column) vectors with unknown slope parameters. The two last symbols on the right-hand side of Eq. (1) are an individual-specific random effect (μ_i) and a genuine error term (ε_{it}), which is assumed to be white noise. Both the terms have expectation equal to zero and their variances are constant for all i and t . Since not all observational units, i.e. individuals, are observed every year, we have an unbalanced panel data set. Eq. (1) is estimated by means of feasible GLS. Since an interesting question is whether males and females respond differently to explanatory variables, we also derive differences in parameter estimates between the two genders and assess

their significance. Under the assumption that the data used in the two involved regressions are from independent populations, we calculate the t -value of an estimated difference by dividing it by the square root of the sum of the estimated variances of the two estimated slope parameters which enter the difference.

Using panel data, it is possible to account for time-invariant individual-specific unobserved heterogeneity. This is usually done by either including fixed effects or random effects in the regression equation. The reason we have chosen to apply a random effects specification, based on the assumption that the random effects are uncorrelated with all the incorporated regressors, is that there is an identification problem in fixed effects models with explanatory variables which are either time-invariant or close to being so. The effects of time-invariant variables are not identified in fixed effects models without imposing additional restrictions. In this chapter we have a special focus on how duration of stay impacts the transfer share. Since age is present in the regression and duration of stay is identical to the individual's age, less his age when immigrating to Norway, the (linear) effect of duration of stay is not identified in the fixed effects model. Also, the educational variables and the variables capturing region in Norway vary little for a specific individual. Thus, even if these variables are not strictly time-invariant, the parameter estimates of them may be doubtful. To solve this problem, some researchers are using a so-called fixed effects vector decomposition estimator to identify the effects of time-invariant regressor in a fixed effects environment. They first run a fixed effects regression using only explanatory variables that vary both across time and across individuals. Then they estimate a regression where fitted fixed effects are regressed on time-invariant variables and the individual-specific mean of variables varying both across time and across observation units. However, as ascertained by ([7], pp. 364–370) such a procedure only works when some of the regressors are uncorrelated with the random effects, cf. for instance [8].²

3. Data

The basic data sets used in this analysis are the population registries covering the total Norwegian population for the years 2000–2014. These data include information about all immigrants to Norway, their country of birth, year of first arrival to Norway, municipality and the number of children in different age groups (0–4, 4–6, 7–18). In the selection of the data we only include immigrants from the non-Nordic countries. More precisely, we have excluded people born in Norway with at least one parent born abroad, and in addition people born abroad with at least one parent born in Norway. For an individual to be included in the data in a specific year, we check whether the individual is included in the population file at the end of that year. Due to return migration, an individual might be included in the data set for some years, then he might be missing in the data set due to migration from Norway, before he

²We have run the Hausman-test to test the random effects model against the fixed effects model using only the regressors that are identified in the fixed effects case. It gave rejection in all cases. According to our experience this is very common when one has a large data set at hand, which also is the case in our analysis.

eventually appears in the dataset again because of having returned to Norway. The sample size also varies across years due to inflow of new immigrants.

We operate with three groups of countries. The first group consists of all countries in Western-Europe with the addition of Canada, United States, Australia and New Zealand. The second group consists of the new EU-members, i.e. the 11 countries in Eastern Europe which have become members since May 2004. These countries are Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The third group consists of all countries which are not included in group 1 and group 2, that is, countries in the rest of Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia (including Turkey), Latin-America and the countries in Oceania except Australia and New Zealand. This way of grouping the countries corresponds to the one used in the official Norwegian population projections.

The sample is also constrained to include only persons aged 19–64 years. The lower age limit excludes children from the analysis, while the upper age limit excludes many persons that might retire from the labor market due to old age pension. For persons aged 62–66 years in our sample there is a difference in the early retirement system between those employed in the public and the private sector of the labor market. Under certain conditions related to work history, persons in the public sector can withdraw from the labor market on early retirement pension when they become 62 years. In the private sector only a fraction of the firms has early retirement schemes. Almost all persons in Norway get ordinary old age pension from the age of 67.

To the unbalanced panel data set described above we have linked the Norwegian income registries with information about the persons' total income as well as total transfers, both measured before income taxation. From these variables, we can, for all individuals in the sample, calculate the fraction between income transfers and total income, i.e., the main variable of this analysis. Total income and total transfers are based on detailed information from the tax assessment, and they are constructed by Statistics Norway to ensure time consistency in the definition. Total income is a gross income measure that includes wages, incomes from self-employment, income transfers as well as gross capital incomes. Interest expenses on debt are excluded. Income transfers on the other hand include both taxable and non-taxable transfers. Among the taxable transfers, the most important ones from our point of view are the disability benefit, the work assessment allowance, unemployment benefit, sickness benefit, parental benefit, qualification benefit and introduction benefit. The parental benefit is intended to ensure parents an income when giving birth or adopting a child. Qualification benefit is for those that require extra follow-up to participate in the labor market. The introduction benefit is a payment for people with a refugee background participating in the introductory program.

Among the non-taxable benefits we find child benefit, housing allowance, scholarship of education including a specific grant for refugees in upper secondary education, social benefits and a cash-for-care benefit. The cash-for-care benefit is an income transfer received by the family if the child is between the ages of 1 and 2 and does not attend a government subsidized kindergarten. In most cases it is the mother that receives the transfer, but if the parents have shared parenting, special rules apply. The benefit has been debated frequently, last time during the parliamentary elections in the autumn of 2017, where it was argued that it provides disincentives for female immigrants from participating in the labor market.

In addition to the variables described above, we have also included information about the individuals' highest level of education from the Norwegian educational database (NUDB). Based on this information we have constructed nine dummies representing different educational achievement measured in years, cf. **Table 4** for an overview of the levels. NUDB also yields information about ongoing educational activity, and based on this information we have constructed a dummy variable for being enrolled in education. The values of all these educational dummies for a specific individual may vary over time, in view of changes in education status.

The regional variables reflecting centrality are based on the Standard for centrality in Statistics Norway.³ This standard classifies the municipalities into 7 levels of centrality, see lower part of **Table 9** in Appendix A, based on traveling time from the municipality to the nearest regional center.

Duration of stay (residence) in Norway is calculated as the number of years since first arrival year to Norway. Observations with duration of stay less than 1 year are omitted from the sample as it takes some time to settle in the country. Adult persons with the same family number in the population registries are classified as having a partner. As these registries do not include information about family members in the country of origin, persons might be classified as not having a partner even if they have one in the country of origin.

Table 1 in the main text and **Tables 8** and **9** in Appendix A show detailed summary statistics for the sample. In the empirical analysis, we focus on three groups of immigrants, those coming to Norway for work, refugees and those reunifying with refugees. A specific feature of our data is that we can distinguish between those reunifying with refugees and other reunifying immigrants. This distinction is important as there are differences in the transfer share between these two groups. According to **Table 1**, fourth column, family immigration is an important reason for immigration among females, and one out of three is reunifying with a refugee. **Table 1** also shows that there are important differences across gender in the reason for immigrating to Norway. While work is the dominating reason for immigration among men, there is a much more even distribution for women. However, escape is an important reason for immigration for both genders. Another interesting feature of **Table 1** is that while the fraction between the number of observations and the number of observation units is about 4 for labor immigrants, the fraction is about 9 for refugees. This difference indicates that duration of stay in Norway is much higher for refugees than for work immigrants in our sample. The main reason for this difference is that most labor immigration to Norway has taken place after the expansion of the European union in 2004.

Table 8 in Appendix A shows the distribution of the transfer share variable – the main variable of our analysis – and how the distribution evolves over time for three different sub-periods during the years 2000–2014. To identify the quartiles, we order the observations for a specific period according to the size of the transfer share. The first quartile is the transfer share of the observation that lies 25% up from the bottom of the distribution, that is, 25% of the

³See <http://www.ssb.no/klass/klassifikasjoner/128>.

observations have a lower transfer share than the observation we are considering. For the second and third quartiles, the percentages are 50 and 75, respectively. Per definition the second quartile coincides with the median value. From the table, we notice that there is a big difference in the transfer share for females and males, particularly among individuals who are reunifying with a refugee. For labor immigrants, the difference across gender is much smaller.

We also find that the transfer share is smaller among labor immigrants than for the two other groups, which have some connection with escape. A potential explanation for this finding is that many refugees might struggle with inferior health due to the situation in their country of origin. However, looking at the mean values for the three sub-periods, we notice that while the mean transfer has increased from 2000 to 2004 to 2010–2014 among labor immigrants, the mean transfer share is almost unchanged among refugees and immigrants reunifying with a refugee. Among labor immigrants the mean transfer share was lower during the period 2005–2009 than for the other two periods in the table.

Table 9 in Appendix A shows the distribution of the other variables used in the analysis. As also noted above, mean duration of stay is much longer among refugees and individuals reunifying with a refugee compared to labor immigrants. For individuals with a connection to escape there is also a significant increase in duration of stay from the period 2000–2004 to 2010–2014.

Looking at the section in the middle of **Table 9**, we notice that particularly among labor immigrants but also immigrants reunifying with refugees, educational information is missing for a relatively large share of the immigrants. About one out of three female refugees and males and females reunifying with refugees only have upper secondary, basic education. Among labor immigrants the educational level is a bit higher, particularly among the females. Most immigrants live in Oslo, the capital city of Norway, but there are also large fractions in regional metropolises and other regional centers. About one out of three labor immigrants live with a partner in Norway, while the fraction is about one out of two among most of the other groups.

4. Empirical results

Instead of reporting all estimated parameters for a subgroup in a single table, we report estimates of slope parameters of blocks of explanatory variables in different tables for selected subgroups. The estimates related to age and duration of stay are reported in **Table 2**, the estimates related to family composition variables are reported in **Table 3** while the estimates related to educational variables are reported in **Table 4**. The estimates related to regional variables are reported in **Table 5**. These tables also include figures for the differences in the estimated marginal effects across gender and the precision of these estimates. Finally, in **Table 6** we report estimated country of birth effects when we only employ data from world region 3.⁴

⁴In addition, all models contain a constant term, annual dummies for all the years except the initial year in the sample and, where relevant, two land background variables. To save space estimates of the effects of these additional variables are not reported.

Variable	Male		Female		Difference	
	Estimate	t-value	Estimate	t-value	Estimate	t-value
Work						
Age	0.002	37.1	0.000	4.2	0.001	11.1
Duration of stay	0.009	36.3	0.009	17.8	-0.000	-0.3
Duration of stay squared divided by 100	-0.032	-21.7	-0.035	-11.7	0.003	0.8
Refugee						
Age	0.010	87.4	0.009	67.9	0.002	10.5
Duration of stay	-0.037	-147.0	-0.038	-130.3	0.002	4.0
Duration of stay squared divided by 100	0.076	111.6	0.080	97.6	-0.003	-3.3
Reunifying with refugee						
Age	0.005	18.5	0.007	36.0	-0.002	-5.8
Duration of stay	-0.014	-19.2	-0.037	-75.1	0.023	26.1
Duration of stay squared divided by 100	0.030	12.9	0.083	52.8	-0.054	-19.3

^aThe table shows results for six separate regression. In the two last columns we report, respectively, the estimate for men less the estimate for women and the *t*-value of this estimated difference.

Table 2. Feasible GLS estimates related to age and duration of stay in a random effects model for transfer share.^a

Given the scope of the article our analysis will only involve the following six subgroups: Male work immigrant, Female work immigrant, Male refugee, Female refugee, Male immigrant reunifying with female refugee and Female immigrant reunifying with male refugee. Male workers and male refugees constitute the two groups with most observations. Males reunified with female refugees constitutes the smallest group. In **Table 10** in Appendix A we report the estimates of the variances of the random effect and the genuine error term, respectively. The last row in the table shows the ratio between the estimates of the two variances. It varies between 0.5 and 1.2 and is somewhat higher for those coming as refugees or for reunification with refugees compared to those that state work as the reason for immigration.

Table 2 reports the estimates of the slope parameters attached to age and the two variables representing duration of stay, which is of great interest, for males and females, respectively. The transfer share is specified as linear in age but quadratic in duration of stay to capture that the marginal effect might vary with duration. All estimates turned out as statistically significant. Generally, the transfer share increases with age, but somewhat more for refugees and individuals coming to Norway because of reunification with refugees than for those coming because of work. Focusing on the effect of duration of stay, we find that for refugees, the transfer share decreases for a long period with the duration of stay, but at a decreasing rate. In contrast, for immigrants coming because of work the transfer share increases with duration of stay, but at a decreasing rate. In [9] it is shown that immigrants with relation to escape have particularly low self-support fractions when considering income from work, especially among females. On the other hand, female work immigrants are self-supported to the same degree as male work immigrants.

Variable	Male		Female		Difference	
	Est.	<i>t</i> -value	Est.	<i>t</i> -value	Est.	<i>t</i> -value
Work						
No. of children aged 0–3 years	0.017	15.3	0.106	82.3	−0.091	−56.9
No. of children aged 4–6 years	0.011	9.7	0.048	27.3	−0.038	−18.1
No. of children aged 7–18 years	0.007	9.7	0.041	31.7	−0.034	−22.7
Partner	−0.024	−22.6	−0.003	−2.0	−0.020	−10.1
Refugee						
No. of children aged 0–3 years	0.032	32.2	0.122	118.5	−0.090	63.3
No. of children aged 4–6 years	0.024	23.0	0.066	61.4	−0.043	−28.4
No. of children aged 7–18 years	−0.000	−0.05	0.014	24.0	−0.014	−17.3
Partner	−0.066	−42.9	−0.102	−62.2	0.037	16.4
Reunifying with refugee						
No. of children aged 0–3 years	0.017	6.7	0.138	110.4	−0.122	−44.0
No. of children aged 4–6 years	0.019	6.6	0.068	52.2	−0.049	−15.7
No. of children aged 7–18 years	0.013	6.9	0.028	32.2	−0.015	−7.1
Partner	−0.090	−23.5	−0.119	−51.7	0.029	6.6

^aThe table shows results for six separate regression. In the two last columns we report, respectively, the estimate for men less the estimate for women and the *t*-value of this estimated difference.

Table 3. Feasible GLS estimates related to family composition variables in a random effects model for transfer share.^a

To compare the effects across gender, we present the differences in the marginal effects and the corresponding *t*-value in columns 5 and 6 of the table. Looking first at the marginal effect of age, we notice that there is a statistically significant difference across gender, but the difference is quite small for all three groups. For labor immigrants and refugees the marginal effect of age is somewhat larger for men than for women, while for persons reunifying with a refugee, the age effect is larger for women than for men.

The differences across gender are more complex when we look at the effect of duration of stay. For labor immigrants we find no significant differences. The parameter estimates are practically the same, and the *t*-values indicate that the differences are not statistically significant.

Also among refugees the effect of duration of stay is quite similar for men and women, but for this group the difference is statistically significant. However, for persons reunifying with a refugee, the difference is larger. For both men and women, the transfer share decreases with duration of stay, but the decrease is larger among women than among men.

In **Table 3** we report estimates related to family composition variables. The message from the table seems clear. An additional child in either of the age intervals increases the transfer share. The only exception is related to the number of children in the oldest age group for refugee men, which does not affect the transfer share. Generally, the younger an additional child is, the

larger is the increase in the transfer share. An explanation for this finding is that many women work part-time when the children are young. Another explanation is that parents who do not use child care in child care centers get a cash for care if the child is less than 2 years. In addition, there is a child allowance that is generally proportional to the number of children aged less than 17 years. Also note that more children increase the transfer share for individuals who have come to Norway for work, but that the estimated effect for these two groups is significantly smaller than for refugee immigrants and immigrants coming to Norway for reunification with refugees. By comparing the estimates across gender, we notice that the effects are higher among women than men. We also find that the younger the children are, the larger is the difference between men and women in the effect of having an additional child. These findings are due to the fact that many women reduce their labor market participation when they are having children.

Table 3 also shows the effect on the transfer share of having a married or cohabiting partner. Having a partner reduces the transfer share. This holds for all six groups, but again the effect is larger for refugees and immigrants being reunified with their family than for immigrants having come to Norway because of work. The effect of having a partner is also significantly different across gender. For labor immigrants the effect is larger among men than for women, while for refugees and persons reunifying with a refugee, the effect is larger for women than for men.

Table 4 shows how variation in educational attainment influences the transfer share for the six subgroups. The reference group is constituted by immigrants without any formal and registered education and the estimates of the other educational categories provide information about how these perform relative to the reference category. Initially, we concentrate on refugees and immigrants reunified with refugees. For all four subgroups, the reference category has the highest transfer share when the individuals are assumed equal with respect to all other observed variables. The estimated differences when comparing with the reference group are all statistically significant at the 5% significance level. Note especially that, according to our

Variable	Male		Female		Difference	
	Est.	t-value	Est.	t-value	Est.	t-value
Work						
Primary education	0.025	2.3	0.015	0.6	0.010	0.3
Lower secondary education	0.008	1.1	-0.001	-0.06	0.010	0.5
Upper secondary, basic education	-0.021	-2.6	-0.063	-3.3	0.042	2.0
Upper secondary, final year	-0.023	-3.0	-0.061	-3.4	0.037	1.9
Post-secondary, not higher education	-0.002	-0.2	-0.058	-2.6	0.056	2.2
First stage of higher education, undergraduate level	-0.028	-3.5	-0.087	-4.8	0.059	3.0
First stage of higher edu., grad. level	-0.048	-6.0	-0.107	-6.0	0.159	3.0
Second stage of higher education, postgraduate education	-0.031	-3.7	-0.086	-4.7	0.055	2.7
Unspecified education	-0.014	-1.8	-0.067	-3.8	0.053	2.7
Enrolled in education	0.091	43.3	0.083	33.2	0.007	2.3

Variable	Male		Female		Difference	
	Est.	t-value	Est.	t-value	Est.	t-value
Refugee						
Primary education	-0.018	-2.7	-0.025	-4.1	0.007	0.8
Lower secondary education	-0.089	-15.2	-0.094	-18.7	0.004	0.6
Upper secondary, basic education	-0.119	-15.0	-0.128	-15.3	0.009	0.8
Upper secondary, final year	-0.164	-27.0	-0.225	-42.8	0.061	7.6
Post-secondary, not higher education	-0.141	-16.4	-0.198	-20.1	0.057	4.4
First stage of higher education, undergraduate level	-0.200	-32.3	-0.296	-53.8	0.096	11.6
First stage of higher edu., grad. level	-0.279	-40.0	-0.389	-55.3	0.110	11.1
Second stage of higher education, postgraduate education	-0.235	-17.2	-0.337	-17.5	0.102	4.3
Unspecified education	-0.067	-10.7	-0.049	-8.9	-0.018	-2.2
Enrolled in education	0.150	99.1	0.111	70.3	0.039	17.6
Refugee						
Primary education	-0.074	-2.5	-0.033	-2.7	-0.041	-1.3
Lower secondary education	-0.101	-4.2	-0.136	-15.1	0.035	1.4
Upper secondary, basic education	-0.175	-5.8	-0.149	-11.3	-0.026	-0.8
Upper secondary, final year	-0.199	-8.2	-0.223	-23.9	0.024	0.9
Post-secondary, not higher education	-0.151	-5.2	-0.194	-11.9	0.042	1.3
First stage of higher education, undergraduate level	-0.264	-10.7	-0.267	27.8	0.003	0.1
First stage of higher edu., grad. level	-0.326	-12.3	-0.351	-29.0	0.025	0.9
Second stage of higher education, postgraduate education	-0.192	-4.3	-0.249	-8.7	0.057	1.1
Unspecified education	-0.105	-4.3	-0.094	-10.3	-0.010	-0.4
Enrolled in education	0.153	42.4	0.133	58.2	0.020	4.7

^aThe table shows results for six separate regression. In the two last columns we report, respectively, the estimate for men less the estimate for women and the *t*-value of this estimated difference.

Table 4. Feasible GLS estimates related to educational variables in a random effects model for transfer share.^a

estimation results, also immigrants with unspecified education have lower transfer shares than those without education. This suggests that immigrants with unspecified education also include individuals with some education. There is a clear tendency that higher level of education goes along with lower transfer shares. For all four subgroups, it is the case that the lowest transfer share is found for immigrants with first stage of higher graduate education, graduate level. There is some variation between the subgroups when it comes to which educational category has the second lowest transfer share. For refugees of both gender this is those with second stage of higher education, graduate level, whereas for immigrants, of both gender, who are reunified with refugees those with first stage of higher education, undergraduate level, have the second lowest transfer share. Furthermore, for all four subgroups, immigrants with

post-secondary, not higher education have a significant lower transfer share than immigrants with some type of secondary education.

If we compare the effects across gender, we find that the effect of educational achievement compared to not having any formal education is not significantly different for any education level among persons reunifying with a refugee. For refugees we find another pattern. For these individuals the effect of getting additional education is significantly different across gender for most groups, except for those with very low education. Compared to the reference group, women benefit more from having additional education than men according to our estimation results.

Let us now turn to those individuals who have immigrated to Norway because of work. Also for these subgroups there is a tendency that higher education goes along with lower transfer shares. However, for both genders, we find no statistically significant difference between those with lower secondary education, primary education and those belonging to the reference category, which consists of those without any formal education. For those with unspecified education, we only find a significant difference for women. As for refugees and immigrants the educational category with the lowest transfer share is first stage of higher education, graduate level. For both genders the transfer shares for those with either first stage of higher education, undergraduate level or second stage of higher education, postgraduate education seem rather equal and they are somewhat higher than for those with the lowest transfer share. For women, there is little difference between those with some type of secondary education and post-secondary, not higher education. However, the three categories have significantly lower transfer shares than the reference category. For men, this only holds true for those with some type of secondary education, whereas those with post-secondary, not higher education, do not have a transfer share that is statistically different from those without any education, who belong to the reference category.

Also for labor immigrants we find that the effect of educational achievement on the transfer share varies systematically across gender. As for the refugees, the difference is most pronounced among individuals with higher education, and in particular among individuals with first stage of higher education, graduate level.

Table 4 also reports the estimate of the effect of the binary variable indicating whether the individual is enrolled in education. Being enrolled in education goes along with a higher transfer share. This is the case for all six subgroups. However, the estimated effect is somewhat smaller for those who have stated work as their reason for coming to Norway than for those coming as refugees or for reunification with refugees. Again, the effect is higher among women than men, in particular among refugees but also among individuals reunifying with a refugee.

Table 5 shows how regional variables related to traveling distance to the nearest regional center and the existence of a university in the region influence immigrants' transfer share. One might suspect that the probability of finding an appropriate job varies systematically with population density in different regions, and that this might influence wage incomes and unemployment benefits received by immigrants. Immigrants living in the capital city constitute the reference group and the signs of the reported estimates hence indicate whether the transfer share of an individual living in one of the indicated regions, listed in the text column, is larger or smaller than for individuals living in the capital city, controlling for all other

Variable	Male		Female		Difference	
	Est.	t-value	Est.	t-value	Est.	t-value
Work						
Regional metropolises	-0.017	-16.3	-0.020	-8.7	0.003	1.1
Regional centers with a university	-0.021	-6.3	-0.023	-3.8	0.002	0.4
Other regional centers	0.006	5.6	0.014	5.9	-0.008	-3.1
Medium-sized towns and regions	0.007	4.3	0.015	4.2	-0.008	-2.0
Small labor areas	-0.007	-3.8	-0.001	-0.3	-0.005	-1.3
Micro labor areas	-0.009	-6.9	-0.013	-4.7	0.004	1.2
Refugee						
Regional metropolises	0.015	6.1	-0.005	-1.5	0.020	5.0
Regional centers with a university	-0.046	-6.3	-0.031	-3.3	-0.015	-1.3
Other regional centers	0.046	23.0	0.028	11.8	0.018	5.8
Medium-sized towns and regions	0.043	13.9	0.033	9.2	0.010	2.0
Small labor areas	0.020	5.7	0.012	2.7	0.009	1.6
Micro labor areas	-0.002	-0.7	-0.035	-10.0	0.033	7.4
Reunifying with refugee						
Regional metropolises	0.007	1.1	0.001	0.3	0.005	0.7
Regional centers with a university	-0.044	-2.3	-0.064	-4.3	0.020	0.8
Other regional centers	0.027	5.3	0.020	5.9	0.007	1.1
Medium-sized towns and regions	0.040	4.7	0.016	2.8	0.024	2.4
Small labor areas	0.047	4.4	0.018	2.6	0.030	2.3
Micro labor areas	-0.009	-1.0	-0.035	-6.3	0.026	2.5

^aThe table shows results for six separate regression. In the two last columns we report, respectively, the estimate for men less the estimate for women and the *t*-value of this estimated difference.

Table 5. Feasible GLS estimates related to regional variables in a random effects model for transfer share.^a

observed variables. Let us first concentrate on the four subgroups constituted by refugees and immigrants who have come to Norway because of reunification. For regional metropolises, we find only one significant difference when comparing with immigrants living in the capital city. Males reunified with female immigrants in this area have a significantly higher transfer share than similar individuals living in the capital city. For all four subgroups, we find that living in regional centers with a university yields a significantly lower transfer share than living in the capital city. Immigrants in the four mentioned subgroups living in other regional centers, medium-sized towns and regions and small labor areas have a higher transfer share than those living in the capital city, but in view of how large the data sets are, the significance of the estimated differences cannot be said to be overwhelming compared with the capital city. Looking at the most rural areas, i.e., micro labor areas, we find no significant difference for

male refugees and males who have come to Norway because of family reunification compared to similar individuals living in the capital city. In contrast, for the two corresponding female subgroups we find that the transfer share is significantly lower in these areas than for similar women living in the capital city.

By comparing the effects of regional variables across gender the overall impression is that the effect of not residing in the capital city is smaller among females than males, but 40% of the differences are not statistically significant. Among individuals reunifying with a refugee the difference across gender is larger in smaller areas compared to bigger ones. For refugees the results are more mixed.

For male and female immigrants who have immigrated to Norway because of work, the empirical results related to regionality differ, to some extent, from those found for the four other subgroups related to refugees and reunifications with refugees. For both genders, we find that the transfer share is significantly lower for an individual living in regional metropolises than for a similar individual living in the capital city. In four out of six cases the difference across gender is not statistically significant. For regional centers and medium-sized towns and regions we find, qualitatively, the same types of effects for labor immigrants as for the four other subgroups, but the magnitude of the effects (in absolute values) is generally smaller. For small labor areas, we only find a significant effect for male immigrants. In contrast to male refugees and males who have come to Norway for reunification with female refugees, male immigrants who have immigrated because of work have a significantly smaller transfer share than similar male immigrants living in the capital city.

In total, these findings indicate that there is large heterogeneity in the effects of the regional variables on the transfer rate. Note, however, that the estimates might not reflect causal effects. The effects we find might equally well be associated with selection when it comes to immigrants' choice of residents. If there is systematic variation among different groups of immigrants in their propensity of moving to different areas within the country, this variation might explain our findings.

So far, we have represented land background with world region dummies, where we have divided the world into three parts. However, since we have information on the land background of each immigrant a more detailed analysis is feasible. In the following we only employ data for world region 3 and consider the four subgroups consisting of refugees of both gender and individuals of both gender reunifying with refugees. We employ a specification which resembles the one given by Eq. (1). What is different is that the world region dummies are removed and thereafter the specification is augmented by country dummies for the most important ones when it comes to the number of immigrants that have emigrated to Norway as refugees or for reunification with refugees. The countries we consider are Russia, Ethiopia, Chile, Sri Lanka, Kosovo,⁵ Eritrea, Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Vietnam, Iran, Iraq and Somalia. All other countries are captured by the intercept of the equations to be estimated. The indicated countries represent, for both genders, about 83.3% of the total number of observations for refugees from world region 3. For immigrants reunifying with refugees the shares are, respectively, 69.4 and 76.7% for males and females.

⁵ Kosovo is a disputed territory and partially recognized state in Southeastern Europe that declared independence from Serbia in February 2008 as the Republic of Kosovo.

In **Table 6** we report estimates of country-specific effects using the model specification outlined above. Recall that these estimates must be interpreted relative to the estimated intercepts, which are also reported in **Table 6**. A negative estimate implies that the individuals from the indicated country, on average, has a lower level of transfer share than the reference category, whereas a positive estimate means that the indicated country has a higher transfer

Country	Refugee		Reunifying with refugee	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Constant term	0.356 (46.668)	0.517 (68.712)	0.258 (9.818)	0.547 (45.962)
Russia	-0.023 (-2.719)	-0.032 (-4.039)	0.024 (0.853)	-0.124 (-7.235)
Ethiopia	-0.060 (-7.586)	-0.090 (-11.163)	0.057 (3.383)	-0.112 (-9.400)
Chile	-0.121 (-15.968)	-0.022 (-2.630)	-0.063 (-4.394)	-0.128 (-11.735)
Sri Lanka	-0.157 (-25.403)	-0.085 (-8.588)	-0.073 (-5.527)	-0.128 (-19.659)
Kosovo	-0.081 (-14.112)	0.006 (0.989)	-0.051 (-4.108)	-0.081 (-8.096)
Eritrea	0.048 (8.499)	-0.022 (-3.501)	0.223 (11.471)	-0.020 (-1.605)
Bosnia-Herzeg.	-0.116 (-21.864)	0.054 (7.166)	0.032 (2.312)	0.066 (7.991)
Afghanistan	-0.105 (-20.139)	-0.094 (-17.716)	-0.100 (-6.364)	-0.183 (-15.521)
Vietnam	-0.085 (-14.618)	-0.038 (-5.933)	-0.041 (-3.720)	-0.162 (-23.576)
Iran	0.005 (1.075)	0.027 (4.758)	0.055 (4.074)	-0.066 (-8.562)
Iraq	-0.008 (-1.952)	0.092 (15.825)	0.085 (9.153)	0.051 (9.142)
Somalia	0.071 (16.074)	0.093 (18.739)	0.257 (30.741)	0.103 (15.943)
No. of obs.	624,202	82,022	382,902	216,972

^a*t*-values in parentheses. The models also include controls for age, duration of stay, family composition, educational attainment level, educational enrolment, area of geographic residence in Norway and year dummies.

Table 6. Estimates of country-specific effects in transfer share equations using data from world region 3.^a

level than the reference category when controlling for differences in observed characteristics and random effects. If one for instance look at male refugees we find that immigrants from Somalia have 7% point higher transfer share than the reference category when one controls for observed characteristics and with random effects set to zero. Besides Somalia, there is one more country with a significant positive estimate of the country effect among men, namely Eritrea. Looking at female refugees, the countries with significant positive estimated country effects are in descending order Somalia, Iraq, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iran. It is natural to associate these results with cultural factors, since it is well known that women in these countries have low participation rates in the labor market. Also for males emigrating to Norway for reunification with female refugees, Somalia and Eritrea are the two countries with the highest estimated country effects. Other countries with positive and significant country effects are in descending order Iraq, Ethiopia, Iran and Bosnia- Herzegovina. Finally, we consider female immigrants reunifying with male immigrants. For this subgroup, there are three countries with positive and significant estimated country effects. These are in descending order Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq.

5. Concluding remarks

We have analyzed the transfer share among non-Nordic immigrants coming to Norway during the period 2000–2014 and how it evolves with duration of stay in Norway and is related to other characteristics of them. For labor immigrants, we find that the transfer share increases with duration of stay, but at a decreasing rate. This means that while labor immigrants have low transfer shares during their first years in Norway, there is an increase in the transfer share as duration of stay increases. A possible explanation for this finding is that there is a selection effect going on when the labor immigrants come to Norway for the first time as only the healthy immigrants come to Norway for work. Refugees on the other hand, have a high transfer share initially, but after having spent some time in Norway, they become more integrated into the society and the labor market, and then the transfer share is being reduced. For both labor immigrants and refugees the integration process with respect to the transfer share seems to be quite similar for men and women as we do not find any important differences across gender in the effect of increased duration of stay.

A special feature of our data is that we can identify persons reunifying with a refugee. This group of immigrants has the same pattern with respect to duration of stay as refugees. As duration of stay increases, there is a decrease in the transfer share, and the reduction is larger among female immigrants compared to males. Having a partner, reduces the transfer share both for refugees and immigrants reunifying with a refugee, while the effect is smaller but of the same sign for labor immigrants.

Our model specifications implicitly assume that the parameters reflecting the effects of the covariates are constant over time. If there are significant changes in the labor market or in the social security system, this assumption might not hold. In Norway, there was a change in the social security system as of 2010. This year three different transfers related to rehabilitation, vocational training and a duration constrained disability benefit were replaced by one single

transfer, i.e., the work assessment allowance. The reform was introduced to reduce welfare dependency and increase labor market participation. It is not clear to us whether this change implied a change in the transfers towards the groups we are analyzing, but it is well known that the outflow from the work assessment program has been slower than assumed initially when the arrangement was introduced.

A common feature of many analyses of welfare dependency and self-support is that the unit of analysis is the individual and not the family. Many immigrants are from countries with a much more unequal division of household work and market work between husband and wife than what is the case in Norway and many other European countries. In this case, we would expect to find a small transfer share for the family member in paid work and a larger share for the family member involved in household work. Due to lack of income from paid work, the transfer share might be quite large even if the transfer level is quite low for this individual, who is often a woman. Then the transfer share is not a good measure of self-support as many women caring for their family are supported by their male partner. This problem calls for studies of self-support that treat the family as the relevant unit of analysis. From an empirical point of view there are, however, several issues related to this type of analysis. Most importantly, it requires data about family formation and other types of data for both family members. Another issue is that the family is a dynamic arrangement involving family formation and family dissolution. This issue complicates analyses of self-support at the family level as the family unit may change over time.

Acknowledgements

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Appendix A

See Tables 7–10.

Vectors of explanatory variables	A description of the content of the vectors in the text column
C_t	Year dummies for each of the years from 2001 to 2014. Altogether 14 variables. The binary variable for year t is 1 if the observation is from year t , otherwise zero. ^a
B_i	Two dummies for word regions 2 and 3, respectively. The dummy for world region j is 1 if the individual is from area j , otherwise zero. ^b
D_{it}	The vector contains three variables. The first (integer) variable is, simply, the age of individual i in year t . The second (integer) variable is the duration of stay for individual i in year t . The third variable is the square of the second variable divided by 100.
F_{it}	The vector contains four variables, whereof the first three are integer variables and the last one a binary variable. The first three contain information on the number of children aged, respectively, 0–3 years, 4–6 years and 7–18 years. The last variable takes the value 1 if the individual has a partner, otherwise zero.

Vectors of explanatory variables	A description of the content of the vectors in the text column
E_{it}	There are nine dummy variables related to education. The first eight of them are related to what is the individual's highest level of completed education. The following classification is employed: (1) Primary education, (2) Lower secondary education, (3) Upper secondary, basic education, (4) Upper secondary, final year education, (5) First stage of higher education, undergraduate level, (6) First stage of higher education, graduate level, (7). Second stage of higher education (postgraduate education) and (8) Unspecified education. If individual i in year t has primary education as the highest completed education, the dummy variable for Primary education will be 1, whereas all other seven dummy variables will be zero. Other constellations are defined in an analogous way. ^c The ninth dummy variable takes the value 1 if the individual is enrolled in education, and otherwise zero.
R_{it}	There are six dummy variables related to regions, where the individuals reside. The following classification is employed: (1) Regional metropolises, (2) Regional centers with a university, (3) Other regional centers, (4) Medium-sized towns and regions, (5) Small labor areas and (6) Micro labor areas. If individual i in year t resides in a regional metropolis the dummy variable for Regional metropolises takes the value 1, whereas all the other regional dummy variables take the value 0. Other constellations are defined in an analogous way. ^d

^aThe dummy variable for the year 2000 has been omitted to avoid perfect co-linearity.

^bThe dummy variable for area 1 has been omitted to avoid perfect co-linearity.

^cThe dummy variable for those with zero education has been omitted to avoid perfect co-linearity.

^dThe dummy variable for those residing in the capital city has been omitted to avoid perfect co-linearity.

Table 7. An overview of the right-hand observed variables.

Period/Statistics	Type of immigrant					
	Work		Refugee		Reunifying with refugee	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
2000–2004						
Mean	0.054	0.091	0.363	0.500	0.321	0.555
Std. dev.	0.184	0.218	0.419	0.418	0.403	0.417
First quartile	0	0	0	0.082	0	0.110
Second quartile	0	0	0.109	0.400	0.066	0.581
Third quartile	0	0.060	0.886	0.999	0.730	1
2005–2009						
Mean	0.060	0.077	0.357	0.500	0.265	0.526
Std. dev.	0.168	0.199	0.425	0.430	0.384	0.427
First quartile	0	0	0	0.058	0	0.081
Second quartile	0	0	0.068	0.412	0	0.476
Third quartile	0.031	0.050	0.903	0.999	0.487	0.999

Period/Statistics	Type of immigrant					
	Work		Refugee		Reunifying with refugee	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
2010–2014						
Mean	0.087	0.121	0.402	0.522	0.304	0.514
Std. dev.	0.212	0.255	0.441	0.438	0.407	0.432
First quartile	0	0	0	0.048	0	0.065
Second quartile	0	0	0.130	0.522	0.019	0.451
Third quartile	0.053	0.081	0.985	1	0.705	1

Table 8. Summary statistics for the transfer share variable.

Variables and measures	Type of immigrant					
	Work		Refugee		Reunifying with refugee	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Mean duration of stay in years						
2000–2004	4.148	3.807	10.168	10.047	8.223	6.958
2005–2009	3.196	3.655	12.391	12.270	9.730	8.812
2010–2014	4.088	3.919	14.211	13.974	12.344	11.318
Mean no. of children 2000–2014						
Aged 0–3 years	0.108	0.238	0.208	0.263	0.267	0.465
Aged 4–6 years	0.068	0.095	0.157	0.199	0.155	0.314
Aged 7–18 years	0.171	0.229	0.574	0.810	0.347	0.858
Share having a partner 2000–2014	0.277	0.310	0.507	0.480	0.457	0.716
Share of educational categ. 2000–2014						
No education	0.003	0.002	0.026	0.055	0.012	0.033
Primary education	0.003	0.002	0.070	0.077	0.024	0.038
Lower secondary education	0.084	0.061	0.296	0.301	0.395	0.312
Upper secondary, basic education	0.029	0.018	0.044	0.035	0.025	0.033
Upper secondary, final year	0.252	0.165	0.235	0.240	0.211	0.190
Post-secondary, not higher education	0.001	0.002	0.017	0.009	0.009	0.005
First stage of higher edu., undergraduate level	0.129	0.263	0.180	0.164	0.101	0.121

Variables and measures	Type of immigrant					
	Work		Refugee		Reunifying with refugee	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
First stage of higher edu., graduate level	0.092	0.176	0.059	0.041	0.030	0.025
Sec. stage of higher edu., postgraduate education	0.031	0.036	0.005	0.003	0.003	0.002
Unspecified education	0.375	0.275	0.068	0.076	0.190	0.241
Share of geographical area 2000–2014						
Capital city	0.307	0.324	0.413	0.393	0.483	0.501
Regional metropolises	0.236	0.218	0.162	0.158	0.172	0.151
Reg. centers with a univers.	0.013	0.019	0.008	0.006	0.007	0.004
Other regional centers	0.229	0.209	0.252	0.269	0.221	0.221
Med.-sized towns and reg.	0.061	0.058	0.062	0.068	0.049	0.049
Small labor areas	0.055	0.054	0.040	0.043	0.028	0.032
Micro labor areas	0.099	0.118	0.064	0.061	0.040	0.042

Table 9. Summary statistics for selected explanatory variables.

Measure	Work		Refugee		Reunifying with refugee	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Variance of random effects	0.0131	0.0226	0.0841	0.0722	0.0708	0.0679
Variance of genuine error term	0.0262	0.0297	0.0753	0.0621	0.0719	0.0730
Variance ratio	0.5000	0.7609	1.1169	1.1626	0.9847	0.9301

Table 10. Estimates of variance parameters in random effects model for transfer share.

Author details

Tom Kornstad and Terje Skjerpen*

*Address all correspondence to: terje.skjerpen@ssb.no

Statistics Norway, Research Department, Oslo, Norway

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The Directions and Socio-Economic Effects of the External Migration from the Romanian Countryside

Alexandru Șerban Zodian and
Maria Claudia Diaconeasa

Additional information is available at the end of the chapter

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Abstract

Against the backdrop of socio-economic phenomena in the post-communist era, as a risk management strategy, a true culture of migration toward the developed West has emerged in Romania. This study will explore the particularities of external migration in the rural areas. The main objective is to find what are the most important socio-economic phenomena that shaped the Romanian rural society. The methodology includes a vast documentary, quantitative, and statistical research. The rural areas have a very low quality of life: 5 in 10 people work in agriculture, which only contributes 4% to the GDP. The main beneficiary countries are Italy and Spain. Temporary migration provides a context for social learning. The most worrying effects are physicians' exodus, family abandonment and breakdown, forced modernization of rural areas, dropout rate, and youth exodus. There is a trend toward feminization of migration, due to a lack of opportunities home. Few migrants return home; 4 out of 10 people want to emigrate and 9 out of 10 know somebody abroad, half have relatives there. Authorities need to take measures at the macro, mezzo, and micro levels to slow down the emigration rate (organization of (re)qualification courses, investments in infrastructure, education and health, supporting medium-sized farms, and cooperatives).

Keywords: rural migration, regional impact, migration directions, migration effects, Romania

1. Introduction

The current chapter comes as a necessity for the better understanding of the phenomena that are underpinning migration from one of the medium to large countries in the European Union (EU), Romania.

Coming from the Eastern European Block, with an accentuated lagging behind in structural reforms and development, compared to West European countries, and with a tumultuous recent history, caused by the reminiscences of the communist regime that lasted from 1948 until 1989, and the mistakes made by the democratic system that came after, Romania's international migration is one of the most complex population movements in the EU, exporting, especially from rural areas, unqualified workforce, and, mostly, specialists from the more developed urban localities.

From a geographical point of view, Romania has a predominantly rural outline, and 46.2% of the population is living in the countryside [1]. The structure of property in the rural area has gone through several profound changes that have managed to hinder its natural course of development. Changes such as forced collectivization, forced industrialization and urbanization, and an abrupt twist of those processes through retrocession of private property to its legitimate owners, without any consideration for the effects on the national economy, has left the population in this area confused, facing major existential fears for tomorrow, on account of the difficulties of making a living from the small number of products generated by performing agriculture on small plots of land.

In this case, searching for a better life elsewhere is a natural consequence that could be addressed through a series of national policies, including investments in the rural infrastructure, in education, and social services. These directions or policies are included in the national development plans for the rural area, and since 2000 they have been financed through European funding, based on development project requests. Nevertheless, the post-communist evolution of the Romanian rural areas has not been remarkable. Most of the rural population, 53% (4.1 million people) still works in agriculture—or the “Cinderella of the economy” [2]—whose contribution to the GDP is only 4% [3]. These workers have little perspective, considering that the EU-funded projects are mostly addressed to educated people, who can implement specific measures, therefore making these programs unattractive for most of the rural population.

While international migration to other EU countries has become the solution for quality of life improvement for many rural inhabitants, its effects on the origin society are both positive and negative. The main objective of this study is to identify the most important socio-economic phenomena that shaped the Romanian rural society in the last 20 years.

The secondary objectives of this study are: to describe the particularities of the Romanian countryside; to evaluate the Romanian strategy for rural development, and to discover to what extent the National Rural Development Program (NRDP) may reach its goals; to describe the main directions of the Romanian international migration from rural areas; to analyze the main socio-economic effects of migration in the countryside; to determine Romanians' attitude toward emigration; to identify the regions, genders, and age groups that are more vulnerable to migration push-pull factors; and to determine the main reasons for the feminization tendency of external migration.

2. The social and economic framework of the post-communist Romanian rural area

As a member of the European Union since January 1, 2007, in Romania, the rural area is defined as all areas outside urban clusters, according to the Eurostat database. Romania fits into the NUTS 3 regional classification with 67.8% or 161,678 km² of its territory being predominantly rural, 29.4% or 70,127 km² being intermediate, and only 2.8% or 6587 km² being predominantly urban, according to the CAP context indicators.

The Romanian Statistics Institute considers the village as the basic territorial unit and the commune as a gathering of villages, and the two describe the rural area. In this case, Romania has a total of 12,957 villages reunited around 2861 communes.

Defining the rural area has always been a challenge, researchers around the world having different understandings of it, and moreover, each person has their own view of the rural area. Agriculture, as a basic economic activity of this area, lays a common ground for everyone. Surely, one may say that the rural areas are where agriculture is the predominant economic activity of the population.

Since they occupy a significant proportion of the EU territory, rural areas stand today as a central piece in the European discussions regarding sustainable development, and Romania is one of the main actors. The 2020 Strategy and The National Rural Development Program consider rural areas as the main resource providers for the industry and for ensuring the food security of the Union. Even more, institutions such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) amplifies this expectation, emphasizing the need for agriculture to develop to help eradicate the extreme poverty, or to provide food security around the globe [4]. In this context, we must ask ourselves if the Romanian rural areas are ready to meet these intentions, considering the difficult changes it has already been through, which have left serious psychological and economic scars.

While in general, rural areas are known for their traditionalism, in Romania they have been greatly shaped and reshaped, in no longer than 70 years, through the profound changes generated by forced collectivization, industrialization and intense urbanization, retrocession of agricultural lands to their legal owners after 1990, people's return to pre-industrial activities, the destruction (deindustrialization) of the former communist economy, and the massive external migration enhanced by the 2007 EU adherence. On the other hand, there are also voices saying that the situation of the Romanian rural areas has remained the same for the last 25 years because people remain reluctant to trusting the authorities, and prefer to work on their own, rather than in groups or cooperatives.

After imposing the forced collectivization, by creating communist cooperative structures and state enterprises that hired, and oppressed, more than 3 million people (28.9% of the working population at that time), the philosophy of the Romanian leaders was to destroy the family farm,

a structure that had survived through times, and ensured the families with food, because this meant that the last resource of the peasants would disappear, and they would finally accept their faith. To build factories, power plants, and other urban structures in the villages, the regime created blocks of small flats around them and populated them with workers. The agricultural lands no longer belonging to their owners, but to the state, and the former owners were forced to work without pay in the new oppressive structures. Șandru, in Dobrinicu and Iordachi [5] and Popescu [6] underline that 80% of the agricultural areas were collectivized by 1962.

Even if the economic intentions were theoretically correct—the Romanian industry grew by 545% [7]—this policy has failed and has hurt millions of people. In a few numbers, it meant leaving 697 villages with no more than 50 inhabitants, killing 800,000 horses, advanced soil erosion, diminishing an ancestral occupation as sheep herding, the loss of interest in agricultural activities, dramatic changes in the family structure, and the loss of rural hierarchy.

From an 80% population living in rural areas prior to communism, in 1990, when that period had ended, 45.7% of the population lived in urban areas, mainly as a result of a false urbanization process, proved by the fact that after the falling of the regime, these areas have turned into hybrids. The people living in former industrial worker flats are now raising animals and crops in small plots around the building, and the industrial mammoths serve as a source of iron and other construction materials.

In the past 10 years, the National Institute of Statistics has recorded little variation in the rural population share; in 2017, after a constant drop in absolute numbers, 46% of the population, which means more than 9 million people, still lives in rural areas [1].

It is obvious now why the rural population is still reluctant in trusting the state or the authorities, many of them having lived the communist times and having experienced the psychological trauma. Even more, the same attitude is passed down to their children, raised to avoid working with other people as much as they can.

In a previous study by the authors on this topic, with a sample of 249 respondents, relevant for the rural population with Internet access, from the 21.3% who are farmers, 5 out of 10 prefer an individual work form, and only 1 out of 10 works in an associative form, while 3 out of 10 do not have any legal work form, and the rest preferring other types of work.

The communist period is not the only one that contributed to the current state of the Romanian rural area. The policies issued after the fall of the communist regime have the same importance. What was called the economic restructuring of Romania has turned out to be a chaotic fight for keeping more of the loot. Returning the agricultural lands to the rightful owners or their children was made with no economic principles in thought, by Law 18/1991. As a result, a massive migration from urban to rural and a massive land fragmentation ensued. More than 3.4 million people were working in agriculture in 1992. The difference is that the organized and forced agriculture with significant productions was turned into subsistence farming with millions of new landowners and farm managers with no formal training.

The primary economy is formed out of agriculture, forestry, and fishing, which are economic activities that predominate in the rural areas, rather than the urban.

While the total occupied population register a drop in the last 10 years of 1.5 million persons, the rate of occupation in agriculture is still at the highest level in the EU (no other member country registers such a phenomenon). There has been an obvious decrease since the year 2000. About 27% of the occupied population in Romania works in agriculture, most of that percentage being represented by subsistence or small farm owners and not by salaried workers.

The general trend is a decrease in agricultural workforce and an increase in service related areas.

After 2000, a clear increase became visible in the service economy, and this is natural since services like insurance or consultancy have turned out to be a profitable business. Even so, the agriculture-based economy has kept on a relatively steady course, hiring more of one-quarter of the occupied population.

In the last 27 years, the Romanian agriculture went from a statist system which gave significant economic results to the practice of subsistence agriculture in over half of the arable land area, which left millions of farms with very low production, and so with low economic performance, while the European countries were already on a different path, one of competitiveness and sustainability.

Another problem that occurred after the regime change was migration. If during the communist period it was almost impossible to leave the country, after 1990, people had more freedom to visit or work in another country. This phenomenon has slowly turned into a western fear of invasion from the east.

Meanwhile, in the EU, the Common Agricultural Policy appeared. When World War II ended, a series of measures were structured that aimed at stimulating agricultural production and at regaining food security in the EU through its main actors, the farmers. The measure of guaranteeing a minimum price at the farm gate [8] had unexpected results, leading to overproduction, especially when the members' number started to grow. In 1992 that measure was replaced with encouraging the retirement of older farmers for a pension and their replacement by younger ones [9].

These actions also had adverse effects such as differences in regional development, environmental pollution caused by intense agricultural activities [10], and population migration from less developed areas to more developed ones [11].

Acknowledging the adverse effects led to the EU's 2000 Agenda [12], a new document with measures for supporting sustainable agriculture, reducing the regional gaps, and social cohesion. The Common Agricultural Policy was then split into two pillars. First, regarding direct payments to farmers, remaining on the economic side, and second, regarding rural development (European Parliament, 2016) with a clear turn to the social life of the rural area. Since 2000 (the year when this split took place), the financial measures included in the second pillar have not changed much.

Investing in the rural area from national funds was not a priority since funding was given by the EU through the SAPARD program. The SAPARD program was implemented in the

2000–2006 period and had the role of preparing farmers for the competitive European market. It was structured on the same basis as the National Rural Development Programs destined for the EU members, having 4 priority Axes and 10 action measures, plus the technical assistance measure.

The four Axes split into two significant development areas: the first referred to enhancing the productive capacity of local producers—through Axes 1 and 3; and the second, to increasing the quality of life in rural areas—through Axes 2 and 4.

Axis 3 intended to increase the number of rural jobs, while Axis 1 had measures of increasing product quality, and Axis 4 of increasing human resources quality. Axis 2 aimed, more than 15 years ago, at solving or diminishing several rural area problems like transportation, sewage infrastructure, and educational infrastructure, however, these problems are still present. The evaluation of this Program exposed a long series of challenges regarding the inefficient fund use [13]. Still, few or no measures of liability were taken afterward.

The assumption of unrealistic objectives caused by the lack of a rigorous analysis of the situation before implementing the program resulted in 9 years of reckless use of funds (the funding continued until 2009). The increase of rural jobs after the implementation of SAPARD projects was only 1.8% with an approximate cost of 18,500 euro/job created according to the Ex-post Evaluation [13].

Considering that the funding also aimed at reducing the possible number of Romanian rural migrants who were supposed to invade the developed EU countries once the borders were free, in 2007, the SAPARD evaluation (2011) mentions it could not stop the migration “exodus”, but it contributed to a limitation of the trend. During its implementation, the number of people from rural areas who chose to leave Romania for another country increased by 5.2%.

After 2007, when Romania earned full member rights in the EU, the National Rural Development Program was implemented for the 2007–2013 period. The priority axes remained the same as in the SAPARD program. Unlike the first program, an evaluation of the rural area was made to set realistic development targets. Therefore, in the expected results chapter of the 2007–2013 program, the phrase “in the next decade, it is estimated that the number of migrant workers will register a certain decrease, due to the certain and progressive development of the Romanian economy, which will offer more job opportunities and individual performance” is stated. The external evaluation of the program, at the end of the implementation period, registered minimum achievements, such as a 1% increase of jobs in the secondary and tertiary economy. An independent study [14] with the purpose of evaluating the most accessed measure in the program, 112—*Installing young farmers*, states that most of the questioned farmers consider the measure as an aid for remaining in their homelands instead of migrating. Even so, the measure had little impact since the maximum amount was 40,000 euro/unit, a small amount of starting a competitive farm.

The general state of education and formal training in the Romanian rural environment supported the preference for accessing measures such as the installation of young farmers and the financing of subsistence farms, which required fewer responsibilities from their beneficiaries, but which yielded little structural gains.

For the current funding period, 2014–2020, Romania has 15 active measures out of which knowledge transfer and agricultural cooperation are central interests. These are basic development agents for each community. The funding for subsistence farms disappears. The new version of the Program assumes the fact that farmers have learned how to respond to market demands and develop their business, but low training and skill levels are omitted, an omission that can prove to be vital at the end of the period.

Looking at statistical trends, the labor input in agriculture has followed the same path as the EU (28) average in the last 10 years.

Even if the total labor input in the agricultural sector is descending, as it is in the EU, reported to the total employment, Romania has the highest rate of people working in agriculture out of all EU members: 27%, while the EU average stands at 4.2% [15]. While the EU (28) average of annual work units in agriculture is 335,370 in 2016, in Romania it is almost four times higher after a steep decrease.

Considering that at the last census approx. 3,629,660 farms were registered in Romania, the difference between the salaried and the non-salaried must be known. The last 10 years show a 9% increase in salaried workforce. The clear majority (more than 80%) of the annual work units in Romanian agriculture are non-salaried, either working on subsistence farms in which they are associated to the farm manager, or being day laborers, without a legal employment form. These are people not bound to their homelands—on the contrary, it is likely for them to leave the rural areas, or even the country, searching for better payment and implicitly a better life. Moreover, how could it be different when the average income for the Romanian farmer is 4000 euro/year while the EU farmer earns around 120,000 euro/year?

Could these 81% non-salaried agricultural workers get another job in rural areas? Not really, a study of Diaconeasa and Chirculescu [16] shows that the employability level, based on six basic factors—as considered by Cohen [17]—education and training, personal development, family, financial stability, health and the inheritance of these workers, is very low and without serious investment in the education, transportation, and health systems they will not be able to get a salaried job in another field other than agriculture. Since the educational infrastructure is very poor, most high schools being in the urban area, it implies additional costs for a person living in the rural area to pursue a better education; moreover, there are no universities in the rural area. In this case, it is tough for a young person living in the rural areas to study for a better job.

More on this, the EU Skills Panorama [18] predicts an increase in the knowledge demands for the agricultural workers by 2025 and a drop of almost 13% in the rate of occupation in agriculture, so basically, the farm workers will have to be well prepared, and that will cause a severe loss of jobs in this area, which will cause new migration waves if no national investment is made soon in the education, transportation, and health infrastructures.

The average size of the Romanian farm is of 3.6 hectares of utilized agricultural area, 12.5 hectares less than the average EU farm, as the CAP context indicators register. The same statistical indicators show a remarkable difference in the farm manager's formal training. In the EU, practical experience is essential for 69.8% of the farmers, 20.2% have basic training, and

8.5% have full agricultural training. In Romania 96.4% of the farmers rely on practical experience, 3.1% have basic training, and only 0.5% have full agricultural training. In this case, the possibility of producing high-quality crops and animal products is very low.

As the costs for supporting a small farm are sometimes higher than the incomes, farmers have little options for investing in enlarging the farm or for investing in their education to produce better crops, therefore their choices are limited. Either they struggle in this situation or they leave the country for a few years, working for western farms where they have a double advantage: first of saving some money and second, of learning new techniques and agricultural practices, basically trying an empirical form of tacit knowledge transfer. Even if that is not the case for all the possible rural migrants, it is close to the story they leave with.

3. The latest directions of the international migration of human resources in the rural areas of Romania

As a general rule, migration flows from regions with high natural growth and low economic, and social development are moving toward regions with low natural growth and high level of socio-economic development.

3.1. Internal migration

Domestic migration, through the change of environment, revolved post-1990 around a predominantly urban to rural route. The domestic exchange rates have been in the past few years about 4% higher for migration from cities to communes, than for the reverse. This population movement trend is explained by the development of residential areas, which are situated in the rural areas near urban localities and are characterized by a high living standard.

3.2. External migration

The stages and characteristics of the post-December Romanian international migration are:

1. 1990–1993: massive deindustrialization, privatization, social and political instability; emigration has an ethnic character; emigrants are male in search of political asylum, because of the violent events of the 1990s; Germany, Hungary, France, and Belgium were the main destinations.
2. 1994–1996: massive deindustrialization, privatization, social and political instability, regional instability; migration for work and study is at an early stage; Hungary, Israel and Turkey are the main destinations.
3. 1997–2001: massive deindustrialization, privatization, social and political instability, the alternation of government, the Asian financial crisis (1997); trafficking, circular and illegal migration are higher; working agreements are signed with Germany, and Spain, Hungary, Italy, Spain, and Ireland are the main destinations.

4. 2002–2006: the right to free movement in the EEA, the labor migration of low-skilled people is intensifying toward Italy, and Spain, those with higher qualifications are heading to France, the United Kingdom or Germany, Italy and Spain are the main destinations.
5. 2007–present: Romania's accession to the EU, the economic and financial crisis of 2008, austerity measures adopted by the Government, economic recovery in recent years, feminization of migration; Italy and Spain are the main destinations, and after the crisis the UK becomes one of the most desirable destinations in 2015.

3.2.1. *Definitive migration*

In 2015, the main destinations were the UK, Italy, Spain, Germany, Belgium, Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, France, and Sweden. The latest data from NIS certify that the total number of permanent emigrants, between 2010 and 2015, with an annual average of 181,000 emigrants, decreased in 2012 and 2013 and increased in 2014 and 2015, but without reaching the 2010 departure figures.

From a numerical (not weighted) perspective, between 1991 and 2015, the feminization of emigration at the national level can be noticed. The peaks are in the years 1995, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2010, 2013. For men, a more significant decrease is registered in the 2006–2010 period.

The age group distribution of the external migration in the 2010–2015 period, once again, reveals that most people who are leaving are young, but there is also a slight increase in the outflow of people over 45 years of age.

3.2.2. *Temporary migration*

Between 2009 and 2014, as a result of the economic crisis, we are dealing with a feminization of temporary rural external migration. From 2015, this trend stopped. Regarding the share of regions in the total temporary rural migration, between 2012 and 2015, there are very small fluctuations from year to year. In 2015, 13.4% of the total number of temporary emigrants left from the North-West Region, 11.2% from the Central Region, 20.1% from the North-East Region, 12.9% from the South-East Region, from South-Muntenia 20.2%, from Bucharest-Ilfov Region 2.4%, from South-West Oltenia 12%, and from the West Region 7.6%.

Regarding the share of each age group from the total temporary external migration, between 2012 and 2015, we notice that: those aged 15–24 represent between 27.3 and 24.2% of the total circulating migrants; the 24–34 segment between 31.3 and 42.2%; those aged 35–44 between 20.8 and 19.5%; those over 45 years between 20.5 and 14.1%. We highlight the increase in the 24–34 age group and the decrease of those over 45 in 2015.

On the other hand, we note the existence of a negative balance of migration, between 2010 and 2015, with the deficit ranging from 48,100 in 2010 to 57,932 in 2015. The situation is extremely unbalanced at the level of entry and exit of men and women: there is a loss of 47,923 women in 2010 and 31,952 women in 2015. The external contribution of men in 2012 and 2013 has not been able to fully balance the deficit caused by the feminization of emigration. However, the latest figures in 2015 show a rebalancing of external migration by gender. Given that external

female migration is more damaging than male migration at the family level, promoting measures to create attractive career opportunities for women could slow down their exodus, knowing that women in rural areas who leave work for the very first time abroad, which highlights the lack of jobs for them in the country.

4. Field research: the push-pull factors of the Romanian rural migration

In the context of the massive external migration analysis of the 1990s, both socio-economic causes and geographic neighborhoods or the development of social networks are important.

The push and pull migration factors can be divided into: (a) socio-economic (places and working conditions, salary levels, and remittances); (b) policies (legislative framework, ethnic, cultural, religious persecution, or wars); (c) environmental (climate change); (d) ethnic (linguistic, employment facilitation and expansion of social capital, access to citizenship and rights, and other opportunities); (e) cultural (migration takes place between countries with a similar or related cultural identity).

1. Method: Sociological inquiry
2. Technique: Self-administered questionnaire
3. Objective: Push-pull factor analysis; migration network analysis
4. Main research questions: (A) What are the main directions of labor migration in Romanian rural areas? (B) What are the main socio-economic effects of labor migration in Romanian rural areas? (C) What is the influence of demographic variables on the intensity of the push and pull factors? (D) What are the preferred means of communication within migration networks? (E) What is the respondents' attitude toward migration? (F) What is the attitude of the interviewees on the effects of migration?
5. Population: Residents of rural areas in Romania
6. Sample: A representative sample at the national level for rural residents with Internet access; the volume of the sample was 249 persons, over 18 years of age. The sample error is $\pm 6\%$ with a 95% level of confidence.
7. Sampling technique: The sample was established in a non-aleatory manner using quotas; 75% of respondents come from the Research Romania panel, while the rest responded to our Facebook and Google AdWords advertising campaigns; Weighting of the final results on the population distribution at the national level in the rural areas by gender, region, and age.
8. Findings
 - (8.1) The main European Economic Area (EEA) destinations are (in the order of importance given by the respondents): Italy, Spain, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Austria, Portugal, Belgium, Finland, Slovenia, Iceland, Cyprus, Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, Hungary, Ireland, Sweden, Malta, Poland, and Estonia.

(8.2) The most developed countries in the EEA are in respondents' perception (in the order of their preference): Germany, Austria, The United Kingdom, France, Italy, Norway, Spain, Denmark, Holland, Sweden, Liechtenstein, Portugal, Croatia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Estonia, The Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Greece, and Latvia.

(8.3) In **Table 1**, we notice that most respondents feel that emigrants' families live better due remittances, while transnational families, with children, face-specific difficulties managing the day-to-day family life. Also, depending on remittances can be a problem, since people who benefit from them directly tend not to work (some even receive social aid on top). The effects of emigration in the origin society are also quite visible to our respondents (5 from 10 versus 2 from 10). Also, 4 out of 10 people (versus 2 out of 10) agree that emigration influenced knowledge, habits, principles and values, beliefs and the social order.

(8.4) The intensity of the push-pull factors can vary depending on demographic variables. Our data (**Figure 1**) suggest they are more powerful for people living in the South-West, South, and South-East development regions, rather than those living in Bucharest-Ilfov and West. Furthermore, they have a more noticeable influence on women, than on men, because of the rural patriarchal society, and the evolution of the labor market after the 2008 Crisis. Regarding the group ages, 18–25, 26–35, and 46–55 are more prone to being affected, while 55+, and 36–45 are a little less. Education also plays a role, respondents with superior studies being less vulnerable than those who only have high school or gymnasium education. While

What are the most important effects of emigration in your hometown?	Agreement (%)	Neutrality (%)	Disagreement (%)
Life conditions have improved for emigrant families	74	21	5
Children of transnational families encounter specific problems	71	17	12
Many families have become dependent on financial remittances	68	22	10
The population of the home town has fallen	54	24	22
Many families are living apart due emigration	51	28	21
Emigration has influenced knowledge, habits, principles/values, beliefs, the order in society in your locality	43	32	25
The number of jobs has dropped in the locality of origin	39	35	26
Town home economy suffers from a lack of skilled labor force due to emigration	32	34	34
Health services have worsened	30	37	33
The economy of the home town has improved due to financial remittances	29	36	35
Overall it is good for the locality of origin that many people emigrated	26	37	37
Emigrants and/or their families have opened businesses in their home town	22	36	42
Those who have an emigrant or their families have helped improve the infrastructure in their home town	11	27	62

Table 1. Effects of emigration on the origin society.




Figure 1. Intensity of push-pull factors in relation to demographic variables.

we measure the push-pull factors together, it is important to notice that their effects are not equal, for instance, people from South-West are most affected by push factors (72 out of 100 in intensity), while being only moderately attracted by the presumed benefits of the destination countries (62 out of 100 in intensity). Of course, this can be explained through geographical vicinity and the availability of migration networks.

(8.5) To communicate with their friends and family from abroad, our respondents use (in the order of importance given by the respondents): phone, Facebook, Email, WhatsApp, SMS, face to face, and blogs. Nine out of 10 know people live abroad, 5 out of 10 have family there, and 9 out of 10 communicate with their family or acquaintances.

(8.6) In terms of their feelings toward migration, in the order of importance given by them, respondents believe that: young people emigrate, migration brings prosperity, the effects are negative for the origin country, migration networks are essential for a successful migration, emigrants become more respected in their communities, there are no attractive economic opportunities in the source country.

(8.7) Regarding their migration historic, 3 out of 10 study participants took part in internal migration, 2 out of 10 in international migration, and 3 out of 10 have tried to emigrate, but without managing to. Most failed projects occur when it comes to migration toward Germany, Spain, France, and Italy, and the main reason is of financial nature.

(8.8) With respect to the intention of migrating, 42% wish to emigrate, and 20% have taken concrete steps toward their goal.

(8.9) On the topic of migration return, 7 out of 10 respondents know migrants who came back (on average they know 6 people that returned). Six out of 10 know a returned migrant who opened a business in their village (on average the respondents know 2 such people). Most return to reunite with their significant others, and to take care of their children.

9. Limitations: Our sample is representative only of the people with Internet access (around 60% in rural areas in Romania). The educational profile of our respondents is not representative of the rural population.
10. Conclusions: The impact of migration on rural labor is considerable, both on a quantitative and on a qualitative level. The lack of jobs and opportunities for professional development in the country and the possibility of earning money abroad remain the main motivations of emigration.

Most worrying is the emergence of an emigration culture in the most vulnerable areas and social groups.

Migration is for our respondents a risk management strategy.

Social networks are catalyzers of migration.

The data underline the importance of entrepreneurship of returning migrants, even if this is rare.

Children of transnational families who have remained home encounter specific problems (educational, emotional, and behavioral), which the authorities must address with greater conviction.

The results of the push-pull factors analysis need to be further researched to counter their influence in the most affected areas and groups. The authorities need to adjust the migration policy to address the causes. Also, more attention needs to be paid to immigration, which can be a solution for the lack of workforce in the country.

5. Socio-economic effects of the Romanian rural migration on the origin society

The effects of the migration phenomenon occur as soon as it begins to manifest itself. They can have positive or negative meanings and they can be felt on the long, medium, or short term. Identifying and analyzing the effects of migration can raise several issues. Communities of origin are developing because a large part of the population migrates; therefore migration becomes a means of ensuring not only the survival but the chance of improvement of the migrant's life. Certain communities provide opportunities for local long-term development, job creation and even economic opportunities and investment from migrants. Thus, we can see these effects as changes in the life of the individual, the family, or the migrant group, but also in the life of the community to which it belongs or in which it is to integrate. The adverse effects of migrating highly skilled labor force for the country of origin increase especially when

emigrants have professions that are essential for the economy, affecting the development of the whole society (and not just financially), both on the short and medium term, as well as on the long term. Instead, it is noted that the destination countries of highly qualified professionals have registered substantial economic growth due to the unique creative capacity of the human capital of immigrants.

5.1. Positive effects

The study of the effects of external migration of the workforce on Romanian rural areas has developed over the last few years. Researchers distinguish between short- and medium-term, and long-term effects [22]. In the short term, the labor market in the home country calms down, and remittances help to improve the material state of the population. In the long run, many effects may be negative due to the reduction in the active population, and to the brain drain.

It is estimated that at the beginning of 2000, about 34% of migrants were highly trained. Likewise, almost 30% of Italian emigrants and 24% of Spanish ones had previously had no jobs [22]. By 2015, 52% of migrants held positions requiring specialization and 39% did not have medium or higher education. Interestingly, 25% of Romanian emigrants said they worked illegally; 60% of women working in Italy in the care sector did not have employment contracts (2012).

Petru Dandea, Cartel Alfa trade's union leader, said that more than 3 million employees are no longer working in Romania. If they were planning to return to the country, the unemployment figure would explode. Concerning unemployed, in almost all European countries, young people form the majority, but the number of jobs has been reduced in the EU by delocalization to Asia. Many times, young people prefer to remain unemployed, becoming daydreamers [19]. We note that most Romanians working abroad do not benefit from EURES-guaranteed jobs.

Interestingly, the birth rate of Romanians in the host country is higher than at home [20]. In 2012, the birth rate of Romanians living abroad was 12.5 per 1000 inhabitants, while in Romania it was only 9.3 [21]. In recent years, hundreds of thousands of Romanian children have been born in host countries. "There are two possibilities to fill the gap left by external migration: the economic development of the country, supplemented by demographic policies to encourage birth, and the return of the Romanian emigrants to the country, and to import people from Moldova, the largest source of immigration in Romania, or even from other states outside the European Union," says Prof. Dr. Monica Roman from ASE [20].

5.1.1. Transnational remittances for household support

It is appreciated that emigration, whether temporary, has reduced social tensions in Romania, and especially the over-population in rural areas. Romanian migrants have the right to participate in local elections in EU countries, conclude labor contracts, and hold bank accounts. Transnational remittances are carried out whether migrants intend to remain outside, or have settled there only temporary. There are migrants who have flexible employment contracts in Italy or Spain and other places. In migrants' locality of origin, the financial flow increases, with

local economies monetizing and substantially increasing the consumption outside survival conditions.

Remittances have increased since 2004, amounting to 3.3% of GDP in 2008. These remittances are substantial because they run through both specialized institutions (Western Union, Money Gram) and emigrant networks. A peak of remittances was recorded in 2008 with \$ 9.4 billion [22]. Most financial resources are destined for consumption and only a small part for bank savings. About 50% of consumption is directed toward household needs, 37% for real estate, and 16% for car purchases. Remittances support local development by solving labor market problems and contribute to reducing social inequalities [22].

5.1.2. Private investment strategies and social remittances

After 2002, the construction of houses commissioned by migrants increased. They considered the real estate as safe investments, unfortunately, the market boom between 2005 and 2008, which led to an unsustainable increase in housing prices. Other migrants have invested in tourist locations, in small and medium-sized agricultural exploitations, or agricultural techniques. Family changes are also often recorded. Many times, migrants have had to ascribe a superior place in society and family to women. The critical spirit has also been directed more toward the local authorities.

The population frequently criticizes the state of the roads and the lack of modernization in the localities that are financially dependent on the money transfers from the migrants. At the same time, there are differences in wealth and income between migrants and non-migrants, which often lead to conflicts.

5.1.3. Cultural effects

Temporary migration provided a context for social learning for Romanians, and also strengthened their social confidence and participation in the activities of the civil society. Opinion polls underline the assimilation of modern democratic and constitutional governance values [23].

Work mobility also contributes to lifestyle changes, increased civic engagement, social trust, and tolerance toward minority groups. However, the most powerful cultural influences are by mass media, TV broadcasts, the internet, social networks.

5.1.4. Other effects

After the outbreak of the financial and economic crisis in the US and the EU (2008), some migrants returned to Romania. Part of the 48,000 owners of Italian firms with Romanian titles returned to the country between 2010 and 2014. In 2012, several employees from construction companies in Spain and Italy returned to Romania. Testimony from Romanian worker in Düsseldorf in June 2011 reveals the point of view that situation of the Romania exodus will turn out good when more and more co-nationals will return to the country. At the same time, the results of a sociological survey conducted in 2008 in Madrid, Spain, showed that 42% of the single Romanian migrants would want to return to the country after some years [23].

It is significant that 45% of migrants associated the future of their children with Romania and 24% considered it to be shared between Spain and Romania. Many migrants did not return to the country because they found lower paid jobs than those in the Madrid area. In Italy, some of the workers from foreign construction companies returned to Romania; these firms have often subcontracted works in Romania. Interesting are also the cases of Romanian citizens who bought apartments in the country, with funds from Italy and Spain, in order to rent them.

It seems that the future migration of the Romanians will rely more heavily on the policies of the destination countries. Most migrants have taken their families with them and had or are looking for a job. Residents also have social protection. However, migration will no longer reach the 2001–2008 quota.

At the same time, we note that 2010 saw the return of more than 300,000 Romanian migrants. In 2010, the Spanish Labor Ministry demanded that the unemployed Romanians return to the country to avoid long-term retention in the labor shortage. Of the 900,000 Romanians, only 237,054 contributed to the social security system and 59,395 received unemployment benefits. In Spain, a government repatriation program was implemented in 2008.

We also highlight the conclusions of a 2010 study: “Bound between the current economic crisis, domestic tensions and gender inequalities that influence women's opportunities to earn income in the country, returning migrants (however many) may become a new vulnerable category in Romania. So far, no special measures taken by state institutions regarding the reintegration of returning migrants are known. Although in 2008, ANOFM organized job fairs in Italy and Spain to encourage Romanians to come to the country, we are not aware of the results of these measures, but very likely from the echoes received, these measures have not been successful. The idea that migrants would be an interesting maneuver for politicians does not seem to be based on scientific studies showing a weak (non-existent) political transnationalism of Romanians abroad. No NGO programs to support integration into the country have yet been identified in Romania. Therefore, instead of posting development potential, our migrants risk being ignored by economically marginalized and marginalized politicians. However, neither in Italy nor in Spain is there any exodus toward migrants' country” [24].

“The number of Romanians who left Italy between 1995 and 2007 is rising. During this time, 20,588 Romanians probably returned to the country. On the other hand, the number of those going to Italy is still significant, which explains the evolution of the Romanian migrant stock in Italy in recent years. Romania has been for the first time among the biggest immigrant communities in Italy, representing 21% of all immigrants. As far as Spain is concerned, Romanians continue to hope for a job, even if it pays less than to return to the country, if they do not know the success patterns of other returning migrants. Figures provided by the Spanish Institute of Statistics show that around 5,500 people left Spain in 2009 to settle in Romania, most of them retired. Among those returning from Spain, men (3,200) are predominant, compared to 2,300 women” [24].

5.1.5. *Negative effects*

“Strong emigration affects human capital and further complicates the aging of the population. It is estimated that in 2013, 2.5 million Romanians (approximately 12.5% of the population)

lived abroad. (...) Emigrants are often poorly qualified, but there are many highly qualified workers who have left the country. This further complicates the problems related to the decline in the working-age population in the context of an aging society. Faced with this challenge, the government intends to implement a program to stimulate internal and external mobility, focusing on highly skilled workers" [8]. Youth unemployment is still high, with 12% not in education.

Emigration has negatively impacted the demographic and the socio-economic situation. It is an essential cause of the population decline, as it mainly affects young people, 62% of whom are of fertile age. The decrease in population has also reached a negative value of 0.2% per year. Areas with high internal and external migration have suffered a decline in their fertility rate (Botoșani, Vaslui, Buzău, Tulcea, Vrancea, Călărași, Giurgiu, Teleorman, and Olt counties). Higher rates of fertility, however, were recorded in Suceava and Iași. Internal migration has complemented population losses in western and central areas. "In general, the older emigration is, and if it affects both sexes, the more severe its demographic effects are" [25]. To the question of whether migration causes social harm to families, 45.4% of respondents underlined benefits, 30% negative, and 24% being neutral [26]. The particularly well-known problem of children who grow up without parents was highlighted. In 2008, UNICEF estimated that 350,000 children out of 4.4 million live in migrant families. Moreover, it was added that migrants postpone marriage and procreation decisions. Such effects will worsen in the long run.

International mobility puts pressure on local employers (from small and medium-sized enterprises), forcing them to choose between wage growth and bankruptcy or business closure. The European Commission (EC) draws attention to the fact that key measures that support apprenticeships, skills certification, and mobility packages are less used. Cooperation between public institutions, education, and private employers is underdeveloped. Pilot measures hardly reach interested young people, many not registered in public services. A national apprenticeship program linked to the National Competitiveness Strategy is announced. The EU also supports programs for youth not professionally employed.

Under these conditions, the participation of older workers in the labor market will increase, given that the elderly dependency ratio will double by 2050. Without the law equalizing the retirement age between men and women, women participation in the labor market will continue to decrease. Moreover, national spending on active labor force policies has fallen to 40% since 2004. At present, the focus is on the European Social Fund (ESF). The internal and ESF measures are not correlated.

Most short-term unemployed are not covered by unemployment benefits. Passive policies continue to absorb 85% of national spending on labor market policies. Since 2014, employers have received social contributions cuts that have lowered the revenue of the social security administration. At the same time, the rural labor force is also affected by the school dropout rate, reaching 18.1% in 2014, which is higher in the countryside.

The labor force is mainly created in the urban area, and the rural area is still losing jobs. Labor productivity in agriculture is five times lower than the national average [22]. This is how the main development disparities between rural and urban are maintained in our country. The

country is lagging in combating poverty, in providing employment, education and access to services, and basic infrastructure.

After the EU accession, programs to reduce urban-rural gaps have multiplied. CAP funds were obtained, and a Rural Development Program was implemented, supporting the Sustainable Development Program. If the EU has allocated more than €8 billion in 2007–2013, the same amount was earmarked between 2014 and 2020, geared to increasing agricultural productivity, encouraging small farms, increasing the added value of agricultural products, creating jobs, making rural development worthwhile. At the same time, prospects for agricultural modernization are anemic due to proper fragmentation (over 3.2 million farms) or limited access to credit (14% in the eTerra database).

Also, poverty affects 50% of the mass of rural inhabitants (28% in cities) and feeds emigration. About 80% of the beneficiaries of social aid are from the countryside. The rural population has a significant share of the informal economy and a little participation in the contributory pension system. Moreover, the low level of training in the countryside makes it harder to develop human capital. In 2013, only 22% of second-chance learners came from rural areas. In 2013, 5% of rural youth graduated from faculties (20% in urban areas). On the other hand, one out of three rural children drop out of school before the ninth grade; rural schools hardly provide normal specialist services [26]. It is also known that the countryside faces mediocre health services, which are vital for the aging workforce (60% of the beneficiaries of direct payments for agriculture are over 60 years old). Health insurance covers 78% of the population, while emigrants are forced to support the treatment of their relatives more seriously.

Moreover, the departure of tens of thousands of health professionals to foreign countries is due to be among the vulnerabilities generated by emigration. Also, medical professionals tend to permanently move to other countries, so their remittances are less important. The medical staff exodus may also translate into an increasing infant or even adult mortality rate, rates which are already higher in the rural areas (with over 5% more deaths than urban areas).

Negative demographic effects should be added to depopulated rural areas, deserted villages, abandoned land, and visible deterioration. Apart from the population, it is important to have productive activities (in Apuseni Mountains, Tutova Hills, Cotmeana Plain, and Colinar Plain of Transylvania). There are also conservative rural spaces, which, despite experiencing a rural exodus, maintain their relative demographic vitality, for example, North-Eastern Moldova or Northern Transylvania. A certain demographic balance is ensured in the interstitial rural areas with temporary bidirectional migration (Transylvania and Banat). Suburban areas are of course favored [25]. The uneven diffusion of the techniques leading to the insertion of rural areas into the national and international exchange circuit, which materializes in different degrees of equipping agricultural holdings, also counts. Isolated and partially isolated spaces are disadvantaged.

On the other hand, the changes caused by the behavioral urbanization of the rural population have positive effects in eliminating demographic and illiteracy explosions. Local and national identity, however, have to suffer. The most developed are the suburban communities.

We cannot ignore the brain drain in the West—over 200,000 university graduates left Romania after 1990—and the temporary settling in the West of tens of thousands of physicians and nurses. At the same time, severe gaps have been created in the national labor market.

On a broader scale, natality in Romania has diminished, and so has the future labor force that can be hired. We emphasize that over 10% of Romanians work abroad [27]. The tendency to remain definitively in the countries of destination is a part of the future of Romania. Emigration countries are increasingly confronted with an aging population, and with a diminishing economic and social growth rate.

Of course, there is an over-representation of farmers among people returning to the country. Strawberry pickers are more likely to go back to the country than other occupational categories. Most of those who have worked in agriculture have practiced circular migration, and the return of migrants from agriculture is temporary, with the probability of returning abroad being quite high. Another possible explanation is that their work in Western Europe farms is usually their first job abroad. The more diversified the economic activities are in destination countries, the lower the return rates are in the origin country. In Romanian migrants' decision to return, individual factors will prevail, amid the extended economic crisis in the country. The economic opportunities in the home community are closely related to the emigration decision, and return to the country.

Among the main factors that discourage migrants' investment in Romania is not the lack of financial resources or of an entrepreneurial spirit, but the bureaucratic obstacles, cumbersome and discretionary procedures, and corruption in Romania. That is why the number of emigrants who do not want to return to the country has increased. About 13% of them are still looking for secure salaries in the West, 13% are looking for a decent pension, and 47% have achieved savings plans.

The migration of the rural labor force can have dire adverse consequences in rural and territorial terms. The departure of the young and adult population may reduce the capacity of rural communities to support themselves economically and financially. Today only 1500–1800 communes have the real capacity to be supported by their people; there are villages that are practically depopulated. The official reduction of the number of small cities and communes is in part blocked by the interests of local governments and their lobbyists not to dismantle such structures.

Emigration processes contribute—together with other transformations in the Romanian society—to the amplification of competition for the provision of development conditions between the areas of Romania. A similar competition will continue to manifest itself between the Romanian and European provinces.

6. Conclusions and proposals

It must be said that the Romanian authorities have been faced with new internal and external socio-economic realities since 2007: (1) the decrease of the remittances, the Romanians who go

to work abroad do not have a predetermined plan of return; (2) migrants' children learn in foreign schools and integrate there; (3) localities, although benefiting at the level of individual households from emigration, do not do so in terms of community sustainability, especially at regional level; (4) migration flows involve more and more diverse population categories, young people, and families with children are the most numerous classes in terms of population loss through emigration; (5) regarding the category of those with higher education, the state is confronted both with the brain wasting phenomenon (inflation of diplomas in the country, uncoordinated with real needs, and not adapted to the labor market) and with brain drain caused by emigration; thus the investment in the development of capital human and education becomes a national cost, harder to recover on the long term [28].

In theory, there is an extraordinary amount of labor in the countryside, so the migration of some categories to cities and to other countries should have beneficial effects on the labor market. However, only small steps have been taken for creating and developing jobs in the SME system, transferring knowledge, advising, and managing farm businesses. In 2013, statistics already showed that 60% of the rural population was working in agriculture. Also, 65% of unskilled workers in the country came from the countryside. At the same time, it is noted that the rural environment remains a labor resource for mining, construction, support services, manufacturing. In 2015, about 2.18 million people were still working in agriculture. If there were about 500,000 unemployed, this number did not include people living from small plots of subsistence farming (300,000), some of who work temporarily in the country or outside of it.

In practice, the impact of migration on the Romanian labor force is considerable; in rural areas, it not only refers to the size of the workforce but also to its quality. Firstly, it draws attention to the significant figure of the population involved in internal and external migration, of over 3.5 million people. In an active population of 8–12 million inhabitants, it is detrimental that 3.5 million people are trained in the migration process. It is also worrying that hundreds of thousands of highly skilled people have gone abroad.

There are rural areas where labor is lacking because of the migration of young people in the country and abroad, especially skilled labor. We recall that most of Romania's poor live in rural areas. The participation rate in early education is 76%, the motivation for education being lower due to economic reasons (lack of employment in the countryside). It is considered in the specialty studies that each school year reduces the unemployment risk by 8.2% [29]. Also, a person with higher education earns 1.36 times more than an average high school graduate. An individual in the last category earns 1.77 times more than one without studies.

Furthermore, we consider that it is hazardous that emigration intersects with the tendency of decreased birth rate and the aging of the Romanian population. This aging of the population is even more visible in rural areas. Moreover, there is an increase in the phenomenon of the old population settling from urban to rural and suburban areas. Thus, the high proportion of the population in rural areas (46%) remained the same. Even more serious is the fact the young migrate not only internally but also externally, while the urban population moving to villages and communes is usually inactive. In 2015, 100,000 people opted for the countryside, while 78,000 moved to cities. There is an improvement in infrastructure and living conditions only in suburban areas: this is rather the transformation of these regions into residential districts

adjacent to the main cities. Professor Gheorghe Zaman pointed out that the transfer to the countryside will increase in the coming years, in the search for a more affordable living. Economists believe this trend will reduce the consumption of food, fuel, credit, and will have negative economic effects. Migration movements, especially among rural youth, are caused by poverty and lack of employment opportunities, while the return is conditioned by the creation of a more efficient local and central government, or by the emergence of possibilities on the rural labor market (through diversification of rural economic activities).

At the same time, we draw attention to the fact that emigration affects the age groups with high fertility rates, decreasing the potential of newborns in Romania. Over 58% of migrants are women in the 26–46 age group, which has severe effects on birth rates and fertility rates [30].

A perverse effect of work mobility is that it reduces the pressure of society on the government's obligation to modernize the economic, social and cultural aspects of Romania. Mainly based on the transfer of remittances by migrants, it shows poor managerial capacity at government level and beyond. "Romania's external migration will be influenced in the next period by how high, and sustainable the economic growth rate will be, the extent to which this increase will significantly increase the standard of living and, of course, the immigration policies of the Western countries. According to the existing scenarios, after a severe destabilization caused by the economic crisis, in Romania the first signs of recovery are extremely uncertain" [30].

Authorities should, among other things, try to develop local inclusive societies and fight against poverty. Attention seems to be given to training young farmers, providing support for business plans. At the same time, both the government and the EU show concerns about investments in basic infrastructure, roads, water supply, and educational infrastructure.

Since it is known that LAGs can associate local, public and private sector initiatives to support small rural businesses. Moreover, LEADER aims to maintain the local workforce, especially by diversifying non-agricultural activities. Equally, the country still lacks enough agronomical high schools and vocational schools. The same adverse conditions for medical staff mainly explain their departure in urban areas and outside the country.

A significant transfer of labor from agriculture to other sectors of activity will be needed. This transfer involves major investments in various sectors of activity, including in rural areas. Modernization in the agricultural sector can also lead to declining seasonal fluctuations, which mark the GDP, yearly budget revenues, many people's incomes, exports, transport and services [30].

Further, there is a high productivity gap between agriculture and other economic sectors. Part of the population in the agricultural sector is under-occupied, resulting in lower productivity than the national average. However, the occupied population in agriculture is oversized. Even Bulgaria had a threefold productivity higher than Romania. After all, practically the entire occupied population aged over 64 is working in agriculture.

It is also proven in UNICEF studies that Romania should invest at least 6% of GDP in education in the years to come, to reduce social disparities, improve the health of the population, reduce dependency on welfare benefits and combat crime, and record higher public

spending in infrastructure. Priority should be given to pre-primary and primary education, vocational and technical education [29].

However, in the agricultural sector, there are young people under 35 (27.9%) who have a low level of education and qualification. This population has low income and is forced to migrate to cities or abroad. This workforce mobility and its flexibility is influenced by income; therefore, the migration trends will not be reduced in the near future. Also, there are income disparities between regions, Bucharest-Ilfov and North-West, for example, in North-West, income is 70% lower than in Bucharest-Ilfov.

On the other hand, "the economic crisis has had multiple negative effects on Romanian migrants working abroad. People who are marginalized on the labor market, with low human capital and low material income, are those who are perceived to be the categories of migrant workers most affected by the crisis. Those who experienced the crisis most severely were Romanians who worked as unskilled workers and those who worked in the informal economy of destination countries. Migrant business sectors, such as hotel buildings or services, along with other areas that depend on economic cycles, have been hit hardest by the recession, causing job losses and a higher rate of unemployment among the migrant workers than in the case of local workers" [31].

On the other hand, we must take into consideration that in Romania the labor force in rural areas is also under-used. This explains why not only emigration abroad should be encouraged, but also labor transfers from agriculture to other sectors. Public policies and active labor market measures are needed.

We believe that employment measures in rural non-agricultural sectors should firstly be adopted by organizing training courses in services; expanding infrastructure networks; encouraging SMEs in the countryside; stimulating the hiring of the rural population; attracting European funds for business and jobs in the rural areas; improving access to utilities (especially Internet access).

Taking into account the youth unemployment rate, it would be necessary to promote youth employment in rural areas by applying for vocational retraining programs and encouraging the implementation of programs for young farmers and entrepreneurs [30].

Equally, the levels of specialization and professionalization of rural labor should be increased. Better measures are needed to combat black-outs and the non-tax economy, which is about 30%.

Despite these analyses, Ilie Ștefan argued that migration processes would be difficult to stop in Romania, since migration is fed by the lack of jobs, low levels of living and poverty. There is a considerable lack of jobs in agriculture, where production is excessively dependent on environmental conditions. The post-communist reforms failed in merging the land in such way that it would have led to the establishment of medium-sized farms that could provide jobs. Real support programs for farmers are also lacking: credit for machinery, storage facilities, and irrigation systems. In part, these shortcomings could be remedied by establishing cooperatives (particularly on distribution).

The still significant contribution of agriculture to GDP shows the inefficiency of the national economy, rather than the exceptional performance of agriculture. While, the agriculture is

somewhat industrialized in Romania, half of the country's arable land being exploited in a traditional system and a half in the industrial system, 50% of agricultural exports are gross commodities and not finished products (which also have high added value). Besides, we import agro-food products.

Emigration is also encouraged by the lack of real competition in public service employment; these jobs' distribution is excessively politicized [32].

Ineffective health and education policies send tens of thousands of specialists abroad. Also, anemic technology transfer urges many young people to study abroad. Romania allocates the lowest funds for research and development in the EU. Moreover, the state continues to show insufficient concern in this direction.

Another specific problem of the countryside is the fact that women are far more likely to leave than men, to cities in the country or abroad (the feminization of migration). Mainly, there is a lack of local (rural) opportunities, the collapse of the post-crisis construction market in Spain, which has led to significant income losses for the families whose men worked there, but also the existence of women's specific job opportunities abroad, the access being facilitated by the well-structured migration networks from Spain and Italy. For most of them, it is their very first job, as before they preferred to live from social remittances and social assistance in Romania. In guest societies, they are mainly engaged in social care and agriculture.

Emigration also causes problems among transnational families, concerning children's education. We believe it is important to support the children left at home, but also the parents left for work. These difficulties could be addressed through the development, among other things, of tools designed to support remote parent education and improved communication with the school. At the level of the education system, a solution could be to strengthen the relationship between school and social assistance by outlining communication methods and procedures between teachers, school directors, school psychologists and social workers. In the rural area, the role of the school counselor should be increased [33].

The balance of negative and positive consequences of short-/medium- and long-term migration reveals: (a) positive consequences are remittances, family welfare, improving education, professional development, trying another lifestyle, plus social value and civics, improving women's empowerment, additional chances of development for discriminated social categories (e.g., Roma); (b) negative aspects are the unrecovered investment in labor, demographic loss, drain of specialists and talents, non-recovery of taxes and duties, remittance trap, false social development, adverse effects on children with parents who have left abroad, the black economy, drugs, and denial of identity.

On the other hand, migrant investment has contributed to the development of the construction sector at the local level, but also to the rise in the prices of construction land, building materials and labor. Also, migration has favored the import of new construction systems, construction techniques and equipment, as well as more economical or better water, electricity and water heating systems [34].

To counteract the negative impact of emigration, measures should be taken at: (a) macro-level: absorption policies and benefits to stay in the country's labor market, policies to create

opportunities and counteract the loss of brains and skilled workers, public policies based on the exploration of the motivations and the pull and push factors, state institutions have to cooperate through policies of exchange of information and coordination of elements of demographic/population and politico-economic movements; (b) at the mezzo level: public policies and communication—focusing on clear medium and micro-level issues, NGOs and other types of associations, supporting the local economy through development policies, tailored policies for each region with community involvement, policies created by specialists associations to serve the individual or groups accurately; (c) at the micro-level: social policies for remediation in specific dysfunctional situations related to migration (children, family, Roma issue), collaboration strategies between specialists and institutions for problems and particular cases [27]. In health, the problems caused by the massive migration of specialists, the relevant policies should: (a) harmonize the health needs of the population by ensuring the need for medical personnel at national level; (b) create a coherent system capable of keeping health professionals in the country by supporting them and taking measures to motivate the youngest (doctors and nurses) [35].

On the other hand, it can be said that the most alarming characteristic of the effects of emigration is the social restructuring in the locality of origin, building a real culture of migration, especially in rural areas [36].

Author details

Alexandru Șerban Zodian* and Maria Claudia Diaconeasa

*Address all correspondence to: serban.zodian@yahoo.com

The Bucharest University of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania

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Immigration and Social Inclusion: Possibilities from School and Sports

Bastian Carter-Thuillier, Victor López-Pastor,
Francisco Gallardo-Fuentes and Juan Carter-Beltran

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Abstract

Immigration is a manifestation of cultural pluralism that crosses a transversal form, an important part of the western societies, generating consequences in political, social and cultural terms. Likewise, the evidence shows that the educational system attached to sport can be a positive context to promote inclusive processes associated to the immigrant population, due to its high social transcendence and its universal character. On the other hand, sports may act as a tool for social and cultural conflict if they focus on the imposition of a dominant culture or exacerbates the competitive sense. The present chapter has by objective to analyze the possibilities of sports as a tool for the social inclusion of the immigrant population, giving special emphasis to the educational options that were offered by the sport practice in the school context. To do this, it presents an important number of theoretical and empirical backgrounds associated with this topic, which will allow the reader to understand the existing relationship between sport, education and immigration, exposing their possible risks and virtues.

Keywords: emigration and immigration, social inclusion, sports, school, physical education

1. Introduction

During the last decades, migratory flows have increased drastically in different latitudes of the planet; process that has demonstrated to be associated with different reasons as the economic globalization; the internationalization of the media; different problematics linked to armed conflicts, imbalances and inequalities in material well-being, in addition to other causes that promote the territorial displacement of individuals and groups [1–3].

Immigration have had as a consequence the creation and transformation of societies, giving rise to the construction of spaces in which different representations and cultural practices coexist, as well as different worldviews and forms of interaction between the subjects that participate in these realities. As a consequence, the increase in migratory movements has allowed relevant changes in different spheres of Western societies, making them even more plural with respect to ethnic, social, and cultural [4–6].

Likewise, the boom in immigration rates and the continued international mobility of the population has generated concern in the States, and in different private entities, for their possible consequences in economic terms. Specifically, this uncertainty lies in the potential micro and macroeconomic effects that can have in the host countries, as well as in the countries of origin, the existence of a constant migratory flow [7]. However, the evidence shows that immigrant labor activity helps in development and economic stability, both in the countries where they currently reside, as in their own countries of origin, in which there is more preponderant their impact on local regional economies, were the monetary capital from abroad is invested [8, 9].

In spite of the above, the growing migratory phenomenon continues to encounter detractors in different fields, since it not only conditions economic factors, but also has important cultural, political, social, and media consequences; both for foreigners and for the native population. Often, immigration is perceived as a threat by the population, which humpers the processes of integration and social inclusion of migrants [3, 10–14].

Immigration, as well as the existing resistance to it, has permeated all social institutions, the educational system being one of the areas where it reaches the greatest impact. It is undeniable that the presence of a significant number of foreign immigrants in the school space is an important factor of cultural diversity, being a manifestation of plurality that crosses the whole social reality, but which finds in the school the opportunity to be understood and valued. Although in this scenario it will also be able to deepen the discriminatory practices already existing in the social environment, we do not opt for approaches that really promote the positive interaction between the different cultural expressions existing in the classroom.

With respect to the recently mentioned, the evidence expresses that the sport, as well as different practices linked to the physical activity, can have a positive impact in the insertion of the immigrant population, being the sports clubs and the educational system, the contexts where they can reach a greater favorable impact.

Sport is an activity with a high social importance [15] and a practice of universal characteristics, which is present in all cultures [16–18]. These characteristics make it a common meeting space, as well as a tool with a high potential for the inclusion of cultural diversity, especially in contexts associated with the phenomenon of immigration [19].

The specific literature on this matter indicates that sport offers important possibilities for the contexts that present immigrant population, because it favors: (a) the acquisition of social and cultural capital [20–23]; (b) the maintaining of cultural identity and cohesion around it [10]; (c) the interaction between “culturally different” [18, 24–26]; and (d) the creation of intercultural networks [27]. However, there are also antecedents that point to sport as a space that can produce or deepen cultural conflicts, because of its excessive competitive sense, gender stereotypes, elitism, and disproportionate exacerbation of rivalries in the field of game [21, 27–29].

In view of the above, it is especially interesting to examine and understand the motives that can make sport an instrument that favors the inclusion of cultural diversity. Also, the aspects that can transform sports practice into an element of segregation and discord among those who are culturally different identify with clarity.

It is clear that the development of studies and discussions around immigration not only responds to scientific or academic purposes, but also to the generation and propagation of knowledge that allows to answer in a pertinent way to everyday social situations, particularly in those contexts or communities that coexist with the obligation and need to relate to individuals with different cultures; therefore, with different customs, beliefs, practices, stories, worldviews, etc.

The present book chapter has an objective to analyze the possibilities of sport as a tool for the social inclusion of the immigrant population, giving special emphasis to the educational options offered by sports practice in the school context. To do this, we present a significant number of theoretical and empirical antecedents associated with this topic, which will allow the reader to understand the existing relationship between sport, education, and immigration. Also, the text does not only pretend to attend to the intellectual or epistemological interests, but also contribute to the development of practices that allows an intercultural coexistence based on respect, dialog, and democratic construction of social spaces.

2. How are relationships configured in culturally diverse societies?

Before analyzing in specific terms, the link between sport and immigration is necessary to understand how individual and collective relationships configure in societies that harbor different cultures.

In spite of existing common spaces densely populated by individuals of different origin and cultural habits, the way to confront cultural diversity is unequal in each context, also giving space to negative practices such as different forms of discrimination, xenophobia, racism, social exclusion, labor sectoralization, and spatial segregation [2, 12, 30–36].

The evidence shows that the relations built between subjects of different cultures and national origins are conditioned, in important measure, by the characteristics of the social space where these interactions are developed; therefore, there are contexts and strategies that can facilitate, hinder, or preclude the relationship between the culturally different. For Flecha and Puigvert [5], there are three major approaches to classify forms of cultural interaction and discrimination: (a) ethnocentric approach; (b) relativistic approach; and (c) communicative approach.

The *ethnocentric approach* understands that the relations between the different cultures must be based on a process of assimilation, in which the immigrant groups must be submitted to the system of hegemonic cultural practices that prevail in that society. This approach is based on the subordination of one culture to another and, consequently, understands that immigrants should adopt as their own the cultural system that prevails in the society where they intend to settle (since it is supposedly “superior”); discarding in some cases an

important part of their own culture of origin, which can cause as a consequence processes of acculturation. Likewise, this approach considers that coexistence of subjects with different cultures is possible. However, these citizens cannot have an equal status, and there should be a relationship where the representatives of the “higher culture” are always imposed and favored.

Secondly, we can find the *relativist approach*, a perspective that promotes multiculturalism as an element of preservation of difference [5]. It expresses that coexistence between culturally distinct groups is unviable for two reasons: (a) because a real understanding between different cultures would be hypothetically impossible and (b) because it would be less convenient to preserve cultural and ethnic diversity in its pure state. This latter view gives space to postmodern racism, which, unlike modern racism (which was theoretically based on racial problems), is based on the alleged antagonistic and irreconcilable differences that would exist between different cultures, as an argument to avoid their coexistence and interaction [37, 38].

For Flecha and Puigvert [5], ethnocentrism and relativism are two sides of the same coin, since in both cases, equality (especially of rights) is impeded for the different cultural forms presents in society. The above is based on the fact that ethnocentrism excludes diversity, betting on a process of homogenization. While relativism regards cultural equality and interaction as harmful, betting to avoid the relationship and pollution (*sic*) between cultures with the objective of preserving them in their original state.

As an alternative to these two options above, the *communicative approach* appears which considers that there are no superior or inferior cultures, but different cultures. Likewise, it promotes “equality of differences”, betting on promoting equality, but in no case homogeneity. This approach is based on the thesis that accepting difference as a principle of equality will cause the maintenance and development of cultural identities. In addition, the communicative approach assumes an ideological position, characterized by its antiracist, critical, and transformative nature; encourages dialog, understanding it as an opportunity to build consensus from an equal plane and not as a space of imposition. Therefore, it favors coexistence and the different types of interaction that cultures may have [5, 39].

In relation of the recent approaches described, it is evident that cultural, ethnic, and national diversity can be appreciated from different perspectives and, therefore, there are different ways to act against it. In short, the way in which immigration is viewed socially will be largely determined by the approach from which the phenomenon is viewed.

The above as an impact on the configuration of the societies where the interactions of different cultures occur, as well as the degree of depth that these links reach (if they really exist). That is, one can speak of different “types” of societies (or social spaces) according to the way in which the relations between migrants and non-migrants are configured, thematic in which two concepts must be clearly differentiated: *Multiculturalism and Interculturalism*.

A *multicultural society* is one where individuals and groups of different cultures coexist within a common territory, but this does not necessarily imply that there is a communication or relationship between them. That is to say, a society that possesses immigrant population, but does

not promotes the interaction or cultural exchange with the native population or between their own groups of foreigners; giving with it space most of the times to ethnocentric practices, which can be decisive in the future generation of conflicts.

Taking into account the characteristics and risks of the multicultural society, as well as the subordinate and exclusive consequences of the ethnocentric approach, it is evident that there is a high risk that problems of coexistence can be generated if this way of understanding cultural diversity prevails. For this reason, Díaz [31] expresses the need to overcome multiculturalism in order to advance toward interculturalism, that is, toward the construction of social systems that promote interaction between the cultures that live on a common space.

The above requires that the representatives of the different cultures that inhabit a determinate context acquire mutually the responsibility of know and understand the systems of customs, practices, and beliefs that each group possesses. This increases the possibilities that positive interrelationships are developed between members of different cultures, allowing us to welcome and value the “difference” without viewing it as inferior or superior.

However, talk about interculturalism is not enough that there is communication between different cultural groups that occupy a territory (e.g. migrants and non-migrants). But it requires the existence of a dynamic process of social and cultural interaction, in which individuals become interdependent and bet to construct from an equal plane a shared reality, emphasizing the aspects that unite and define their cultural singularities [40, 41]. What has been described above usually gives way to two-way processes of cultural feedback and fusion, that is, cultures become reciprocally permeable and appropriate elements with “alien” cultural origin, which in the field of anthropology is usually categorized under the concept of *transculturation*.

Despite the opportunities offered by interculturalism around coexistence and the development of intercultural relations, Tubino [42] states that it is necessary to overcome functional interculturalism and move toward a critical interculturalism, consequently of transforming, emancipatory, and egalitarian character. As is evident, this view is closely linked by its critical nature to the communicative approach, since it not only bets on fostering interaction between different cultures, but also raises the need for these relationships to be built on a level of mutual respect that promote the individual and collective development of all cultural forms present in the context.

Given the antecedents expressed so far, it is evident that there are multiple perspectives to explain the cultural relations that occur in societies due to migration processes. Likewise, these approaches account for how the relationships between different cultural groups should be configure, representing each of these positions an ideological stance against the phenomenon of immigration or other expressions of cultural diversity. It is then evident that social spaces based on interculturalism and the construction of cultural relations based on the principles enunciated by the communicative approach turn out to be the only alternatives that can allow the immigrant population an equal participation and development in society, as well as promoting positive exchange among cultures.

3. Is the school an effective space for the social inclusion of the immigrant population?

As mentioned above, immigration is an expression of cultural diversity that crosses all social reality, a space in which the educational system occupies a preponderant role. As a consequence, immigration deeply permeates school institutions, being one of the main manifestations of cultural plurality present in educational centers [43, 44].

The school system has a high incidence in the processes of integration of foreigners, since it will influence their social insertion in the present, as well as determine their future, since it will largely define their participation in the labor field and, in consequence, also in the economy [45]. However, despite the socializing and inclusive potential of the school, it has been opted usually to carry out integration processes for the immigrant population based on an assimilative logic, using the privileged platform that the educational system possess as a means for the immigrant population adopts as its own the dominant cultural features of the host society. This is detrimental to their original culture [13, 46] and is a constant challenge for the integration processes that take place in the school, as well as the transfer of the same to the daily life, being able to cause cultural conflicts [47, 48].

Due to the difficulties that are generated in the integration or inclusion (as applicable in each case) of the immigrant students in the school space, some negative social representations have been generated with respect to the foreign students, as well as to the interculturality itself, calling it complex and negative, even by teachers themselves [49]. This has generated “culturalist” discourses that label immigrant students as harmful and detrimental agents in educational and social terms for the rest of the students [50–52]. It is precisely these kinds of speeches about immigration that give foreign students a negative, stereotyped, and homogenized connotation, generating conflicting situations between the educational system and immigrant students.

The above has generated problems of exclusion and segregation, existing educational centers that are similar to ghettos, since the presence of foreign students predominates, as well as the absence of schoolchildren with nationality of the host country [53]; it is a problem that is getting worse as families avoid sending their children to schools in which they should share classrooms with immigrant students [45], a scenario that is often seen in educational public centers [51].

The school should not only cooperate to develop positive social integration processes in the school context, but also has the duty to help build socialization processes that grant autonomy tools to immigrant students, in order to enable them to position themselves as citizens in society.

However, talk of integration is not the same as inclusion. Although both terms have been misused as synonyms many times in the educational context [54], they are concepts that have differences that go beyond mere semantics.

Although both words have similar definitions, they should neither be used interchangeably, nor should they be interpreted as analogous terms in the educational scenario. The term integration simply refers to “fitting in” or inserting into a particular social system, such as school,

an individual, or group that previously had no access to it. While discussing inclusions recognize and respect, the right of all groups and individuals to participate in a common space built on the similarities that such subjects or social groups possess [55]. In other words, a school that responds to the expectations and needs of all those who are part of it, including knowledge, content, and practices are associated with the cultures of immigrants, as well as non-immigrants who participate in the context.

However, should we make the mistake of stigmatizing the concept of integration. Since the evidence shows that integration is an important initial step in the construction of inclusive social spaces [56]. Specifically, Poon-McBrayer [57] mentions that to achieve an education of inclusive characteristics, usually the educational systems live three stages, being the inclusion the final phase of this process: (a) integration; (b) integration in transition to inclusion; and (c) inclusion. In few words, it is necessary to ensure that the educational system assumes in the first instance the need to integrate “to the different”, to later bet on the development of processes that allows the immigrant and non-immigrant students to jointly build processes of mutual inclusion; although this does not always follow strict linear logic.

However, the processes of integration that are developed from the school context have been faced with hard questions. Specifically, during the last decades, discourses close to the social criticism current have appeared, in which the educational system is accused of being a space destined to the production, transmission, and distribution of the dominant ideology, which translates into practices of cultural homogenization [58] and, therefore, in actions that prevent the development of possible processes of school and social inclusion.

Regard to mentioned in the previous paragraph, it seems necessary that in order to develop truly inclusive processes, be prevailing to consolidate an education with intercultural characteristics, and based on the principles established by the communicative approach [5], which results transcended when it comes to contexts hosting individuals of different nationalities [59]. This means a school built under an equal and inclusive vision that promotes interaction between different cultural agents and bets on a project for all the cultural diversity present in the educational context, and not an exclusive one for the “culturally different”.

Likewise, intercultural education must also include the design and implementation of an intercultural school curriculum, which implies not only transforming the ways in which relationships between individuals belonging to different cultures are constructed, but also the incorporation of content that are directly related to the cultural diversity present in the classroom. This would translate into a curriculum that shelter both, cultural knowledge linked to immigrant groups and the culture of the host society. A curriculum of these characteristics will enable students to acquire intercultural competences [41] and, consequently, be citizens prepared to tolerate and value the cultural diversity present in society.

In virtue of all the antecedents exposed so far, it is evident that the school as a social institution has a transcendent relationship with the immigration phenomenon. This not only refers to the fact that the educational system must respond optimally to the cultural diversity it has today in the classroom, but also because it is also a space that has a high importance in the processes of integration and social inclusion of the population. Likewise, the school does not

prove to be an intrinsically inclusive space around the phenomenon of immigration, however the potential of such a context is evident, especially when it is committed to the construction of educational environments that as by objective the development of interculturalism.

4. Can sport help in the social inclusion of the immigrant population?

Sport is a social and cultural practice that has symbols, mechanisms, and a language with unique characteristics. It has also shown to have an important role in the production and reproduction of interpersonal relationships, and can act as an element that facilitates the integration and differentiation in social terms [15]. In addition, in the vast majority of cultures, it can be observed that the existence of sporting activities, games, dances, and other corporal practices constitute motor habits, which form part of the identity of these cultural groups, due to the social value of sport in the collective consciousness of these groups [17].

At present, it is possible to affirm that the sport is a supracultural and global activity; that is, an element that crosses transversally to different cultures and that is practiced in all the latitudes of the planet. In addition, language proficiency does not usually condition the participation of subjects and often has a playful dimension. All the aforementioned characteristics allow to visualize the sport as a space with high options to favor the socialization between the different cultures [18].

It is evident that sport, in its different modern expressions, transcends borders and countries, being practiced in most of the nations of the world [17]. Precisely because of its universal nature, sport can be a meeting point for different cultures [19], favoring sociocultural interaction [60], and acting as a universe of common references for individuals who are carriers of different cultures [29].

Considering these virtues and possibilities, sport proves to be a field with real possibilities of favoring the social integration and participation of the immigrant population [61, 62], as well as promoting intercultural and interethnic relations [47, 63]. In a similar line, other authors mention that physical activity and sport have a high intrinsic value for the development of intercultural practices, having the capacity to generate equal scenarios and networks above ethnic and cultural characteristics, as well as being potentially favorable for the acquisition of social capital in culturally diverse environments [27, 47].

Díaz [31] explain this is possible thanks the fact that behind the simple structure of sport and physical activity is a great sociocultural complexity that is based on the language and symbolism of human kinetics. In other words, sport becomes a meeting place for the diverse cultures because it is composed by a universal language associated to the corporeity, crossing transversally all the existing cultural realities.

During the last years, different studies have been developed in order to analyze these theoretical statements empirically. An important part of the results of these investigations has indicated that sport is a favorable element for the contexts related to the phenomenon of

immigration. In concrete terms, these studies show that sport cooperates positively with: (a) the acquisition of social and cultural capital [20–23]; (b) maintaining cultural identity and cohesion around it [64]; (c) the interaction between “culturally different” [18, 24–26]; and (d) the creation of intercultural networks [27].

In relation to the above, Tirone et al. [65] express that sport has shown to be a tool that can facilitate the inclusion of the immigrant population, either recreationally or in high performance contexts, showing evidence. Likewise, Theebom et al. [22] have demonstrated how sports clubs cooperate positively in the processes of acquisition of social capital of the immigrant population and in the interaction of foreigners with the native members of society. Results that coincide with a study by Forde et al. [66], which conclude that community sports programs prove to be important spaces for the social inclusion of the immigrant population; although Makarova and Herzog [63] express that such spaces will be effective as long as the immigrant population is prevented from living in segregation or marginalization during sports practice.

However, it precipitates to consider sport as an intrinsically positive tool for environments where there is an immigrant population, since as mentioned earlier, evidence also indicates that sports activities can produce or deepen cultural conflicts due to the exacerbation of the competitive sense, elitism, rivalries, and gender stereotypes linked to physical activity [21, 27–29].

In this same plane, it is important to consider that each culture has singular customs and beliefs about corporality, which consequently translates into different ways of understanding the sport itself and its practice, analyzing it from its own cultural codes. Therefore, to express that sport is a positive tool for the development of interculturality would be a hurried act, since it can also be used for hegemonic purposes, using the privileged social position of sport to transmit and impose the dominant culture, disfavoring and acculturating minority immigrant groups [28]; which has demonstrated to negatively condition interpersonal relationships and the distribution of social capital among the immigrant and non-immigrant population [21]. It is also transcendent to consider that the adoption of foreign cultural ideals about the body and movement by immigrants could produce a rupture with some deeply rooted cultural elements and values [27].

For this reason, sport can only be useful for these purposes if it helps to overcome the prejudices, stereotypes, and social discourses that in a explicitly and implicitly way pretend to put one culture over the other [67]. For this, it is coherent to consider that in the contexts where different cultures coexist, sports forms are also linked to all the cultural systems present in that space and not only those arbitrarily imposed by the hegemonic culture. That is to say, to promote the practice of activities with diverse cultural origin, using games and motor expressions with diverse cultural origin, in order to promote an approach and reciprocal recognition among the cultures [68, 69].

In relation to the background previously reviewed, it can be seen that there are two positions regarding the use of sport as a tool in environments associated with immigration. On one side, there are authors who defend its use, exposing evidence regarding its positive effects, while on the other side, we can observe a current that shows suspicion and caution regarding the idea of viewing the sport as an element intrinsically favorable for the development of interculturality.

However, much of the empirical studies in which sport has proven to be a beneficial instrument for the cultural interaction between immigrants and the native population express that the characteristics of the context are determinant so that the sport can be successful in this task [21, 25, 63, 64, 70–73]. In concrete terms, research in which sport has proven to be an effective means (in different contexts) for the construction of relations between immigrants and non-immigrants, as well as for community and educational integration, affirm that the inclusive potential of sport in the face of cultural diversity can be significantly reduced when the necessary guarantees are not granted for the existence of an environment based on mutual respect for cultural differences that individuals or groups may have.

This view has been reinforced by different theoretical and empirical background, which raises that sport can increase its intercultural potential in contexts that promotes the development of social values and mutual respect [25, 74], as well as facilitating the acquisition of social capital transferable to everyday life [22] and better adaptation to contexts that possess cultural diversity [64]; aspects that in their totality facilitate the social inclusion of the immigrant groups [65].

In this sense, it is therefore necessary to understand that sport by itself cannot be considered an effective element for the development of interculturality, since it is a tool that can be used to serve different interests. However, sport or physical activity that is practiced within school centers cannot be subject to the same logic, since that context as for objective to educate, and therefore cooperate for the development of positive social values versus diversity.

According to the above statement, physical education (PE) is a tool that can significantly contribute to the development of an intercultural educational project (see **Figure 1**), by having intrinsically educational principles and objectives [69, 75] as a consequence, to strengthen the processes of integration and inclusion of the immigrant population [16, 18, 27, 29, 31, 75–79]. For this to happen, the creation of environment in which cultural diversity must be promoted, as well as pay attention to the possible conflicts or cultural shocks that can occur when cultural and corporeal realities are confronted in a common space [77]. It is therefore very important that the professionals in charge of these contexts are competent in intercultural terms [80] so that they can deal with this type of situations and are able to reciprocally incorporate elements from all cultures present in the educational context [81], transforming cultural diversity into an opportunity for continuous learning.

In addition to the PE class, school sports can play an important positive role in the realities that harbor school sports, collaborating in the development of socio-educational values associated with diversity and providing space for the execution of activities of diverse cultural origin that promote the rapprochement among the culturally different [82–84]. However, in order for school sport to actually carry out an educational work and consequently cooperate in the development of values, this concept must be understood as any type of physical activity developed during the school period, in a complementary way to the class of PE, and, therefore, for educational purposes the concepts of “school sport” and “school-age sport” should not be confused with each other, since the latter is related in most cases to an activity that does not necessarily pursue educational purposes, but usually has a competitive logic and is usually carried out outside school centers [85].

It is precisely for these reasons that school sport, as a motor practice and formative in terms of value, is a space that collectively harbors the positive potential of school and sport for the




Figure 1. Description social inclusion possibilities of immigrant population from sports and school.

inclusion of the immigrant population (see **Figure 1**). Owing to the previous reasons, Soler et al. [80] argue that it can favor the participation of immigrant students, although for this to occur, it must be safeguarded that the intervention proposals promote and ensure participation, transversality, and continuity.

5. Final considerations

As it has been expressed, the evidence shows that sport has positive effects in contexts linked to immigration when it is used from an educational perspective and focuses its efforts

on building environments underpinned on mutual respect and the acquisition of values. However, this is a still incipient line in research terms, since an important part of studies on immigration and sport tend to ignore the educational potential of sports in contexts with cultural diversity [19]. Proof for this is a systematic review carried out by Fernández et al. [86], who pointed out that most of the studies associated with “immigration, sport, and physical activity” carried out until 2011 had centered until then on three major lines, without the educational dimension of the sport being one of them: (a) high performance sport; (b) talent migration; and (c) research of a sociological nature.

For this reason, it is imperative to carry out studies and practical proposals that help to understand in greater depth the effects of sports practice, in its different manifestations, as a means for the social inclusion of immigrant groups in different contexts. Although it is clear that sport has a high potential for these purposes, however, it will depend on the objectives with which it is used and could act as a negative element if it is focused from only a competitive, exclusionary, and elitist perspective. It is for this reason that PE and school sport seem to be viable and concrete alternatives for the development of interculturality under a climate of mutual respect and educational practices that guarantee on a greater extent a positive interaction between cultures, simultaneously using the virtues of sport and the school for the development of inclusive processes.

Author details

Bastian Carter-Thuillier^{1*}, Victor López-Pastor², Francisco Gallardo-Fuentes³ and Juan Carter-Beltrán³

*Address all correspondence to: bcarter@uct.cl

1 Universidad Católica de Temuco, Chile

2 Universidad de Valladolid, Spain

3 Universidad de Los Lagos, Chile

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Urban Poverty Caused by the Immigrants: A Challenge to the Local Government in Bursa, Turkey

Arzu Ispalar Çahantimur and
Rengin Beceren Öztürk

Additional information is available at the end of the chapter

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Abstract

This study presents the industrialization and urbanization processes of Bursa, considering the role of local governments regarding their supply of opportunities for the urban poor in order to improve their livelihoods during these processes. The study has focused on three different kinds of immigrant populations: immigrants from eastern and south-eastern regions of Turkey, immigrants from Balkan countries and Syrian refugees. They all have been experiencing the challenges of such rapid urbanization. They are both the reason and the victims of this mostly illegal urban sprawl of the city. Besides urban regeneration studies, attempts for the social inclusion of these immigrant populations are also examined via an archival analysis carried out for the city of Bursa along with the interviews conducted with the key actors of the local governments. Although the conclusions are based on the case study, they are also relevant to other rapidly industrializing cities, which harbor populations of both immigration and domestic migrations.

Keywords: urban regeneration, urban poverty, local government, Bursa, Turkey

1. Introduction

Political upheaval and struggles in the Middle East in the last few years are affecting many people together with the local people of the Middle East countries. The large amount of these affected people belong to the neighboring nations. Thus, being a gateway to the Western world, Turkey is the leading country to provide shelter for refugees who do not have any kind of safety for their lives in their own countries. The conducted international policies bring about the increase in the number of refugees. Turkey, where all the Middle East people desperate to migrate, has been especially influenced by Syrian refugees over the past decade. On the other hand, Turkey has been a place for the immigrants from Balkan countries, especially

Bulgaria, since the 1950s. The government has been taking extraordinary efforts to meet the basic needs—such as living, sheltering and education—of not only its own people, but also of the immigrant populations. Furthermore, the national development dynamics of Turkey has given rise to migration from rural to urban areas of the country. Considering the sociocultural, economic and physical problems the country has been facing with, it is obvious that all of these problems resulted with urban poverty and deprivation should be handled by every related platform including academia.

This study presents the industrialization and urbanization processes of Bursa, considering the role of local governments regarding their supply of opportunities for the urban poor in order to improve their livelihoods during these processes. The study has focused on three different kinds of immigrant populations: immigrants from eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey, immigrants from Balkan countries and Syrian refugees. They all have been experiencing the challenges of such rapid urbanization. They are both the reason and the victims of this mostly illegal urban sprawl of the city. Besides urban regeneration studies, attempts for the social inclusion of these immigrant populations are also examined via an archival analysis carried out for the city of Bursa along with the interviews conducted with the key actors of the local governments. Although the conclusions are based on the case study, they are also relevant to other rapidly industrializing cities, which harbor populations of both immigration and domestic migrations.

In the scope of this study, urban poverty and deprivation caused by domestic migrations and immigrations that Bursa has been faced with for many years will be described. Urban regeneration implementations conducted mostly with the collaboration of central and local governments are introduced. The contribution of these regeneration implementations to solve the urban problems is discussed as a conclusion.

2. The concept of urban regeneration

Healey et al. define urban regeneration as an idea involving both the perception of city decline¹ and the hope of renewal, reversing trends in order to find a new basis for economic growth and social well-being² [1]. Roberts and Sykes define the term as “a comprehensive and integrated vision and action which leads to the resolution of urban problems and which seeks to bring about a lasting improvement in the economic, physical, social and environmental condition of an area that has been subject to change” [3].

The objectives of urban regeneration are generally listed as follows: improving the physical conditions of the urban environment; increasing the opportunities for local livelihood including activities in order to develop skills of the unemployed; dealing with social needs such as community safety, education and health promotion; developing strategies for improving

¹Decline in local economies, in the use of land and buildings, in the quality of the environment and social life.

²Adapted from Parkinson [2].

locality with community capacity building and community-based organizations and developing a participatory approach for governance [2–4].

To be meaningful, regeneration needs to be a process to change a place, for the better, which is then capable of self-sustainment. It is a dynamic concept rather than an end state. It should therefore go beyond the physical and embrace the social and economic factors. This beneficial effect need not be general, but specific to a place together with its inhabitants.

An important element of successful regeneration process is that the planning vision should make use of the existing social and physical characteristics of an area, rather than eliminate them. Many practitioners now agree that urban projects should begin with a survey of all existing elements, planned or not, and that the individual qualities of a place should be enhanced by developing new proposals out of what is already there [5].

As understood from the above definitions, urban regeneration includes not only the physical attempts but also values the social and cultural issues. However, in Turkey, most of the local governments perceive urban regeneration process as a replacement of old and poor quality elements of building stock and physical infrastructure with new and quality ones. Such a perception does not cover any aspect of sociocultural and economic issues, which an ideal urban regeneration process should. Furthermore, in almost every city in Turkey, urban regeneration implementations transform deteriorated areas with the same rules and policies. Thus, locational, physical and sociocultural differences that shape diversity are out of concern [6]. Ataöv and Osmay believed that urban regeneration strategies of Turkey are similar to the physical planning approach of the 1950s and 1960s in Western developed countries because of the large-scale construction operations, which lack the social significance of space [7].

However, TOKİ (Housing Development Administration of Turkey) summarizes Turkey's low-income housing policy as the construction of modern, low-income social-housing estates as part of the "regeneration" of poor areas, especially former illegal settlements. TOKİ also promotes "urban regeneration" as the main tool to create and modernize the domestic housing market [8]. On the other hand, some researchers indicate that this urban regeneration approach not only intends to both modernize and improve the housing stock of cities but also stimulates national economic development [9, 10].

3. The urban challenges in Turkey

Due to its geopolitical situation, being like a bridge in between the East and the West, Turkey is a land that has been a subject to major migrations for centuries (**Figure 1**). International and domestic migrations have had much negative impact on both rural and urban areas. On the one hand, we have the rural areas that are being abandoned by its population thus contributing less and less to the economy of the country, and on the other hand, we have the urban areas struggling to accommodate populations way over their capacities, both of which have been separately subject to diverse impacts such as domestic migrations. As to immigrants, they usually prefer a progressive process of settling. They initially settle in rural areas



Figure 1. Location of Turkey between the West and the East.



Figure 2. Some views of squatter areas in Turkey.

and gradually reach certain living standards and then migrate to urban areas with expectations of better income. Therefore, as the urban areas expand into its outskirts, the impact of urban reflection on these rural areas displays itself at levels of physical, social and economic transformation.

Unregistered housing areas keep increasing as well. Illegal squatters (*gecekondu*)³ that can accommodate up to three to four families, keep getting constructed with only a title to the land, after which the local governments provide these illegal quarters with basic infrastructure of electricity, water and sewage, so that the votes in question can be assured for the upcoming elections, which leads to even faster growth of unregistered housing areas (Figure 2). Thus, this practice turns into a long and difficult process of transforming such unsanitary and unsafe living quarters into liveable residential areas, mostly due to disagreements in between the municipal administrations and the family members who claim rights to these squatters.

Solution-oriented operations regarding such physical, locational and sociocultural problems due to urbanization process in Turkey take place on two separate platforms. The first one is the operations directed by the subsidiary units of the central government under the leader-

³The definition of "gecekondu," according to the law of gecekondu numbered 775, adopted in 1996, is as follows: the house unit illegally built in anyone's building plot without his permission. For further information, see www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.775.pdf [11].

ship of the “Ministry of Environment and Urbanization” and the “Ministry of Development,” and the other platform is directed by the local governments along with the municipal administrations. The most outstanding operation directed by the central government is KENTGES⁴. Politics and activities to solve legal, technical and managerial problems that emerge during urban development process, in a sanitary, well-balanced and safe manner, were determined based on this action plan. It is a vision of urbanization and housing, in the context of spatial planning, settlement and building, aiming to accomplish by the year 2023, which is the 100th anniversary of the Turkish Republic. While evaluating the resources, the opportunities and the possibilities of Turkey, corresponding goals, strategies and action plans, which can be inter consistent and swiftly applicable, were also determined.

The operations of the local governments are conducted within the authority and the responsibilities that are determined by the municipal law of 5393⁵. This law assigns multiple tasks to the local administrations, embodying the social politics of the central government along with the “social municipality” approach⁶ [12]. In order to accomplish these tasks, it is essential that more of public expenditure should be allocated to the issues of health, education, housing and environment [13].

Within the law in question and by the provisions of the articles⁷ of social municipality, the municipal administrations are responsible to carry out or at least supervise various social services and support them to help people gain skills and professions [14]. It is the responsibility of the municipal administrations to provide all types of medical services to the permanent population through medical centers, hospitals and mobile medical units. They are also responsible to set up social facilities in order to carry out and develop other social and cultural services. They need to allocate funds and resources to implement social services for the poor, the indigent and the orphans. They are also required to build mass housing units for these vulnerable members of the society [15–17].

Besides such topics of operations as summarized above, we should also refer to the operations that aim solving the problems of the Syrian refugees, which has been the agenda for the last 5 years. In the Report of Turkey 2016—Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan—it is indicated that the government of Turkey has been playing a leading role by providing protection and help to the Syrian refugees via AFAD⁸ especially in the southeast of the country (**Figure 3**).

As indicated in Regional Refugee Resilience Plan 2016–2017 (3RP), NGOs play an effective role in providing protection and service especially to noncamp Syrians who are trying to live in cities. There are 139 international NGOs; half of them were accredited after the beginning of the huge migration from Syria. Implementing Regional Refugee Resilience Plan (3RP)

⁴Integrated Urban Development Strategy and Action Plan.

⁵Urbanization Council was undertaken by the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement with the participation of 356 members from 151 institutions in 4–7 May 2009. It is an advisory council on urbanization affairs that has the main aim of developing an action plan, which enables sustainable urban development throughout the country. Official Journal dated 13.07.2005, Number 25834, Published municipal law of 5393.

⁶Keleş defines “social municipality” as the municipality of social welfare state [12].

⁷The articles including social municipality approach are: md 14, md 7, md 38/n, md60/i, taken from Özgökçeler and Bıçkı [14].

⁸Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency.



Figure 3. Some views from refugee camps.

activities, they provide support to local NGOs. One of the most hopeful progresses in this process is the private sector actors willing to alleviate the unfavorable impacts of the refugees on the local people and the positive respond of the 3RP partners for the engagement with the private sector [18].

4. Local governments' effort to rise to the challenge of urban poverty in Bursa

Following the general evaluation of the situation in Turkey, the operations of the local governments of Bursa, which is the second major city of the Marmara region after Istanbul, are discussed (Figure 4). It is the first capital of the Ottoman Empire and is located on the historic Silk Road and the Spice Road. Its textile industry that was founded in the Ottoman period continued to develop during the Republican period of the country. New industrial developments



Figure 4. Location of Bursa in Turkey.



Figure 5. A view from the planned labor housing area.

including mainly the textile and the automotive production that began at the 1950s caused the city to expand rapidly. The establishment of the first industrial zone of the country in Bursa in 1966 initiated the rapid and unplanned urbanization process of the city. The macro form of the city, which developed in parallel to six separate master development plans from 1924 to 1984, has a linear geographic attribution of east to west, leaning on the skirts of Uludağ on the south side and expanding towards the abundant plains of Bursa on the north side [19]. The purpose of these strategic plans was to be able to control the rapid urbanization, which was triggered by a 10-year rapid industrialization process from 1960 to 1970. In 1998, “Bursa’s Strategic Plan of 2020” was prepared with the objectives anticipated for the year 2020. The 1/100.000 scaled strategic plan of Bursa and its surroundings, which began to be prepared with a participatory approach in 2010, have not yet been approved.

Besides the domestic migrations that were triggered by the rapid industrialization, immigration from the Balkan countries,⁹ which took place between 1925 and 1995, has increased the need for housing. The grid-layout planned housing area, which was anticipated for the Bulgarian immigrants arriving in 1968, was set up to direct and move such housing process towards the plains of Bursa. Following the foundation of this new district along with the development of the organized industrial zone, this housing area expanding with four separate districts has become a region especially for accommodating labor (**Figure 5**).

Housing needs of such unorganized labor along with the migrating population from the rural areas could only be fulfilled with the partnership-titled plots of land or the illegal ones. Hence, illegal housing was once again triggered by the inability to fulfill the needs of the people with low and middle income, due to the mass immigration in 1989 along with the poor economic circumstances of the time. These illegal housing districts covered very extensive areas, located on the north side of the Mudanya-Bursa-Ankara highway on the west side of the city and the north and south side of the Bursa-Ankara highway on the east side of the city. As to the skirts of Uludağ, another illegal housing area was formed on the upper side of the housing zone in the central city [20]. (**Figure 6**)

⁹Especially Bulgarian immigrants who came with four major waves of mass migration between the years 1925–1949, 1950–1952, 1968–1979 and 1989–1995 caused a huge increase in the amount of housing units.



Figure 6. Some views from illegal neighborhoods in Bursa.

Unfortunately, planned development of the housing areas, which was much needed because of the increasing demand in housing, due to these domestic migrations that were triggered by the increase in employment opportunities, was unable to be expedited. The inability to prevent this process of immigration and domestic migrations, which have significantly changed the social, economic and cultural structure of the population of Bursa, has led to inevitable disappointments of such immigrants and migrants, who were hoping to find employment and obtain decent livelihood. Furthermore, this situation caused a decrease in local residents' quality of life and also a decline in their job opportunities (Figure 7).

Two of the biggest municipalities of Bursa metropolitan city of which areas are subject to immigration have adopted social municipality approach in order to offer solutions not only for their local people but also for the immigrant families. The municipality of Yildirim county, locating on the east of Bursa and hosting the biggest amount of immigrant families, provides too many social facilities. With its slogan of "Safe and peaceful city of Yildirim" and corresponding objectives, the municipal administration has established social centers to facilitate educational courses especially for youngsters and women to help them gain professions.



Figure 7. Some views from changing neighborhoods in Bursa.

Named as “the district halls,” these centers are open to everyone. The most outstanding ones of such social projects, which are conducted with the related NGOs, are as follows: “you are valuable, stay healthy” project to cure and decrease drug abuse among youngsters, “healthy women and happy families in Yıldırım” project to solve the health issues of women, “women’s guesthouse” project to protect and accommodate women who have been subject to violence and “virtuous youth, virtuous Yıldırım” scouting protocol to instil and inspire children and youngsters with moral and ethical values [21].

The municipality of Osmangazi county, locating at the center of Bursa, has also been in demand of the immigrants. Especially, the skirts of the mount Uludag and the plain of Bursa are occupied by illegal houses of the immigrants. Osmangazi Municipality also provides some social facilities for people living in its boundaries. The most noteworthy of them is the “Career Development Courses” that has been offering 75 different kinds of courses in 22 centers and 109 neighborhoods. “Education Houses” in five different districts of the county serve young people and children with their physical opportunities including libraries, computer laboratories, workshop studios, multifunctional halls, sports halls and educators. “Psychological counseling and guidance centers” in four different districts serve the families via individual psychological counseling, family counseling and partner counseling services [22].

Besides these attempts in order to provide a higher quality of life for their citizens and immigrants living in Bursa, these municipalities undertake some urban regeneration implementations in collaboration with the Metropolitan Municipality of Bursa. Although the main aim of these regeneration implementations is to offer a healthy and safe living environment for the residents, they also contribute to overcome the urban deprivation in and around these districts. In Osmangazi county, there are two big urban regeneration projects, one of which has been under construction since 2014. This project includes 2076 housing units and 202 retail units in 420,000 m² area, where 85% of the total area will be green area. The other project is for the regeneration of illegal housing areas over the skirts of the mount Uludag and will be implemented over 7000 m² area including 230 units. In Yıldırım county, urban regeneration operations are carried out in 11 different residential areas, which correspond to 33% of Yıldırım. The construction facilities in two of the areas have already started. The implementation of the one is about to finish, and the design process of the other eight is going on. All of these urban regeneration projects undertaken in two counties of Bursa are developed for the housing areas that need to be strengthen against any probable earthquake. Also, these regeneration areas formerly included unhealthy and unsafe building stock that need to be changed. Some views from these implementations are shown in **Figure 8**.



Figure 8. Some views from urban regeneration studies in Bursa.

5. Conclusion and policy recommendations

Unfortunately, the phenomenon of urban regeneration, which includes sociological, psychological, economic, physical and spatial dimensions, is still not dealt with a holistic approach in Turkey. Demolishing the existing areas and building more housing only with reasons, such as unhealthy conditions and location of a disaster area, are considered and accepted as “urban regeneration.” Construction operations, disregarding the needs and living styles of the residents, but being built with concerns of generating more revenue, result in dense residential blocks, detached from the local contexts and unsatisfactory not only for the residents but also for the citizens. Furthermore, as in many other cities with immigrants, shareholding in adjacent parcels and sharing the right of ownership for residences with no garden is a great economic problem in Bursa. It is a difficult and unresolved process to persuade the beneficiaries and claimants that the right approach is not the “net usage area,” instead “value”-based rights exchange. These problems are observed almost all over Turkey¹⁰.

Economic problems experienced during the renovation of the housing stocks make the process more complicated. The fact that most of the housing stocks of these two counties of Bursa are built on either the dangerous or the protected natural areas makes the operations crucial. Additionally, the low-standard building materials and techniques used in the construction of “squatters” pose a serious threat to the residents. This shows that in real terms, it is definitely essential to begin an “urban regeneration” with the collaboration of all of the actors by using a holistic and participative approach.

It was noted that the priority to determine the areas of urban regeneration is to take over and continue from the point that the previous management had left¹¹. It has also been observed that the management has not been very successful in convincing the public to evaluate properties based on “value” rather than the “usable space,” even though they have tried. On the other hand, it was stated that the flats that were produced through similar constructional operations during previous periods of management have quickly gained value, examples of which should increase and be known by the public, which will make it easier to convince them. However, efforts or even intentions to convince the public that the anticipated new housing areas should be mixed used and vital urban environments were not observed. No participatory approach was adopted to raise the public’s awareness regarding the determination of their expectations and the meaning of actual urban regeneration. The biggest problem of the municipality has been to determine the financial model of the operations conducted as urban regeneration and find the appropriate contracting companies. Considering the dynamics of a middle-income country such as Turkey, the problem in question is undeniable. Nonetheless, it is overlooked or not yet recognized that the implementation of high-quality urban environments fulfilling diverse needs will definitely help in solving such issues.

¹⁰It is also studied and evaluated by many researchers in national and international literature. For example, Candan, A., B., Kolluoğlu, B., 2008; Erman, T., 2001; Karpat, K., 1976; Keyder, Ç., Öncü, A., 1993; Öncü, A., 1988

¹¹The previous management had determined the areas in question based on the priority of the need to strengthen their construction systems to establish earthquake-resistant features.

It can be concluded that the local governments' fight against urban poverty in Bursa is appreciable but unfortunately not effective enough. There are so many municipal initiatives some of which are implemented. There are also voluntary undertakings handled by NGOs. However, the lack of coordination between the related actors brings about waste of time and effort throughout these well-intentioned exertions. Further research is required to plan and organize multidisciplinary studies that should be undertaken with an integrative and participatory approach.

Author details

Arzu Ispalar Çahantimur* and Rengin Beceren Öztürk

*Address all correspondence to: arzucahan@gmail.com

Faculty of Architecture, Uludağ University, Bursa, Turkey

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Employment: A Significant Indicator of Socio-Economic Upward Mobility for the Lost Boys Living in the Kansas City Area

Danvas Ogeto Mabeya

Additional information is available at the end of the chapter

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Abstract

The United States Citizenship and Immigration services (USIS) have a provision that grants refugees who enter the United States permission to work. The government policy requires adult refugees, who are eighteen years and above, get jobs within six months of resettlement. They are to be assisted by agencies specializing in resettlement aid and services to find employment so as to become self-reliant quickly. This study examines the socio-economic dynamics and processes of adjustments the South Sudanese refugees commonly known as the Lost Boys since their resettlement in 2000 in the U.S. The study argues that the resettlement process of the Lost Boys had a problem in the first place in that the Boys were resettled according to their arbitrary given ages. This had important consequences as those resettled as minors had advantages over those resettled as legal adults. The minors, who were resettled as dependents in foster families and started off without economic empowerment, were placed in schools. Those resettled as Legal adults were placed in apartments and were required to start working. This produced a clear reverse trend, in terms of acquisition of social economic capital of the minors over legal adults more than ten years since their resettlement.

Keywords: human capital, refugees, assigned ages, unaccompanied children, migration

1. Introduction

1.1. Historical perspective of Sudan

Sudan has continuously sustained civil wars among its demographic, religious, and racial groups for over four decades since its independence from Great Britain in 1956. The war

of 1983 triggered the exodus of the young Southern Sudanese Boys, commonly known as, the Lost Boys. Many South Sudanese refugees dream of 1 day returning to what most have termed as their “motherland” [1]. However, this dream was short lived. Before most could even set foot in their newest country, the world plunged into yet another conflict between the Southerners (tribal/ethnic groups). This conflict has been termed a “civil war” by some international monitoring agencies [2]. Once again, hope was lost. This “civil war” has continued into the better part of 2017 [3].

1.2. The start of the epic journey

As indicated above, the road-map of this study goes back to events starting in the 1980s. The Lost Boys are primarily refugees from Southern Sudan (Dinka and Nuer cultures). They are a very social group given that they were raised in rural areas of South Sudan where they worked as pastoralists and herders, spoke the same language, belonged to the same ethnic groups, practiced the same religion, were young Boys with similar economic status and had little to no formal education.

In the late 1980s, more than 33,000 boys were forced from their homes due to outbreaks of violence in Southern Sudan. The Sudanese (Islamic/Muslim) government attacked the rebels in the south, killing civilians and enslaving young girls. Young boys who took herds of cattle out to the grazing fields were instead forced to run for their lives. The journey of these young Boys who managed to survive began with them migrating from Sudan. They joined together in small groups and made their way first to Ethiopia, back to Sudan, then to Kenya [4]. The International Red Cross, which found them as they walked to Kenya, named them the Lost Boys, since they arrived in Kenya unaccompanied by their parents. These Boys were named after characters from the story Peter Pan. More so, these Boys did not know whether their families were alive or dead. The phrase Lost Boys was used to identify those who did not know where their families were. The international agency, United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), took them to the Kakuma refugee camps in Northern Kenya. While at the refugee camps, these Boys were housed, fed, medically treated and modestly educated from primary to high school [5]. By the time they reached the refugee camps, they had walked nearly 1000 miles. Approximately 10,000 Boys, of the original 33,000 who started the epic journey, arrived in Kenya [4]. It was here, that they were prepared for the long journey of resettlement in the U.S in 2000.

2. The research question

The central research problem investigated in this study is: What factors enhanced or hindered the refugee South Sudanese Lost Boys living in the Kansas City area access and penetrate the U.S. labor market after resettlement in 2000?

2.1. The 1980 refugee act

Established in 1980, the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives created the U.S. Homeland Security Act that was meant to ensure that refugees become self-sufficient as quickly as

possible. The House of Representatives in 2002 established a new status for unaccompanied refugee children termed “unaccompanied alien children” (UAC). To qualify under this act, a refugee had to be less than 18 years old, lack lawful immigration status and upon arrival in the U.S., be without parents or guardians. This contradicts with the Refugee Act of 1980. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report states that congress must (1) provide a uniform procedure for refugee admissions and (2) authorize federal assistance to resettle refugees and promote their self-sufficiency [6].

2.2. The resettlement program and process

The resettlement and eventually integration of about 3600 Sudanese Lost Boys by the U.S government and Red Cross in 2000, was aimed at providing the Lost Boys with education and an environment in which they would overcome trauma. In the process, they would also be shielded from being victims of child soldiering in Sudan [5, 7]. The recruitment exercise was expected to go on for the rest of the Lost Boys, but was brought to a halt by the terrorist attacks on the U.S., September 11, 2001. Bixler says, “about 100 of the 3,800 Boys were still waiting to be interviewed after the 9/11 event” [5]. The resettlement of the refugee “South Sudanese Lost Boys” started with the arrival of small groups in 2000. The resettlement criterion was based on their ages unaccompanied by their parents or families. The International Rescue Committee stated that since most of the arriving Lost Boys were deemed to be over 18 and thus considered young adults, they did not qualify for foster care. “We placed the older boys together in apartments to try to maintain the kind of support network that they developed throughout their difficult journey”. Most of these “Boys”, however, did not know their birth dates and were randomly assigned an age (minors or legal adults) by the U.S. government/UN to facilitate their resettlement process [4, 8]. When physically examined in the refugee camps, the “Boy” who did not know their age was given January 1 as their date of birth. The intent was to make them eligible to receive U.S. government benefits for unaccompanied minors [9]. As stated above, the resettlement of the refugee “Lost Boys” was done in two categories (according to their assigned ages). The first group consisted of those who were 18 years or younger. This group was resettled as minors. They were placed with foster families who assisted them with going to school. The second group consisted of those who were 18 years and older. They were considered young adults. They were placed in apartments and expected to get jobs to start paying their bills. This group was not given a chance to immediately go to school after resettlement [10].

2.3. Primary findings: consequences of arbitrary assigned age resettlement

There were challenges that many were unprepared for from the demographic age resettlement arrangements. The Lost Boys that were considered minors were placed with foster families where they received different levels of support. Those Lost Boys that were considered legal adults had to secure employment immediately and learn how to fend for themselves. For 3 months they were provided a living space free of rent, but they had to be prepared to start paying for their living establishment after the 3 months was over. Once they began working, they were expected to repay certain medical expenses and the cost of the airplane tickets that allowed them to leave Africa. Some boys found it necessary to work two or three jobs to raise enough money to pay their bills and remit support to their families back in Africa. They also learned that

acquisition of English language skills was primary to secure even a manual job in the U.S., not to mention lack of previous work experience, as most had not worked in Africa [10].

2.4. Their expectations after resettlement

Finding a safe sanctuary, an education and a job, was uttermost to every participant in my study. This finding can be supported by Muhindi and Nyakato which underlined the expectations of the Lost Boys finding a safe environment in the U.S. in which they could move freely, express themselves without fear and realize their dreams of education and professional careers [11]. They also hoped to get well-paying jobs which would enable them to build their socio-economic upward mobility and remit money back home to help those left behind. Once resettled, the U.S. government and Red Cross planned to give the Boys an education, while allowing them to heal from extremely severe trauma [5].

3. Secondary migration

According to Dustmann, immigrants are very rational when it comes to choosing their place of residence in a new country. They are aware of favorable and unfavorable conditions in their new environment. Therefore, immigrants and refugees, who thought they might be resettled in unfavorable environment, which might not have many social opportunities, will relocate after some time to places where they will maximize their window of opportunities [12]. Immigrants and refugees will tend to relocate to areas where their own ethnic communities reside and in this way, they will share both economic and social assets. It is very common for immigrants to relocate to other states and cities in search of better work, cheaper housing, safer neighborhoods or to be closer to friends or family [13]. According to John Gak, President of the Brothers Organization for Relief, most of the Lost Boys who lived in Kansas City, relocated from other states in the U.S. [14]. The United States Federal government allows refugees, once legally admitted and resettled, to relocate to states and cities they deem to be conducive for their stay. This is like any other legal resident of the U.S. [15]. However, this migration can result in a high concentration of an ethnic population in one area. Critics see this as a rejection of assimilation of immigrant groups into the host society; resulting in those immigrants not becoming proficient in English language, consumption patterns, attitudes, customs, and family values [12].

Janzen, El-Hasan, Lohrentz and Hartnett, assert "Kansas had been demographically viewed as white, mainstream Americana by the media for a long time. Indeed, Barnett reported the then Kansas Senator, Sam Brownback, had opposed the resettlement of Somali Bantu refugees from Africa citing their huge populations and cultural differences" [16, 17]. He later gave in, partly because states have no say or control over refugee resettlement programs (Refugee Protection Act of 2001). He ended up supporting this bill and has been a key supporter of resettlement programs of Kansas refugees, more so, the "Sudanese Lost Boys." Some of whom he has met with personally.

In their empirical research on why East African immigrants moved to Kansas City, Janzen found that socio-economic reasons have been the most important factors. In their final report to the Kansas Humanities Council, they concluded that some of the most important reasons why many African immigrants relocated to the Kansas City area from other states was:

"life was more straight-forward in the Midwest than in big cities of the East; educational opportunities were available more advantageously; raising families was possible." [16]

These opportunities attracted African immigrants from other States and cities to the Kansas City area. On the other hand, David James argues in his work, *"The Racial State Theory"*, that the movement of the blacks from the southern States to Kansas, represented an escape from the South's repression toward a free state. After conducting interviews with the Lost Boys, I found those Boys who migrated to Kansas, did so because of the same reasons given above by Janzen et al. as their important motivation. One participant in this study said:

"A lot of lost boys came from other states. Many of the lost boys came to Kansas City because of jobs. Another thing is that if you have a 'Lost Boy' who is your friend, you can call him to come and live with you." [18]

Laura Berger stated that Peter Nyarol Dut, one of the Lost Boys, left Houston, Texas for Kansas because he was frustrated with trying to make ends meet financially and trying to get to school [19]. Dut felt discriminated against and it was difficult to adjust to the urban environment in Houston. Dut thought the only reason he came to the U.S. was to go to school. His cousin in Olathe told him that Olathe East High School had accepted some Sudanese refugees and that he stood a chance of being accepted. That being the case, Dut made the decision to relocate to Olathe, Kansas. An article by Nancy Beardsley of Voice of America asserted that new waves of immigrants were transforming Kansas City. This included African-Americans moving from the southern U. S., to more northern states [20]. Many immigrants are attracted to opportunities provided to them in Kansas City as confirmed by one Ethiopian immigrant, Daniel Fikru. Fikru came to Kansas to seek opportunity and he had this to say:

"Kansas City is not a crowded place. There's a lot of opportunity. Housing and education is affordable." [20]

Many immigrants are attracted to both social and economic opportunities availed to them in Kansas City that are not easily available in other states. Today, the Kansas and Missouri area can be said to be a major destination for African immigrants.

3.1. Human capital theory consideration

Human capital theory, a proposal by Schultz in 1961 and developed by Becker in 1964, is a theory that has its foundation in labor economics. Labor economics refers to the study of workforce and productivity. According to the proponents of human capital theory, human capital enhances cognitive base of economically productive human capacity. That is the ability and investment in people [21]. Traditionally (pre-industrial societies), economic power of human beings was

dependent on material asserts such as land, animals, and even family size as a source of labor [22]. Unlike traditional societies, industrial societies depend on heavy investment in education, skills, and health of the population to foster economic growth of societies [23]. In what McLuhan refers to as a "Global Village", training and skills are a vital capital needed in order for individuals to fully participate in the new and competitive global economy. Human capital has become a key tool for economic success not only in the Western world but around the world. In the U.S. for example, education is the key to good life [10, 24]. So, what is Human Capital Theory?

Adam Smith defines human capital as the accumulation of competencies, knowledge, and personality attributes embodied in the capability to perform a task to produce an economic value [25]. This is acquired through education and experience of a willing individual. Becker contends, human capital is realized through the amount of investment an individual is able to generate [23]. Full time investment in education is a good example of human capital in the Western world involving direct costs. Because of high costs involved in training individuals, Fagerlind and Saha argue that "human capital theory provides a basic justification for large public expenditure on education both in developing and developed nations [26]." The outcome of this large expenditure is realized through "rapid economic growth for society." For individuals this could be seen through individual economic success and achievement. For society it would be seen through growth and wealth of a given society. A good example of such success of investment in human capital is referred to in economics as the "Asian Tigers" Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan [27]. The World Bank 1993 report indicated that the success of those countries depended on the quality of education they provided to their citizens. Olaniyan and Okemakinde suppose that education can be equated to an economic good [28]. This is because it is not easily obtainable and thus a need to be apportioned. They go on to say, economists have come to regard education as both "consumer" and "capital good." It can be used to enhance human resources vital for economic and social change. Individuals look into future income after investing presently and differed consumption. Various economic terms have been used to measure human capital: education, science and technological advancement, and research and innovation.

Fitzsimons explains that reformulation of human capital theory can be realized through education and training in the new global economy. He goes on to say "Under Human Capital Theory the basis for nation state structural policy frameworks is the enhancement of *labor flexibility* through regulatory reform in the labor market." This is done by "raising skill levels by additional investment in education, training and employment schemes, and immigration focused on attracting high-quality human capital." Therefore, human capital can be seen as an abstract form of labor as a commodity [29]. Idris Mgobozi on the other hand, contends that the labor market is a social institution, whereby people invest in their capacity for labor and reap as much as they can in the labor market by being rewarded in return by higher wages. He goes on to say, individuals who are more educated earn more than those who are less educated [30]. More so, employers are likely to hire workers who are highly educated because they can be trained in a short period for a specific job with low costs. Well-educated individuals can quickly and successfully adjust to rapidly changing and dynamic economic conditions in the labor market [31, 32].

Most of the participant refugee Lost Boys in my study were in collegiate institutions by the time of the interviews, although some were working part time jobs. Those who had already acquired collegiate education had an opportunity to compete with Americans in the labor

market and this would lead to both social and economic upward mobility. The group of Lost Boys that had not managed to acquire proficiency in English had difficulty in securing a job and more so interacting with Americans [10]. David Haines states that refugee economic self-sufficiency is the principle goal of the U.S refugee resettlement policy as stipulated in the Refugee Act of 1980 [33]. This self-sufficiency principle is embedded in “The Federal Refugee Resettlement Program to provide for the effective resettlement of refugees and to assist them to achieve economic self-sufficiency as quickly as possible after arrival in the United States” [34].

3.1.1. Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR)

To effectively execute this refugee policy, the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) was forthwith established under the Department of Health and Human Services, which is headed by a Director under the Refugee act of 1980 [34]. Section 412. [8 U.S.C. 1522] (1) (B) provides the intent of congress as:

- i. employable refugees should be placed in jobs as soon as they arrive in the U.S; Section (2) (C) provides that the Director may recognize and take into account,
- ii. the availability of employment opportunities, affordable housing, public and private resources (including educational, healthcare, and mental health services) for refugees in the area, and
- iii. the likelihood of refugees becoming self-sufficient and free from long-term dependence on public assistance [34].

These stipulations are consistent with agencies that assist refugees with resettlement objectives. This is done through empowering refugees with human capital through education and training that enable them to access and penetrate the U.S. job markets. In the case of the refugee Lost Boys, Martha Donkor contends that those who had attended African or Arab learning institutions, found that the social capital carried with them from Africa was inefficient in American Society [35]. So, in schools they learned to do away with their low valued social capital with higher valued American capital that was valued by educators, employers, and American society. The degree of integration, assimilation, and even getting employed; depended on how fast each individual “Lost Boy” managed to do away with their original capital, while adopting American values [35].

4. Instruments and procedure

4.1. Ethnography

It is important to give this study an ethnographic approach given cultural elements (language, beliefs, values, and practices) of the Lost Boys are included in this study to enhance understanding of the processes of integration, assimilation, and/or marginalization of these Boys. Harris and Johnson define ethnography as “a descriptive account of social life and culture in a particular social system based on detailed observations of what people actually do.” Hammersley and Atkinson go a step further to say, “ethnography refers primarily to a specific method or set of

methods used in research or study" [36, 37]. This study draws from Ager and Strang's demographic and cultural/ethnographic criteria by examining key human development indicators to elucidate the relative degree of assimilation of each participant "Lost Boy" since their resettlement in 2000. These indicators included whether the Lost Boys were employed, had an education, had acquired English language proficiency, participated in community activities such as politics and sports, had become U.S. citizens, participated in U. S. cultural activities, and practiced religions [38]. However, the two scholars caution that achievement in any of the above indicators does not necessarily suggest successful integration, but rather serve as means to achieve integration.

4.2. Research protocol

I opted to use qualitative research methods in this study. Rather than seeking validation, this study seeks to retain the rich original data in detail. In this study, purely quantitative methods are unlikely to elucidate the raw primary data necessary to address the research problem. Although both qualitative and quantitative studies seek to explain causal relationships, the latter is more variable-centered. Also, since this study is based on open-ended questions, it makes sense to apply qualitative research tools. Furthermore, it is hoped that an interested quantitative researcher will be able to take the conceptual tools developed in this study and apply them to isolate relevant variables in future research.

4.3. The study location

This study applies a multiple case study model, which provides the methodology for collection of data from randomly selected participants [39]. The study employs an information-oriented sampling technique (snowball) in which the participants refer or name their friends or other individuals in the population as potential interviewees [40]. This technique enables me to get 40 participants. Data used in this study was collected on July 25, 2009 from the participating Sudanese Lost Boys in the greater Kansas City area. Primary investigation with the Lost Boys participating in the study indicated that there were about 100 Lost Boys living in the greater Kansas City area (this number was not verified because official data was not available). All participants were 18 years and above at the time of their respective interviews. The interviews were conducted at the residence of one participant who was attending Johnson County Community College. He also acted as the liaison for the study and coordinated interviews held in his home. Data collection protocol for this study included in-depth and standard unstructured interviews, life stories, participant observation, informal conversation, and spending time with the Lost Boys.

4.4. Data collection agenda

The interviews were conducted face-to-face in English, while being recorded and later transcribed and analyzed. Face-to-face interviews allowed for the collection of observational data, such as facial expressions. Each interview ranged from half an hour to over 2 hours, with the majority being around an hour and a half. Although using an interview schedule, this study was flexible enough to allow the participants' time to reflect and then answer (not rushing their responses). Though some participants did not respond to all questions sited to them, it

remained important to make sure that further information was harnessed by making follow ups at the end of the interview. Since the study used open-ended questions, it took a two-way communication where the interviewee asked for more relevant information when needed. The same questions were asked repeatedly to each participant and a saturation point was reached at 40 face-to-face interviews. This prompted the end of the interview process.

4.5. Data analysis

After conducting interviews with the Lost Boys, I transcribed the digitally recorded interviews and used the data as the primary research source. I assigned the responses in a coded form, where respondents were just called participants instead of using their real names. I employed a thematic system using Ager and Strang's [38] demographic and cultural/ethnographic criteria for my data analysis and identified common themes. A thematic system protects the confidentiality of individual participants instead of presenting individual cases. (Confidentiality of the participants in this research was of great importance, as they demanded this type of protection.) I designed a table (see Mabeya [10], Figure 9, p. 135) where I developed the major themes and sub-themes, which I later transformed into categories. In this case, all data were classified according to the main themes and sub-themes. A multiple case study framework was used to analyze the 40 cases. The sub-themes were based on the level of education a given participant had achieved: high school diploma and/or college degree. The type of education they received was sometimes reflected in the type of job or employment secured by an individual. However, this did not mean that those who were highly educated and had better jobs made more money than those who did manual work. Some manual jobs paid incredibly well. Those working as mechanics, in construction, and/

Education and English language			
	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3
Number	8	8	24
Adult/minor	Minor	Adult	Adult
Able to communicate with other African American immigrants	Yes, in English	No, common language with other groups	Could communicate in English and Swahili common to most Africans
Education in Africa	5	0	Yes
Continuing English Language proficiency	Immersed in American families	Enrolled in ESL difficult to learn English—lack of immersion and interaction	
Schooling in U.S.	Yes—after foster families assisted with tuition	Enrolled in English as a Second Language (ESL)	Yes
Financial assistance/income	FF paid tuition FF provided housing and helped with daily living	Difficult to find a job	Due to schooling, many were unable to find a job.

Table 1. Human capital.

or electricians, all commanded a high hourly wage. Alluding to Wolcott and Berg, each cautioned against drawing hasty conclusions and suggested that, “researchers should conduct open ‘coding.’” This would not only lead to ‘opening the inquiry widely,’ but, also, as Wolcott put it, ...keep breaking down elements until they are small enough units to invite rudimentary analysis, then begin to build the analysis from there” [41, 42]. As stated by K.M. Eisenhardt, if all participants or most participants provide similar results, then there exists substantial support for the development of a preliminary theory that describes the validity of the phenomena [43]. Three major themes emerged during this study and recurred among nearly all participants from the above 11 categories mentioned earlier (**Tables 1 and 2**). *Education (Human capital)*, *Employment (economic empowerment)*, and, *Citizenship (naturalization)*. Participants are then categorized into three themes depending on the social capital they possessed at the time of the interviews (see **Table 3**).

Naturalization			
	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3
Number	15	15	10
Adult/minor	Adults	3 minors 12 adults	5 minors 5 adults
U.S. permanent resident	No	Yes	Yes
U.S. citizen	No	No	Yes
Visit Africa	No	Yes	Yes
Bring families to U.S.	No	No	Yes
Financial assistance	No	Able to get student loans and unemployment benefits	Minors—yes Adults—no

Table 2. Citizenship.

Economic empowerment					
	Group 1		Group 2		Group 3 Group 4
Number	8		8		10 14
Adult/minor	Minor		Adult		Adult Adult
School/English in Africa	5		No		Some Some
Work in Africa	No		No		Some No
Financial assistance	Supported by foster families who received financial assistance		Yes		Yes Yes
Education in U.S.	Yes		No		Yes No
Work in U.S.	No—not allowed due to being a minor		Required to work—difficult to find employment—no work skills—little English—temp manual labor jobs		Yes Yes

Table 3. Employment.

5. Presenting the employment findings

For most refugees from developing countries (including the Lost Boys), economic empowerment can only be achieved through employment using human capital. Unfortunately, from the days of early childhood in Sudan through their exodus in Africa and eventual resettlement in the U.S., the Lost Boys never experienced an accommodating peaceful environment. It is only after resettlement in the U.S. that they recaptured their chance to get an education. Empowered with education, most Boys are now in a position to acquire employment in the American labor market. Those that are already employed have become economically self-sufficient [10]. A Halpern's 2008 report prepared for U. S. Department of Health and Human Services concluded that, economic self-sufficiency is very important for successful resettlement of refugees as stipulated in the U. S. Refugee Act of 1980 [44]. According to federal regulations, economic self-sufficiency is defined as "the total earnings of a family that enables it to support itself without external financial assistance" [44]. Sara McKinnon contends that the resettlement program for the Lost Boys in the U.S. was one of the most successful ever in U.S. history, given that nearly all the Boys who were legal adults at the time of their resettlement got employed [45]. The Office of Refugee Resettlement published the employment percentage of the Lost Boys at 85%; whereas, that rate was 55% for other refugees in the U.S. in 2003. Moreover, the ORR found economic opportunity, language, and education to be key for economic self-sufficiency [34]. A study done by Potocky and McDonald identified the length of residence, citizenship, and secondary migration to be related to economic self-sufficiency [46].

The following section categorizes the Lost Boys into four groups relative to the major theme of employment from my research. Participants in the first group were resettled as minors and were legally barred from working and instead were placed in foster families who sponsored their education in American schools. The second group was composed of Boys who had no labor and professional skills before their resettlement in the U.S. The third group arrived in the U.S. with minimal skills and education acquired in Africa. The fourth group acquired professional experience and skills, only after arrival in the U.S.

The first group: Due to their young ages and scarcity of employment opportunities, eight participants in this study did not work in Africa. Although they were sent out to the fields to tend to family cattle, this was not considered to be a job; it was considered to be an obligation to the family. Boys who were sent out to graze cattle were not paid. This group of Boys were resettled in the U.S. and placed under the care of foster families legally entrusted with their welfare. Foster families received assistance from the government and other refugee agencies in support of resettlement programs (according to the participants the foster families got financial, food assistance, and tax breaks). These Boys were not allowed to work in the U.S. because they were considered minors according to U.S. law. However, they had the opportunity to go to school while growing up. These Boys had become young adults by the time of this study and had moved out of the foster families homes; lived on their own or with other adults Boys. One participant said:

When I first came to the United States I was placed in a foster family in California. I was told I was a minor by resettlement agencies. I did not know my real age, though they said my age was thirteen years old. The foster family took care of me. They paid for my school, bought me clothes, books, and food. They also assisted me get a job when I become nineteen years. With a job, I decided to move out and live on my own before relocating to Kansas from California.

Another participant who had relocated from Dallas, Texas to Kansas City said:

I don't know what would have happened if I was left to live alone. In the United States, life is so expensive. My foster family helped me a lot. They took me as their child. They provided me with all that I needed. They took me to school because I did not get a chance to go to school in Africa. They even allowed me to use their phone to call family and friends in Africa. I am so grateful of them. I call them once in a while. They always want me to go visit, but I don't have time now that I work two jobs.

The second group: This was a group of eight Boys who arrived in the U.S. as young adults. They were required to start working immediately after arrival. However, this group possessed no working or professional skills prior to their arrival. This is because they did not have a chance to go to school in Africa. Those in this group who had a chance to go to school did not speak English because they went through Egypt, where the language of instruction was only Arabic. This group of Boys had problems getting employment because they did not possess the working skills needed and were not fluent in English. Due to this, most of them could only get temporary jobs as manual laborers. One participant said:

I did not have a job in Africa. I lived and depended on my parents going to school and back home. I only managed to get a job when I was resettled in the U.S. I have worked different jobs and made a lot of money. I currently work with a construction company making \$20 an hour.

However, they were all enrolled in English as a Second Language (ESL) classes in Kansas City where they were learning how to speak and write English. A few of those in this group had graduated from these programs and were already enrolled in two-year college programs in Kansas City learning institutions. This participant said:

I did not have a job nor go to school in Africa. I only took care of my family cattle. My family had a lot of cattle, maybe a thousand. They were passed on to my dad from my grandfather before he died. I like cattle a lot. Now that I am in the U.S, I have to be on my own. I have to pay my bills, go to school and pay tuition... I cannot get a nice paying job because I am not fluent in English. But one day when I will be fluent in English, I will get a good job.

Another participant gave this exciting response:

"I don't know whether Americans really understand Africa and Africans. They just resettled us in different states without asking us where we wanted to settle. I moved here because I did not want to live in New York. That one is big for me. I like small towns. I can't even speak English of big towns. I don't have any work experience that they require in big cities. I just wish they could resettle me in a farm where I could take care of cattle like I did in Sudan."

The third group: This group was composed of 10 participants who possessed some education and working skills accrued from Africa. McKinnon would consider the resettlement of this third group of participants as “successful” because they secured employment and enrolled in higher institutions of learning (colleges) [45]. Although their English was not fluent, they were able to adapt to American English. Due to this, American employers were ready to hire them. Some of them had some work experience from Africa. In addition, this group received education in the Kenyan refugee camps where English was a part of the Kenyan educational curriculum and a language of instruction. It was easy for participants in this group to fill out application forms for employment on their own. Some of them had already completed 2-year associate degrees and were working. One participant described his work experience in Africa and in America as follows:

In Africa I worked. I worked with a Chinese company in a high-rise in Nairobi. There was an estate which was being built over there. That was in 1996. I worked with them up to 98, then left to join St. Kizito. I finished in 2000. I did my practices, then I worked in a workshop. It was inside St. Kizito. They were not paying me very well. But I was just forcing myself because I needed to provide for my family and I needed some money. I have a family. I did not come with my parents. If I was to be with my parents I would not have suffered. I would have just concentrated on my education. My dad is there for me and my mother is there for me. I came to the United States through Catholic Charities. They sponsored me for three months. They gave me food stamps and some household stuff. They looked for me a job. Then from there I never saw them again. That was in 2005. Four and half years ago. They don't know what I am doing, how I am surviving.

Another participant said:

Yea, yea, in Africa, I work in, you know, just in a lab. Like in Khartoum, I work in a market. I worked for somebody, not for me. We stay in the market and someone came to buy something you know. That one I do in Sudan. Then Egypt, too, I work in a company like America but I don't have money because America here you work two company. Is good. They give, you know, five hundred two weeks. In Egypt I think it is....aaahhh \$60 for a month. You don't work for hour. I now work here for \$8 an hour. Is good. You work 8 hours for \$8 is not bad. But in Egypt no hours. It is a month.

He added:

In the United States it is very difficult survive if you don't have job. Most people will not even want to live with you. You don't have job, that one is difficult. In Africa you can survive even without a job. Your family, neighbors and even the community can take care of you. They can provide housing and food.

According to Latkiewicz and Anderson, employers report that refugees have difficulty in correctly filling out application forms [47]. The actual process of job application is foreign to most refugee Lost Boys as participant explained:

In Africa we did not have to apply for jobs. If we wanted to work, we just went into an office and asked some if there was work, and if there was we just got it. I don't have English to write application because somebody is busy and don't have time to fill my application. I don't have to do anything.

More so,

At work, you don't have to speak well. Some people don't address you because they see you like different...different because, you know, another language, it is difficult to learn. In the future I don't know what I want to be or do because I don't have English or education for now. Aaaahhh, I try this one for three years. I know something for that one. That, I think, I will know what I will want to be. Now.... Doctor is good for me because how can people here in the United States be good and help me. I go help people in a lot of place, too.

The fourth group: This group was comprised of 14 participants who did not have work experience from Africa. Though some of them went to school in Kenyan refugee camps of Kakuma, they did not have a chance to work there, as work opportunities in refugee camps were limited. This group acquired working skills only after they arrived in the U.S. This group did not have a lot of problems getting simple manual jobs because they could speak English. Most of them said they received on-site job training. Six of these participants worked in nursing homes where they took care of the elderly. Trained as Certified Nursing Assistant (CNA). One participant said:

I did my high school at the Kenyan refugee camp of Kakuma. I was advised it was easy to get a job on arrival in the U.S. in a nursing home but I had to get some training. So I took a three month course and graduated as a CNA. After that It was not hard for me to get a job in nursing homes. This a job many Americans don't like to do.

Another participant said:

I work at the....My first job was in a hotel at Casino (inaudible), that was my first year when I got to the United States, I worked a year or so, I was going to a community college. My second job was working at the nursing home as a nursing aid (nursing assistant). And my, ahhhh, I don't think I can remember all, I worked at a chemist (a pharmacy company). I am working now at what they call Wall Fund. There are different jobs. There is no really single job that I have worked.

5.1. Discussion

It is clear from this study that the Lost Boys, though being handicapped with the lack of English Language, they were ready to learn and move up the social ladder in American society. They were eager and motivated. However, a small number of those who participated in this study seemed not to be highly motivated because of the lack of English language skills. Sponsorship of the U.S. government and other refugee interest groups played a key role in resettling newly arrived refugees. This role was even greater for refugees who came from very poor countries and of different cultures. From the research finding of this study, the resettlement programs for the Lost Boys who were resettled as minors, had advantages in resettlement over those resettled as legal adults. This is because the Lost Boys were resettled according to their assigned arbitrary ages. The minors were resettled in foster families and were not allowed to seek employment until they were of legal age to work (18 years and above). Therefore, they started off without economic empowerment. Those that were resettled as legal adults were expected to get jobs immediately so that they could

pay their bills (housing and other utilities). In this way, there was a clear reverse trend in terms of acquisition of social and cultural capital of the adult Boys since their resettlement more than 10 years ago. Those resettled as legal adults seemed to struggle with balancing to work, acquiring English language skills and going to school. Those considered minors were placed with foster families starting off as dependents, but ended up having a better opportunity of acquiring English language from their foster families. The experiences they received in American schools helped them greatly improve their English language skills by interacting with American children [10]. This was not my expectation. I expected to find those Lost Boys who had started working immediately after resettlement to be doing well in terms of education and finances. This was not the case though. It became clear after my research that allocation of placement of the “Lost Boys” based on arbitrary ages, had serious consequences in terms of their integration, assimilation, and employment as time went by.

5.2. Analysis

My primary investigations found those immigrant/refugees in the Metropolitan Kansas City areas who do not have job skills, who are not fluent in the English language or have no college education; tend to look for employment in ethnically owned businesses of people from their original countries (Mexicans, Cubans, Vietnamese, Chinese, and Somalis). I classify this group of immigrants/refugees as enclave laborers. However, this is not the case with the Lost Boys since not many Sudanese immigrant’s own businesses in the Kansas City area. Lost Boys in the Kansas City area have no alternative but to look for jobs run by Americans or foreign investors. In this case, the basic underlying condition for them is to have professional skills and to be fluent in the English language in order to get an American job and be able to keep it. James Tollefson argues that getting any job in America, maintaining a job, and advancing to even a better job depends to a large extent on English language proficiency for immigrants. Employers in most cases take it for granted that the failure of refugees not clearly understanding what they are instructed to do, is a major weakness in terms of productivity in the work place [48]. Lack of education and English proficiency skills led some “Lost Boys” to live in ethnic enclaves and in segregation [35]. This further lead to their exclusion from social and labor markets since employers seem reluctant to employ people who do not speak English or do not have professional skills [10]. The Lost Boys who were resettled as minors had an advantage by living with foster families who took care of them. The foster families also took them to schools where they were enrolled. They also paid their tuition and other expenses. Those Lost Boys that were resettled as legal adults seemed to be struggling after 10 years of their resettlement. They were placed in apartments and were required to start working immediately after their resettlement. They were to repay all their resettlement expenses from Africa to the U.S. They were also to repay their air tickets. In this case, the legal adults did not have the opportunity to go to school immediately after their resettlement. They were not immediately integrated into American culture, which is readily available in learning institutions through teachers and students. This led some of them to be marginalized or self-excluded from society [10].

6. Conclusion

Resettlement in a new country is often challenging due to: new culture, food, values, languages, social life and the environment. As opposed to economic and academic immigrants who prepare and learn more about their new host country before relocating, many refugees do not have much time and choice. Any assistance that refugees can get becomes handy. Whereas, the U.S. government has assisted unaccompanied minors from Cuba, Haiti and Vietnam, much attention was given to the “Sudanese Lost Boys”. This was because the Lost Boys underwent many traumatic experiences in Africa before their resettlement in the U.S. in 2000. Unlike other unaccompanied refugees, the Lost Boys had to walk about 1000 miles before they were rescued by the international community from the Sudanese army who wanted to persecute them. The U.S. government has helped the Lost Boys a great deal in their resettlement programs. The government not only provided housing and other social welfare amenities, but also assisted the legal adult Lost Boys to get employment. This was done through assigned agencies that were allocated the responsibilities to see that those legal adults got jobs.

Employment of refugees in host societies is probably one of the significant indicators of their adjustment/acculturation and thus integration/assimilation. This leads the refugees into becoming economically self-sufficient in their new environment. From the above discussions, you can see that the acquisition of the English language was among the barriers the Lost Boys had to overcome to secure employment. This was the primary and most important barrier. Another barrier was the lack of previous work experience (professional skills) since most of them never worked in Africa. Only in rare cases did school-aged children work in Africa. The vast-majority depended on their parents to provide everything; whereas, in the U.S., children as young as 16 years of age are allowed to work in small businesses. Orphaned and resettled in the U.S., the Lost Boys who were not placed in foster care had to learn quickly to fend for themselves. They soon found nothing was for free in the U.S. This point was driven home when they were asked to start repaying the purchase price of the airplane tickets from Africa, as well as certain medical expenses as soon as they started working. Some Boys found it necessary to work two or three jobs in order to raise enough money to pay their bills, tuition, and also to remit some finances to people back in Africa.

Research in this study identified advantages and challenges associated with the arbitrarily assigned ages to each of the Lost Boys. While they were doing well, challenges still existed that tested their individual resilience. Minors received social and educational support from foster families, while those who were legal adults, largely had to fend for themselves. It was very difficult for some legal adults to secure employment because some of them lacked work skills and were not proficient in English on arrival in the U.S. Therefore, as stated earlier, “experience” defined by age was a handicap once the human capital of the participants was analyzed. It was interesting from this study to find out how much more human capital was possessed by Lost Boys resettled as minors relative to those resettled as adults, especially

given the fact that all of these Boys are now legal adults. The findings in this study suggest that one's age and the treatment of people by their arbitrary assigned ages (minors/adults) can play an important role in shaping the kind of capital and opportunities made available to individuals. Therefore, the Lost Boys, though resettled at nearly the same time, had a wide range of integration experiences. Some Boys have disappeared into the margins of American society, while some have become very successful in the American society.

Finally, I would say, it would be an immigration process improvement in the future for the policy makers to avail equal opportunities to all refugees resettled in the U.S. no matter what their age, race, gender, disability, and nationality.

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Author details

Danvas Ogeto Mabeya

Address all correspondence to: danvasm@yahoo.com

Southeast Community College, Lincoln, United States of America

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Social Capital as Survival Strategy for Immigrants in South Africa: A Conceptual Framework

Nosipho Hlatshwayo and Kambidima Wotela

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Abstract

Social survival strategies are premised on relations anchored around ethnicity, culture, nationality, and language. Out of this strategy is the concept of social capital which is defined as the link that allow people to discover opportunities as well as employment based in social relationships with previous migrants. There is no doubt that foreign nationals utilise different forms of social capital to achieve different means—the reliance on family at the point of entry to access shelter and employment opportunities whereas they access friendships and networks within the employment circles to access other employment opportunities. The aim of this research is to detail how foreign nationals employ social capital networks as a survival strategy in South African urban townships using Diepsloot, found in the northwest of Johannesburg, as a case study. It is an important study because there is a lack of literature linking social capital as a survival strategy. We focus on social capital because it is a propeller—at least at initial and transition stages of migration—to access other forms of survival strategies. This paper, before all else, derives a conceptual framework that should guide the empirical part of such a research.

Keywords: migration, survival strategy, migrant networks, social capital networks
theoretical framework, conceptual framework

1. Introduction

Social survival strategies are premised on relations anchored around ethnicity, culture, nationality, and language. Out of this strategy is the concept of social capital which is defined as the link that allow people to discover opportunities as well as employment based in social relationships with previous migrants [1]. Recent literature, for example [2–4], has reflected on social capital networks as a facilitator of survival among foreign nationals in the context

of the South African development trajectory and international migration. Regardless, the focus on how social capital networks actually facilitate continued migration is inadequate to guide policy and legislative shift on immigration. Inevitably, this implies absent or inadequate social interventions to support foreign nationals residing in South African urban townships. This is of interest because the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa as well as a number of international declarations ratified by South Africa guarantee social, physical, and economic rights to those that 'live in the Republic' [5]. This implies a need to understand the role and extent of social capital network as a survival strategy among foreign nationals. Such knowledge will expose the gap and, therefore, facilitate the development of responsive and progressive state-driven interventions meant to uphold the full rights of foreign nationals in South Africa.

Therefore, ultimately, this research intends to understand how foreign nationals in South Africa use social capital networks to survive through a case study, Diepsloot, an urban township in the northwest of Johannesburg. This paper proposes a conceptual framework that should guide the empirical part of this research when collecting, processing, and analysing data and information to interrogate, thereafter, interpret the empirical findings. This implies that we do not present or discuss empirical research results in this paper. However, we derive and present an interpretive framework and, consequently, a conceptual framework—described in [6]—from a systematic interrogation of academic and non-academic literature.

2. The approach

The debate on what is and what is not a conceptual framework remains a contested terrain. Ravitch and Riggan [7] point out three perceptions of this terminology. The first perception and probably the most misleading does not distinguish between theoretical and conceptual frameworks. The second looks at a conceptual framework as a visual representation of how a research is organised or how its major theoretical tenets are organised. The last one views conceptual frameworks as a node that links all elements of a research process—that is, conceptualisation, supporting literature, procedure and methods, framework for interpretation of empirical results as well as the disposition, positionality, and interest of the researcher. In this paper, we describe a conceptual framework as an advanced outline of how an empirical research should proceed after interrogating literature on the subject of interest [8]—in this case, social capital as a survival strategy for immigrants in South Africa. The description combines the second and third perspectives highlighted in [7]. Wotela [6, 9] has outlined a seven-step procedure of conceptualising conceptual frameworks in research. The write-up begins with an understanding of the research setting—Diepsloot, an urban township in Johannesburg and then the research problem in context—survival strategies among foreign nationals where we explore both social capital networks and state social support. Thereafter, we review methods, data, findings, and conclusions of past and current studies assessing social capital among foreign nationals to establish the knowledge gap on this subject as well as the methodological precedence. Most studies reviewed employed a quantitative

research strategy and, therefore, established the extent and significance of survival strategies employed by immigrants in South Africa. However, we are more concerned with how this plays out. Therefore, we have proposed a qualitative research strategy. We then proceed to develop a framework for interpreting the empirical findings in a proceeding paper. Again with this knowledge we have proposed a combination of migration and sociological frameworks. Finally, we propose a conceptual framework that details steps to be followed when empirically assessing the use of social capital as a survival strategy for immigrants in South Africa. In each of these areas of focus, we apply a thematic summative content analysis [10] when summarising and synthesising literature before writing up.

3. The physical research setting; Diepsloot in context

First of all, **Figure 1** shows, the current official boundary of South Africa. As Wotela and Letsiri [11], point out this boundary



Figure 1. The map of South Africa showing its neighbouring countries. 'Map of South Africa with English labels' by Htonl-Own work. Licenced under CC BY-SA 3.0 via Commons - https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_South_Africa_with_English_labels.svg#/media/File:Map_of_South_Africa_with_English_labels.svg.

'... stretches from the Atlantic Ocean on its west to the Indian Ocean on its east. To its South are the two Oceans while to its north is Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Swaziland to its east. There is also Lesotho right within its boundaries. As detailed in [12–14], this boundary was established in 1910 after combining two Boer independent countries—The South African Republic (formerly the Transvaal Colony) and the Orange Free State (formerly the Orange River Colony)—and the two British colonies, that is, the Cape Colony and the Natal Colony. Obviously, the previous four international boundaries that make-up the current South Africa are a product of the Berlin Conference of 1884 to 1885 that decided on international boundaries of the African continent'.

Second, the map also shows that South Africa has nine provinces but the province of focus for this paper is Gauteng Province towards the north eastern side of the country. Third, as **Figure 2(a)** shows this Province has five sub-regions including a metropolitan municipality called the Greater City of Johannesburg. Lastly, as shown in **Figure 2(b)**, Diepsloot, our research context, is located to the northwest of the City—that is, 35 kilometres away from the Johannesburg central business district and 5 kilometres away from Dainfern, Sandton, and Fourways, which are some of the affluent suburban areas in the northwestern part of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality where the notable numbers of Diepsloot residents work. Diepsloot occupies a total areas of about 5.6 square kilometres with an estimated population of 350,000 people in about 30,000 households [15]. This translates to 62,724 people per square kilometre making the township one of the most densely populated area in the City of Johannesburg.




Figure 2. The map of Gauteng Province and the City of Johannesburg. The Map of Gauteng Province sourced from <http://www.saaccommodation-finder.com> and the Map of Johannesburg sourced from <http://www.localgovernment.org.za>.

According to the Tswelopele Education Foundation [16], the Johannesburg Municipality established Diepsloot in 1995 as a transit camp for people who were being removed from Alexandra, Honeydew, and Zevenfontein. On inception, the Township received 200 families. They relied on farm work for sustenance. By 1996, Diepsloot was still a reception area with temporary settlements. To date, it has grown with about 13 extensions (Wards 95 and 113) mostly informal settlements with minimum basic services because of increasing pressure on services [17].

Though Diepsloot is mainly a Black African township, its outlook is ethnically diverse. The majority of its population comes from the Limpopo Province comprising the Pedi, Shangaan, Tsonga, and the Venda. Twenty-three percent of the township comprises foreign nationals mostly from Bangladesh, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Pakistan, Somalia and Zimbabwe [18]. Zuberi and Sibanda [19] have established the relationship between migration status, nativity, and labour force outcomes in the post-apartheid labour market in South Africa. They found that migrants from the Southern African region are relatively young (20–29 years old) and migration reduces with age. Proportion of male immigrants in the labour force is higher than South African born males because of higher education attainment among foreign nationals compared with South African males. For some time, the people in this Township co-existed and lived in harmony despite their diverse background up until 2008 when xenophobia manifested with the May 2013 incidents of lootings and abusing foreign nationals became apparent. A non-governmental organisation, PlanAct [20], attributes these tensions to competition for housing and employment. The notable proportion of foreign nationals makes it an interesting case study on survival strategies and social capital.

As is the case with most townships in developing countries especially in Africa, Diepsloot comprise of a young population—that is, about 56% is less than 35 years old [21]. About 74% of its population is economically active with 47% employed in both the formal and informal sectors implying that half of this population is unemployed [3, 18]. As an intervention, the state provides temporary employment through the Expanded Public Works Programme—an infrastructure development programme whose focus in to provide employment to the poor South African households [22].

The economy of Diepsloot is a mixture of formal and informal businesses. The former are found in well planned shopping malls while the latter are found almost anywhere and mostly deal in basic groceries, hair salons, food and beverage. Such businesses barely survive and their profit margins are insufficient to get people out of the poverty trap. Similarly, the inadequate housing in Diepsloot comprises formal and informal structures side by side—that is, makeshift houses called shacks, state subsidised houses, and bank financed houses. South Africans, who own most of the formal houses, have erected backyard dwelling units that they rent out to foreign nationals and fellow South Africans who have not received state subsidised unit. In sum, Diepsloot residents fall in the low to lower-middle income groups. It is, therefore, not surprising that their living standard range from low (abject poverty) to moderate (hand-to-mouth) characteristics that go hand in hand with disease and crime.

4. Survival strategies employed by foreign nationals in South Africa: Social capital versus state social support

South Africa is a major recipient of migrants from countries in Southern Africa and beyond. Official reports show that amidst increasing but sporadic xenophobic attacks, immigration into South Africa has continued. For an example, the 2011 Census results show revealed a stable inflow of foreign nationals in South Africa between 2001 and 2011 despite the violent 2008 xenophobic violence [22]. Wotela and Letsiri [11] have discussed why immigrants make South Africa the country of choice. They point out that the long historical four migration streams as well as official amnesties that have created a blended society within this region—resulting in strong migration networks—account for immigration into South Africa.

Boyd [23] has summarised determinants and consequences of personal networks in the migration of industrialised countries. One key determinant is that families make migration decisions as a unit to send family members to a foreign country with established social capital networks. These networks are based on kinship residing in both the receiving and sending countries provide for coping strategies and perpetuate a migration stream even amidst several disincentives. It is these strong social capital networks that facilitate the survival of both internal and international migrants. Past research, for example see [4, 24, 25], has found that the stronger the social links one has to the particular community, the better the chances of finding employment and earning a higher wage.

Another factor contributing to immigration into South Africa and strengthening social capital networks is policy shifts in dealing with foreign nationals as detailed in [11]. An organisation called The People Against Suffering, Oppression and Poverty [26] has pointed out that the dispensation the South African government provided Zimbabweans to regularise their employed in 2009 is a contributing factor to the stable immigration. They argue that such dispensation facilitates for other family members of foreign nationals to also migrate to South Africa in spite of several deportations.

In sum, as Wotela and Letsiri [11] have argued, ‘... we can attribute the initiation of South African immigration to the pull and largely the push factors’ but its perpetuation is attributable to well-established social capital networks. This is called cumulative causation effect, that is, initial migration establishes migration networks that provide for survival strategies for new migrants. A study by Kwanuka and Monson [27] traced Zimbabwean nationals into four neighbouring countries including South Africa. They confirm that Zimbabweans use migration as a survival strategy by pooling resources to expatriate a family member who they expect to remit money back to them. They conclude that networks in the receiving countries and immigration policies can deter or encourage in-migration.

Immigration has economic and social consequences in developing countries. Cities in developed countries provide access to shelter, employment, and other social facilities which is not the case in developing countries. Lourenço-Lindell [24] points out that people in African cities face challenges ranging from absent or ineffective provision of basic services,

poor housing, few secure employment opportunities, and insufficient income. Competition for limited resources, especially employment opportunities, between locals and foreign nationals breeds conflict [28, 29].

However, the presence of foreign nationals in a country has implications beyond accessing employment. The hosting state is expected to provide and look out for them including an effort to integrate them into society. This includes and implies developing and implementing interventions meant for immigrant social welfare. In South Africa, more than 15 million people receive social grants among other forms of social support for the poor such as subsidised housing, free access to health and education from the state. However, this is not the case with poor and vulnerable immigrants. The Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa [30] have pointed out that by systematic design and practice, foreign nationals are excluded from such social support. This means their cost of basic necessities is higher than average leaving poor foreign nationals vulnerable.

This of course does not include instances where foreign nationals have accessed state social support legally or illegally. Some foreign nationals have managed to access the state grants which they expatriate to their country of origin [31]. Reports of the 'immigrants' accessing state social support especially housing in poor South African urban townships including Diepsloot are cited by locals to be the reasons for the xenophobic attacks [30]. However, removing such foreign nationals from the beneficiary list may leave them poor and vulnerable.

In sum, the foreign nationals in Diepsloot probably chose to live there because it is within few kilometres of possible employment. Newbold and Garcia [32, 33] have argued that migrants settle close to where they can access economic opportunities and close to their kind. However, given the relatively insufficient basic services and quality housing in Diepsloot, we would argue that this is only good enough in the absence of alternatives. Further, foreign national are excluded from accessing state social support despite the constitution guaranteeing social, physical, and economic rights to those that 'live in the Republic' of South Africa. This is unlike democratic and socialist states that strive for universal access to social goods and services despite one's migration status [34, 35].

5. Methods, data, findings and conclusions of studies on survival strategies among foreign nationals

With a contextual understanding of social capital, state social support, and survival strategies among foreign nationals in Diepsloot, we now review selected similar studies on this subject. In doing so, we point out research approaches, designs, procedures and methods that such studies have applied as well as the findings and conclusions they have realised. The ultimate objective is to uncover the knowledge gap on this subject in general and specifically in the South African urban townships. We also use this knowledge to establish some methodological options that we can employ for the empirical part of this research which we certainly present as part of our conceptual framework. Needless to state that studies

on survival strategies that foreign nationals employ span through decades and across the global. Therefore, we interrogate some studies on social capital networks in the United States of America (USA) before focusing on the African continent and more specifically Southern Africa.

Some studies, for example, see [36] have applied the theory of social networks and social enclaves to interrogate if a member of a particular social capital network transmits information and facilitates employment in the sector where this member is employed to other members of the network. The assumption is that having social network members employed in the dominant industries within a migrant's location increases their chances of finding employment in similar industries. Boal [36] uses state records on location and earnings of migrants, duration of stay, and local labour market outcomes. The results show that recent migrants who are members of established networks in labour markets have relatively higher (5%) employment rates and get higher (0.7%) regardless of sex and level of education. This shows that social capital networks facilitate continued immigration into South Africa. The research did not consider cultural and social dynamics of ethnic societies.

Others such as [37] have interrogated the role of social structure in labour markets among the Hispanics in the USA to uncover the link between social capital networks, employment, and wages. The study employs a quantitative research strategy and the positive causality theory of migration that argues that migration volumes are propelled by the positive experiences of the initial migrants and that having good contacts increases the chances of finding employment among foreign nationals. Further, using the Lin's [38] description, Mouw [37] describes social capital as labour market connections that increase the chances of knowing about job vacancies. The results show that, among other things, Mexicans with more relatives in the USA have a higher chance of finding employment and earning higher wages. This implies that those with a broad social network have several avenues of looking for employment and, therefore, the use of social capital reduces the duration that one is unemployed. Once one is employed then they focus on maximising wages again through social networks. Again, the strength of their networks determines the level of their wages with new and less socially connected migrants taking lower paying jobs and the highly connected migrants earning higher wages. Further, proficiency in the local language and the time spent in the United States by both the immigrants looking for a job and their contacts determines the duration of finding employment. The study concludes that using social capital networks to search for employment results in foreign nationals doing 'segregated' jobs 'reserved' for immigrants and dependency on social networks reduces with time.

Building on Mouw's [37] work, Anderson and colleagues [39] show that the quantity and quality of social capital networks as well as location determines the employment search outcomes of foreign nationals in the United States of America (USA). They describe social capital networks as 'a web of interconnected people who directly or indirectly interact with each other' [39]. They employed a quantitative research strategy using census data and information collected by the Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics Programme that captures individual's employment status and location. The study compared employment outcomes of 17,100 foreign nationals in the metropolitan areas of the USA. The results show that foreign

nationals are more likely to belong to an enclave to harness employment opportunities and higher wages. Foreign nationals within the same enclave are likely to work in the same firm. This suggests that social networks act as labour market intermediary. The study concludes that education and employment status among members of the network determines its quality and thus the chances of accessing the labour market.

Closer to the context of our research, De Jong and colleagues [40] have explored the determinants of migration within Southern African context. They employed a mixed research strategy and cross-sectional research design targeting households from which they interviewed 4000 internal, cross-border, and international migrants. The cross-border migrants comprised undocumented migrants, farm workers, and contract workers in Gauteng, Limpopo, and the North West provinces. They also interviewed government officials, academics and non-governmental organisations in Mozambique, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. The study found that social capital is a major contributing factor to migration decision-making because it provides for the initial survival of migrants from within South Africa and among foreign nationals. Through socialisation, foreign nationals utilise capital networks and survival strategies to find shelter and employment in South Africa. Foreign nationals have also created employment enclaves because they refer others to employment opportunities within industries in which are employed.

More recently and in more detail, Madhwar and Landau [41] have also explored the extent to which foreign nationals in Johannesburg, Mozambique, and Nairobi use social networks as a survival strategy. Further and more importantly, they interrogate 'trust' as a determinant of social capital among locals and foreign nationals. They employed a mixed research strategy and the social network framework. They interviewed 2211 local in-migrants and foreign immigrants in 2006 through 2007. They argue that trust, as a determinant of social capital, is just as important as ethnicity, nationality, and residential history because it facilitates accessing opportunities, coping, and survival. Then they differentiate between 'bonding trust' and 'bridging trust' — the former is based on ethnicity and nationality whereas the latter transcends ethnicity and nationality. Their findings show that both local in-migrants and foreign immigrants use both bonding and bridging trust to settle in new environment through accessing shelter, employment, and documentation. More specifically, they are more likely to trust their relatives but avoid participating in ethnic cultural activities. The latter is more notable among foreign nationals because they wish to avoid monotonic group behaviour which might signal unwillingness to claim a stake in the regions of residence. Further, erosion of bonding trust has consequently been replaced by religious capital networks.

These results and findings have found support from Freemantle [42] who found a degree of mistrust among people the same ethnicity and nationality. Similarly, Peter's [43] findings that suggest that forging strong ties based on ethnicity and nationality in Johannesburg can dwarf individual aspirations. Earlier Massey and Aysa [44] had demonstrated that Mozambican foreign nationals utilise both use both bonding and bridging trust. They also marry across nationalities thus adapting to the new environment while maintaining ties with their fellow nationals.

Collectively these studies demonstrate that social capital network do exist it be in the United States of America or Southern Africa. They could be based on ethnicity, nationality, and religious. However, as Madhwar and Landau [41] have cautioned, we should apply discretion when applying the concept of social capital networks. It is beyond doubt that in-migrants and immigrants employ social capital networks as a survival strategy by providing for employment and other economic opportunities—even in Greater Johannesburg area [4]. True as this maybe, this study seeks to establish if social capital networking is a notable determinant in accessing employment and other economic opportunities for foreign nationals in Diepsloot. Of importance is the link between ‘who you know’ and chances of getting employment with a higher wage. Obviously, understanding social capital networks will allows us to interrogate the link between the quantity and quality of such networks [37] with survival strategies among foreign nationals in Diepsloot. There is a data and information challenge that we need to overcome. Unlike Anderson and colleagues [39] who used a reliable and larger dataset United States of America National Census Bureau, we do not have such a source. The equivalent, Statistics South Africa, has acknowledged the need to coordinate and collate migration data and information between the various agencies of government [21]. There will also be a need to interview both legal and illegal immigrants implying that we need data and information beyond official sources. In sum, the methods employed by Madhwar and Landau [41], though they focused on trust as an aspect of social capital, seem more suitable for Diepsloot—that is, a mixed research strategy and a case study. The qualitative research strategy is an important recommendation for contextual research studies of groups and networks, social cohesion and inclusion, collective action and cooperation within the frame of social capital network [45].

6. Establishing a framework for interpreting anticipated empirical results on the roles of social capital as a survival strategy for immigrants in South Africa

Wotela [9] has argued that to establish a framework, theoretical or otherwise, for interpreting anticipated empirical results one needs to first of all establish and discuss the academic context of the study, its key components, and the key attributes or variables. Through an iterative process we settled for migration, and not sociology, as the academic home of this research. Therefore, in the next sub-Section (5.1) we discuss migration and its important components in the context of social capital networks before interrogating the determinants of migration, again, in the context of social capital networks in sub-Section 5.2. Finally, sub-Section 5.3 provides for a framework for interpreting anticipated empirical results from a study on the roles of social capital as a survival strategy for immigrants in South Africa.

6.1. An introduction to migration and its important components in the context of social capital networks

Lundquist and colleagues [46] as well as Wotela and Letsiri [11] describe migration as one of the three components of demography (the others being fertility and mortality) that describes

the movements of people between clearly distinguishable geographic units and in so doing subtracting from the population of origin and adding to the population of destination. The various reasons why people move include cultural, political, economic, social, and environmental either deplorable at the region of origin or conducive at the region of destination. The move can be voluntarily or involuntary. Further, an individual can be born once and die once but migrate several times in their life time. It is factor that provides for complexity in the study of migration. Migration can be intra country, that is, out-migration and in-migration as well as inter country, that is, emigration and immigration.

Several authors, for example, see [46–48] point out that the study of migration, like the other demographic components, requires data and information on movements from administrative data, registrations at border crossing, as well as through retrospective questions during census and surveys. Some countries have applied various techniques including demographic techniques to estimate migration. We cannot over emphasise that compared to fertility and mortality, migration data and information has several challenges. Retrospective questions during census and surveys, which are the main sources of such data and information in developing countries, suffer from deliberate concealment from respondents as well as failure to capture movement that occurred five years prior to a census or a survey.

Arising from the concept of migration is the term migrant or migrants—that is, residents or individual who belong to a particular region who are living in or migrated to another place other than theirs [49]. Others including [50] describe migrants as foreign-born or foreign-nationals who have moved into a new country for more than year for various reasons. Time dimension differentiates between those that in a host country temporarily and those who have established a life in the host country. The focus of this paper is international migration and more specifically immigrants or foreign nationals. We use of the term foreign nationals for two reasons to distinguish between them from local migrants and temporary international migrants. These are the ones who enact survival strategies and including social cohesion within the host communities even if they intend to move on.

Simply defined, survival strategies refer to having some kind of a successful implementation of a strategy for survival [51]. Dercon [52] describes them as the ‘ability to withstand risks and implement successful coping strategies which could be income based, capital and opportunities among others’. These include employment, formal and informal trading, social support, savings and credits as well as remittances. The four survival strategies of foreign nationals in South Africa include physical, human, economic, and social capital [4].

Physical survival strategies include the ability of individuals and households to find adequate water, food, shelter, and sanitation. Focus on physical capital is important as it is the initial strategy employed by migrants to support their physical needs during the initial transition migration period. Human survival strategies include the level of education that foreign nationals have to improve their chances of employability within the formal sector of the economy. For example, foreign nationals migrating to Canada who have attained a higher level of education have a higher chance of accessing employment [32]. Language is another human capital survival strategy. In Johannesburg, English proficiency increases the chances of employment while knowledge of isiZulu increases the chances of social

integration [3]. Economic survival strategies—that are well covered in social capital literature focused on foreign nationals—include access to employment, informal trading, and entrepreneurship. These studies include Amisi [53] who has interrogated sector participation of foreign nationals in informal trade among the Congolese in Durban and [4] who have interrogated sector participation by Johannesburg-based foreign nationals in informal trading and entrepreneurship. Effectively, social survival strategies are premised on relations anchored around sex or gender, ethnicity, culture, kinship, beliefs, nationality, and language as well as religion, friendship, social class, and common interest. A related concept is social capital—that is, the links that allow people residing in different communities to discover and access opportunities based on social relationships with previous migrants [1, 49].

Adler and Kwon [54] have attempted to provide a comprehensive history and description of ‘social capital’. They point out that Bourdieu [55] was the first to describe this concept as the ‘aggregate of actual or potential resources which are linked to possessions of a network based on institutionalised relationships of acquaintances’. This description focuses on the relationship that actors have with the network with a view to access (the means) resources without developing the bond that ties the network outside its sole purpose. Alternatively, Putnam [56] provides an *internally* focused description stating that social capital as ‘features of social organisation such as networks norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit’. This description emphasises the structure of relations among actors in a network and thus giving rise to the bonding social capital network anchored on kinship, ethnicity, and common cause. Further, there is a neutral (neither internal nor external focus) definition of social capital networks—that is, ‘the web of social relationships that influences individual behaviour and thereby affects economic growth’ [57]. To distinguish between internal and external focus, Putnam and Goss [58] describe bonding capital as ‘social networks that brings together people who are like one another in important respects’ bridging capital as social networks that brings people who are unlike one another together. Therefore, as Geys and Murdoch [59] have argued, in a bonding social capital network, the members are homogeneous and the shared norms compel members to provide safety nets that act as a survival strategy. In a bridging social capital network members are heterogeneous groups but still exchange of information and ideas on diverse interests. Regardless, social capital networks are central to understanding the survival of the foreign nationals in Diepsloot. Social capital networks assist foreign nationals at the initial and transition stages of migration to discover and access survival strategies described above excluding education which is usually acquired prior to migrating in this context.

6.2. Determinants of migration in the context of social capital networks

Understanding the determinants of migration (pull and push) provides for a context in which migration takes place. **Table 1** shows some of the cultural, political, economic, social, and environmental push and pull factors. Other factors include diversity of the places of origin and destination, presence and absence of obstacles to migration such as distance, legal barriers, and level of development, stability of the economy as well as threats to survival.

Migration motivators	Push factors	Pull factors
Cultural	Gender discrimination	Family reunification
	Ethnic discrimination	Freedom from discrimination
	Religious discrimination	
Political	Conflict	Safety and security
	Poor governance	Political freedom
	Human rights abuses	
Economic	Poverty	Prospects of higher wages
	Unemployment	Personal and professional development
	Low wages	
Social	Lack of access to health	Improved standard of living
	Lack of access to education	
Environmental	Degradation	Sustainable livelihood

Adapted from Harris and Todaro [60].

Table 1. Migration ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors.

However, for this research, it is more useful to examine the use of social capital as a survival strategy to bring out factors that determine migration as a result of participating in a bonding or bridging social network. First off any demographer, for example, see [46], will refer to Ravenstein’s law of migration as the number of migrants over any given distance is proportional to the envisaged opportunities offered at destination but inversely related to opportunities in nearer distance. Therefore, migration will only occur if there are more opportunities at the place of destination compared with the place of origin. The first question is, ‘what are these opportunities?’ First, actual wage or labour markets differentials between sending and receiving countries shapes the type and extent of migration experienced between countries [60]. Arguably people move from high-unemployment low-wage regions to low-unemployment high-wage regions. Second, rather than wage differentials only, the prospects of finding employment in the receiving country are another determinant of migration [61]. The focus on the prospects of employment in the receiving countries through social capital networks is what our research intends to uncover. The second question is, ‘who provides information on these opportunities?’ Put differently, ‘what are the social capital determinants of migration?’ Literature points to three groupings—that is, social relations, market relations, and hierarchical relations determinants of migration.

Greenwood and McDowell [62] point out that social relations, as social capital determinants of migration, implies among others the extent of one’s social capital network based on family, ethnic, historical, cultural, and friendship in the receiving country. This is extended to affiliations to established institutions and professional affiliations. The social relations, as social capital determinants of migration, find support with the network theory—that stipulates that

the more people one knows in the receiving country, the greater their probability to migrate. Initial family members become pioneer migrants and pave the migration path for successive family members who leverage on them for shelter, money, and social intelligence. Upon interrogating trust and social networks in Johannesburg, Madhavan and Landau [41] argue that trust among immigrants and in-migrant is considerable compared with trust between immigrants and locals. Similar to family ties, people of a particular ethnicity provide support to their kin migrants during transition although this network has proven to be weaker than one based on family ties.

Sixty percent of Zimbabwean foreign nationals found in Johannesburg had to rely on relatives for accommodation and access to employment when transiting [4]. This implies that in the absence of social relations, their migration transition would be costly. Obviously, social capital networks with more employed members and have strong ties among them—that is, bonding capital—attract more members and thus expanding the size of the network [63]. Further, belonging to a social capital networks with more employed members reduces the time one remains unemployed upon migrating [25]. Therefore, migrants opt to join and participate in a social capital network because it increases the chances of getting employment. Further, sometimes foreign national use weak social ties or bridging capital which crosses the ethnic and cultural boundaries, that is, recruitment agencies to access employment opportunities [63].

Moving on, Greenwood and McDowell [62] point out that market relations¹, as social capital determinants of migration, are actually an extension of social relations. They include age, education, and employment as well as wage differentials between the sending and receiving countries, cost of living, and domestic economic policies. The study [40] which we described in Section 5 found that migration in Southern African region is influenced by the sending countries' poor economic conditions which lead to unemployment, devaluation of local currencies, low wages, and increased cost of living. However, as the authors also confirmed empirically using the Mozambican and Zimbabwean emigration, poor political conditions result in poor or adverse economic policies and climate conditions. Further, market relations should be understood within the context of existing social capital ties in the receiving countries [62]. No matter how strong the push and pull factors, migration decision-making is eventually a function of social capital ties. This is why historic social ties played a pivotal role in the Mozambican and Zimbabwean emigration [40]. As a result, when these ties are absent, the employment outcomes of immigrants are lower and, therefore, reducing cumulative migration facilitated by strong social capital ties.

Lastly, according Adler and Kwon [54], hierarchical relations, as social capital determinants of migration, include institutional arrangements or institutionalised networks. These include access to government services and support of non-governmental organisations established to facilitate internal and international migration and, therefore, create social capital networks. These relations do influence migration decision-making and provide for, alas indirectly, the survival of foreign nationals in the receiving countries. Effectively, the hierarchical

¹Frankly, from the interrogations in [64], we think social relations are more of cultural relations and market relations are the social relations. We not pursue this argument because it is not the focus of this paper.

determinants of migration are proximity to the social capital and its networks. They are 'the gatekeepers and opportunity brokers' that hinder or facilitate migration and access to the social networks that provide for survival among foreign nationals [54].

For an example, Amisi [53] found that hierarchical determinants among the Durban foreign nationals in South Africa include migration documentation issued by the Department of Home Affairs and other law enforcement agencies as well as support and assistance offered by non-profit organisations including cross-border religious organisations. Amisi [53] also found that social networks among Congolese nationals who broker relations for other foreign nationals to access these hierarchical institutions for them to survive in Durban facilitate rent-seeking practices of officials. Such practices should deter migration to South Africa by those who are still in the receiving country. Instead, they facilitate continued migration when social capital provides for by-passing institutional impediments in place. Further, religious institutions that support migration and provide social networks were found to be efficient in assisting aspirant immigrants at the point of entering South Africa.

In sum, as **Figure 3**, which shows the determinants of migration in the context of social capital networks, points out that both internal and international migration is facilitated by social capital networks. These could be either bonding or bridging. The former also referred to as internal exists even in the absence of migration and is based on ethnicity and nationality. The latter whose sole purpose is to facilitate migration is external or transcends ethnicity and nationality. The literature we have just reviewed also links bonding networks to social capital networks in the receiving country while it links bridging networks to the hierarchal format. The market networks seems to have a blend of both but more so with hierarchal and, therefore, bridging social networks. This is these characteristics that we should operationalise and explicitly distinguish when constructing a research data or information collection instrument.




Figure 3. Determinants of migration in the context of social capital networks.

6.3. Documented frameworks for interpreting empirical findings on utilisation of social capital as a survival strategy for immigrants in South Africa

Although we settled for demography or more specifically migration as the academic context of this study, there are frameworks in sociology that we can use to interpret findings on social capital as a survival strategy for immigrants in South Africa. Therefore, apart from migration theories, we also interrogate these theories before choosing those that are applicable to this study. We are hoping to get a combination of frameworks that can explain interactions and migration decision-making by foreign nationals and the use of social capital as a survival strategy.

To contextualise frameworks in migration or at least those accepted by demographers on this subject, we first but briefly reflect on four theories, that is, neoclassical economic theories, segmented labour market theories and the world systems theories. We, however, limit this interrogation to the link between migration and the use of social networks. King [65] points out that *neoclassical economics* and *new economics of migration* theories are based on the push and pull factors of migration and, therefore, differentials between regions and countries as well as the principles of utility maximisation, rational choice, and labour mobility. They focus on how households maximise income through providing for remittance from household emigrants. Further, according to Piore [66] and King [65], the *segment labour market theory* complements the two economics theories and pays attention to the demand-led process of migration, which compels or pulls certain skills to the receiving countries. Migration results when demand for cheap and flexible labour available in sending countries is compelled to receiving countries promising or providing secure and well paid employment. Obviously such migration breeds inequality, dependency, and under development of the sending countries. Lastly, Froebel and colleagues [67] as well as Morawska [68] have emphasised that the *world systems* theories of migration focus on globalisation as the facilitator of migration because it provides for the global market economy and division of labour. These theories have their roots in the expansion of global capitalist systems. Their proponents argue that the socio-economic links between the dominant capitalist powers and their former colonies provide migration routes and facilitate international division of labour and hence migration.

We now turn to frameworks in sociology. First off, this is the field that examines how private experiences and personal difficulties are entwined with the structural arrangements of society [69]. Being an established field of study, it has a number of frameworks that interpret interactions between individuals within global social processes [70]. The first of these is the *structural functionalism theory*, which according to Jary and Jary [71], propounds that individual behaviour and decisions are premised on socialised as children within a family unit. Earlier, Parsons [72] had argued that society has a defined role for each member into which they are socialised at family level—with males performing more instrumental roles and females performing expressive roles. If individuals deviate from the predetermined roles, it is symptomatic of a dysfunctional family and community structure. The theory fails to recognise family forms that do not fit into the structural and expressive roles.

The second is *symbolic interactionism theory* which, according to Lal [73] and Jacobsen [74], propounds that individual behaviour determines societal behaviour as well as social interactions of individuals within a society. Unlike structural functionalism that propounds that structure determines behaviour, symbolic interactionism emphasises the ability of individuals to actively and constructively interpret symbols in their actions. This theory, therefore, refutes Boyd's [23] argument that migration is a family decision but emphasises individual satisfaction over familial benefit. Unfortunately, it cannot explain the remittances that foreign nationals send to their respective families back home.

The third is a group collectively called *conflict theories* that have their roots in the Marxist theories. These theories see the family as primary in producing class through property relations and family structures. Building on these theories, Engels [75] and Foucault [76] have argued that the patriarchal roles assigned to males in nuclear family formation and monogamous marital arrangements intend to concentrate power and maximise means of production placed in the hands of the males. In support, the Marxist feminists have argued that the subdued role of a woman is meant to allow for a functional capitalist system and assist in the reproduction of labour at no or little cost to capitalism. These frameworks unfortunately cannot explain the migration of females in search for employment and the change in gender roles as far as family support is concerned.

Though all the frameworks above are indeed relevant to migration or social capital networks or migration in the context of social capital networks three of them—the network theory, institutional theory, and the cumulative causation theory—stand out to be the most relevant to study context. Granovetter [77] pioneered the *network theory* having examined social ties and social networks between communities in the sending and receiving countries that facilitate migration and access employment opportunities. He found that the stronger the ties between two people, the greater the chance that their worlds will overlap. This means that networks create either bonding or bridging social capital networks that provides members with information circulating within the network. Some members use this information to access to employment opportunities and higher wages [78]. Therefore, the probability of one migrating is increases when they have a relative or an acquaintance in the receiving location/country. Further, some receiving countries have policies that promote social networks among immigrants. For example, at one point the United States of America (USA) allocated most immigrant visas to those with a family member already in the USA thus reinforcing and formalising social networks. Obviously having a social tie increases the possibility of an immigrant finding a high wage employment [79].

Massey and colleagues [80] coined the *institutional theory* to provide a framework within which to understand legal and illegal migration facilitated by institutions—for profit and not for profit; legal and illegal—involved in international migration. They argue that migration results from an institutionalised process or system that provides '... services such as transportation, labour contracts, counterfeit documents, dwellings and legal advice ...' [81]. By lowering actual and psychological cost of migration, these institutions provide for increased migration volumes. The question is, 'how do formal institutions such as financial institutions

and government support services provide for a survival strategy among foreign nationals?’ According to Massey and colleagues [82], *cumulative causation* theories explain how economic and social changes in a particular context facilitate migration. Migration is cumulative when it ‘... alters the social context within which subsequent migration decisions are made’ in a way that makes subsequent migration likely [82]. Factors affecting migration include distribution of income, land, agricultural arrangements, culture, distribution of human capital and social nuances associated with the meaning of work [83].

The foregoing is an indication that there are several general and specific frameworks relevant to migration or social capital networks or migration in the context of social capital networks three of them. Collectively, they cater for the academic context (migration and sociology) and the research problem at hand (social capital networks). Their relevance is certainly determined by the context—in this case, Southern Africa and South Africa in general but more specifically Gauteng Province, City of Johannesburg, Diepsloot Township. The value of these frameworks is that they look beyond the economic push and pull factors of migration to loop in networks that provide for survival strategies and, therefore, propelling migration volumes. As Budnik [84, 85] points out, the network and institutional theories provide a framework for interrogating ‘support to migration via acceleration of information flows and indirectly reduction of migration cost’. Further, the cumulative causation framework provides for examining perpetuation of migration due to socio-economic changes including wealth distribution resulting from remittances, structural changes in labour arrangement to contain costs as well as social value attached to mobility.

We should, however, note some deficiencies of these theories pointed out by Kurekova [86]. First, migration theories cannot explain immobility and, therefore, in certain societies that meet conditions that propel high migration volumes. Second, the theories presented here do not explicitly point out the role of interventions that deter or perpetuate migration in both the receiving and sending countries. Lastly, the theories fail to explain the initiation of migration and the degree to which this perpetuates or deters current levels and trends. However, with regards to South Africa, Wotela and Letsiri [11] have detailed the genesis of Southern African migration into South Africa.

7. Social capital as a survival strategy for immigrants in South Africa—a conceptual framework

The aim of this research is to detail how foreign nationals employ social capital networks as a survival strategy in Diepsloot, an urban township in Johannesburg. However, this paper is limited to conceptualising ‘how’ we intend to pursue this research. This implies reviewing literature to derive its conceptual framework that we envisage will effectively guide the empirical part of this research. Effectively, a conceptual framework is systematic summarising of and decision-making based on literature reviewed in Sections 3 through 7. Therefore, this section also doubles as a summary and conclusion. **Figure 4** is a visual representation that




Figure 4. A proposed conceptual framework for interrogating the role of social capital as a survival strategy for immigrants in South Africa.

summarises the literature reviewed in this paper and proposes how the empirical part of this research should be executed based on the literature reviewed. First of all, besides Diepsloot, the physical research context exhibiting expect characteristics of an African urban township, it is the notable proportion of foreign nationals makes it an interesting case study on survival strategies and social capital.

Second, though not a problem per se, immigration into South Africa has continued despite the incidences of xenophobia and xenophobic violence. The literature we have reviewed in Section 3 points to several reasons why this is the case but three resonate with our physical research setting. First, the political, economic, and social conditions of the sending countries push out its citizens to immigrate. Second, though these citizens could migrate to anywhere

else in Southern Africa other than South Africa they settle for this country because of networks that have been created since forced labour migrant stream in labour in 1897 [11]. Lastly, it is the official interventions and amnesties for those who entered or lived in South Africa illegally and, therefore, creating a vacuum for the next immigrant. Obviously, most immigrants come to work in South Africa and the rising unemployment and shortage of public services such as housing, South African feel like foreign nationals are taking what is theirs. This has led to xenophobia and xenophobic incidences and violence. Besides, most foreign nationals are not exactly living the life they envisaged.

Third, most similar studies have employed a mixed research strategy but with a bias towards the quantitative approach and a cross-section research design using the survey format. There is no doubt this has helped establish the relationship between social capital networks and survival strategies and employment and higher wage. Not all studies make mention of the frameworks employed to interpret the research findings but two studies use the positive causality theory of migration [37] and the theory of social networks [37]. Almost all the studies conclude the obvious, that is, (i.) most social networks are based on ethnicity and nationality and (ii) social networks facilitate continued immigration.

True as this maybe, none of the studies actually target Diepsloot and, therefore, providing for what we call a 'physical setting' knowledge gap. Therefore, we would like to know if in Diepsloot (i.) most social networks are based on ethnicity and nationality and (ii) if these social networks facilitate continued immigration. The latter implies establishing if foreign nationals in Diepsloot use social capital networks to access employment and other economic opportunities. Is there a link between 'who you know' and chances of getting employment with a higher wage in Diepsloot? We focus on social capital because it is a propeller—at least at initial and transition stages of migration—to access other forms of survival strategies. Unlike most studies reviewed, we intend to employ a qualitative research strategy and a case study research design. This implies that our research procedure and methods will allow for a semi-structured interview schedule and purposive sampling to harness in-depth information on how social networking actually plays out in the context (Diepsloot). This approach is justified by Dudwick and colleagues [45] who recommend using qualitative strategy, procedure and methods when studying groups and networks, social cohesion and inclusion, collective action and cooperation within the frame of social capital network.

Lastly, as part of pre-determining a framework that will be used to interpret anticipated empirical results of this research, we opted to situate it within migration. However, we could not avoid discussing the sociological connotations of social networking and capital. The focus is international migration, more specifically, immigration rather than emigration. During this interrogation, we picked important attributes that we need empirical information to understand the roles of social capital as a survival strategy among immigrants in South Africa. These include, survival strategies (physical, economic, and social), social capital (bonding social capital networks and bridging social capital network), social relations, hierarchical relations, and market relations. Finally, we anticipate interpreting our empirical results using the network theory, the institutional theory, and the cumulative causation theories.

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Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that they have no financial or personal relationships which have inappropriately influenced them in this research or writing this article.

Author details

Nosipho Hlatshwayo and Kambidima Wotela*

*Address all correspondence to: kambidima.wotela.wsg@gmail.com

WITS Graduate School Governance, Johannesburg, South Africa

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Refugee Learners' Experiences of Curriculum Transition in South Africa

Lawrence Meda

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Abstract

There is a dearth of scholarship on refugee education particularly the way in which learners navigate a new curriculum in the host country. The purpose of this study is to explore Zimbabwean learners' experiences of curricula transition at a refugee school in South Africa. The study was performed using a qualitative case study, and its paradigmatic position was interpretive. Bronfenbrenner's Social Ecological Model was used as a theoretical framework. Ten participants were purposively selected to participate in semi-structured interviews. The study found that refugee learners' experiences of curricula transition manifest in three categories: content, contextual and conceptual experiences. It is concluded that providing education to refugee learners without giving them the necessary support, which is needed for them to adapt to a new curriculum, is tantamount to setting them up for a failure.

Keywords: refugee, learners, curriculum, experiences

1. Introduction

The word "curriculum" comes from the Latin word '*currere*', meaning to run a course" [1]. From that context, curriculum can be defined as a race course. With time, a race course became a course of study. Curriculum entails any material that the school intends to let children experience [2]. Curriculum is everything in the sense that it can be understood as historical, political, racial, gendered, phenomenological, post-modern and autobiographical [3]. It is everything that happens to a learner in the past, present and future [1]. Curriculum is viewed as thought and something that we live; hence, it is autobiographical [4]. It can also be viewed as components that students ought to know in the teaching and learning process [5]. Curriculum is something that is overlooked with refugee learners, yet it is very consequential in their educational lives.

One of the fundamental challenges faced by refugee children in schools is adaptation to a new curriculum. Children will be accustomed to the curriculum used in their home country, which could have striking differences with the one they have to follow in the host country. Issues faced by refugee learners include having to adapt to the new curriculum in the host country [6]. French-speaking Black African-born students who entered Canada as refugees were integrated in Canadian schools [7]. They viewed the curricula as incompatible with their needs and what they were used to studying.

There is an increasing recognition that many educational environments have been failing to meet the needs of refugee children, especially curriculum related, such as assisting them to adapt [8]. Learners are often mainstreamed in schools, and it is up to them to adapt. Some children find it hard to fit into the new educational system, which results in frustration and failure to perform in school. Refugee children who went to attend schooling in Australia had problems with the curriculum, which was new and completely different from what they were used to studying. This resulted in frustration with, and alienation from, their mainstream schools [9].

In a situation where refugee children struggle to come to terms with curricula in the host country, schools have a critical role to play in helping learners to have a smooth curricular transition from their home to the host country [10]. Learners require additional support from teachers so that they understand differences that exist between what they used to study and what they will actually be studying. Zimbabwean refugee learners did not receive any form of support to adapt to a new curriculum when they joined a school of refugees in South Africa. Children were used to following their localised Zimbabwean curriculum, which was not the same as the Cambridge curriculum, which they were using at a school of refugees in South Africa.

In order to understand Zimbabwean learners' experiences of curricular transition, it is critical to illuminate the curriculum changes that occurred in their country (Zimbabwe). This is important because learners who joined a refugee school in South Africa were familiar with the Zimbabwean curriculum, which was developed along the lines of the Cambridge system.

Before Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980, its curricula, including examinations, were controlled by the University of Cambridge in the United Kingdom [11]. Shortly after Zimbabwe gained its independence, the country was determined to run its curricula and set its own examinations locally. There was a smooth transition of the curriculum from Cambridge to Zimbabwe School Examinations Council (ZIMSEC).

The localisation of examinations occurred from 1984 to 1994, and emphasis was initially on the ordinary-level examinations [12]. Refugee children who participated in this study did not have experience in the Cambridge curriculum while they were in Zimbabwe. Some were born in 1995, the time when localisation had already begun. However, their education was heavily inspired by the lingering influence of the Cambridge curriculum in Zimbabwe [11].

1.1. Theoretical framework

A theoretical framework guiding this study is the Bronfenbrenner's Social Ecological Model. At the heart of the Social Ecological Model is a view that interaction of people in different systems is inevitable in a developing child [13]. Similarly, interaction of refugee learners is inevitable when they strive to adapt to a new curriculum in the host country. An experience of curricular transition among refugee children is a product of interaction among different stakeholders [14]. The model highlights that during the process of human growth and development, a person interacts with microsystems, mesosystems, exosystems, macrosystems and chronosystems [15].

The microsystem entails a child's interaction with proximal settings of parents, teachers, principal and peers [13]. Mesosystem is a system that shows the interaction of microsystems [16]. An exosystem is defined as: "One or more settings that do not involve the developing person as an active participant, but in which events occur that affect, or are affected by, what happens in the setting containing the developing person" [15]. The exosystem also refers to the influence that a community has [16].

The macrosystem can be seen as the norms, values, attitudes, beliefs and ideologies, which someone gets from the society in which he/she lives. It can be viewed as a societal blueprint for a particular culture [15]. The chronosystem summarises the length of time and how it relates to the interactions between micro-, meso-, exo- and macrosystems and their influences on the growth and development of a child [14].

2. Methodology

The study adopted a qualitative research approach. The approach was ideal because it allowed the researcher to collect data by interacting extensively and closely with participants during the study. Qualitative research enables a researcher to interact with respondents in order to gain insight about the nature of a particular phenomenon [17].

The paradigmatic position for this study was interpretive. Every qualitative research has an interpretive perspective, which focuses on uncovering participants' views [18]. The paradigm was chosen because it allowed the researcher to acquire information by engaging in a dialogue with participants. The study was conducted in the form of a case study design. A case study was preferred because it provides an in-depth description and exploration of a specific subject that is under study [19]. The study was conducted at a refugee school in Johannesburg, South Africa. The school has accompanied and unaccompanied refugee children from different African countries. It has both primary and secondary education, which follows Curriculum Assessment Policy Statement (CAPS) and the Cambridge curriculum, respectively.

In almost all qualitative research, purposive sampling is adopted in which researchers use their judgement to select a sample that they believe, based on prior information, will provide the data they need [20]. In this study, "purposive sampling", a qualitative sampling

procedure which allows the researcher to deliberately select participants, a learning site and research techniques, was used [21]. Purposive sampling was used to select 10 participants: one principal, four teachers and five learners. The principal was selected to explain how and why the school adapted the Cambridge curriculum. Teachers were selected to elucidate learners' experiences of curricular transition. Zimbabwean learners who were in form four were selected to explain their experiences of changing curricula from ZIMSEC to Cambridge.

Data were collected using documentary reviews, semi-structured interviews with each of the participants and a focus group discussion with all learners. Data were analysed using content analysis. Ethical issues were observed by obtaining ethical clearances from the university and refugee school. The purpose of the study was explained to all participants. They were informed that they were free to withdraw from the study at any point in time. Consent forms were signed, and pseudonyms were used to ensure confidentiality. Validity and trustworthiness were ensured by a pilot study, which was done to test the instruments. Transcribed data were taken back to participants to show how their voices were captured. This was done to enhance trustworthiness of the study.

3. Findings

3.1. Curriculum at a refugee school

The school offers a full educational programme for primary and secondary education to children of all ages. The following subjects are taught at Chitate Street School of Refugees (pseudonym): Maths, English language, Science, Life skills/orientation, Computers, Art and craft, Music, Drama, Physical education, Commerce, Geography, History, English literature, Bible knowledge/Divinity, Accounts, Business Management and Sociology. The refugee curriculum was slightly modified by the school management team to incorporate life skills/orientation, computer studies, music and drama, arts and physical education, which are done by learners from Grade 3 to Form 4 [22].

According to the principal, primary and secondary school learners do different curricula at the school. The primary level, which extends from Grades 1 to 7, follows South Africa's CAPS. The secondary school level follows the Cambridge curriculum, which is completely different from the CAPS. The principal said: "The decision to use Cambridge in the secondary school was agreed upon by the school (teachers and Bishop) and refugee community".

The principal explained reasons why the school decided to adapt the Cambridge curriculum:

The school teachers and refugee community decided to follow the Cambridge curriculum for three main reasons:

- i. The Cambridge curriculum is international. Certificates obtained through Cambridge are accepted everywhere in the world. Since the school has children from 12 different countries, it was agreed by the Bishop, parents and teachers and refugee community that the Cambridge curriculum was better than CAPS because it enables children to go back to their home countries and integrate into tertiary education or the job market without problems.

- ii. At the school's inception, there were children and teachers from Zimbabwe only. Currently, the majority of learners and all teachers are refugees from Zimbabwe. This was another reason for adapting the Cambridge curriculum because of very high numbers of Zimbabwean children in the school. Chitate Street School adopted the Cambridge system because of its closeness to the ZIMSEC as compared to CAPS or any other curriculum.
- iii. Learners were rejected by South African schools because they did not have identity and refugee documents. This meant that learners were not going to be eligible to write South Africa's matric examinations. This was different from the British-based Cambridge curriculum, which allowed learners to write examinations without necessarily having refugee status papers.

The Cambridge curriculum is studied by learners who are in secondary school. Whenever it is examination time, the school registers with the British Council, which is located in Johannesburg.

3.1.1. Refugee learners' experiences of curricular transition

There are many issues occurring around the curriculum at Chitate Street School. Refugee learners from Zimbabwe experienced what can be described as curriculum switching. Every Zimbabwean learner at Chitate Street School changed curricula at least twice. That is, from ZIMSEC offered in Zimbabwe to Cambridge, which is studied at a refugee school in South Africa. One may think that refugee children had a smooth curricular transition from ZIMSEC to Cambridge because the two curricula have a lot of similarities since the latter influenced the former. Despite so many similarities between Cambridge and ZIMSEC, all teachers unanimously agreed that curricular switching experienced by children affected their performance. Refugee learners from Zimbabwe experienced contextual, content and conceptual differences between ZIMSEC and Cambridge.

3.1.1.1. Learners' contextual experiences of curricula

ZIMSEC and Cambridge curricula use different contextual orientations. While ZIMSEC contextualises its phenomena to Southern African countries in general, and Zimbabwe in particular, Cambridge focuses on global issues. Where learners would give western examples in the Cambridge curriculum, they are required to use local examples (from Zimbabwe and Southern Africa) in the ZIMSEC. In all subjects, ZIMSEC would require learners to have comprehensive understanding of issues surrounding Southern Africa and to have a little bit of reference to Western countries. This is contrary to Cambridge which requires learners to understand what is happening in the whole world including all African countries.

In Geography, the Cambridge curriculum is designed in a way that children learn world Geography, which makes them imagine things in a world view. A geography teacher said:

Cambridge curriculum is designed in a way that children learn topography of the whole world for example, prairies of Canada. On the contrary, ZIMSEC required children to be in touch with reality of geographical features in Southern Africa. For example, they learnt about Table Mountain in Cape Town, South Africa or Mountain Kilimanjaro in Tanzania.

Zimbabwean children who were used to localised information in the ZIMSEC had a challenge of adjusting to the world view, which is a pre-requisite of the Cambridge curriculum. Children struggle to understand the switch of curricula from locally based to international examples. There was a similar challenge in conducting experiments in science. A science teacher said:

My learners were used to ZIMSEC where they would use locally available plants such as a potato when carrying out an experiment of osmosis in science. This is different from Cambridge which requires learners to use rubab (a foreign plant) to demonstrate the movement of molecules from a region of high to low water concentration. Children did not know what rubab was. They thought that osmosis could be done with a potato only. They did not know that the use of a potato in ZIMSEC was a way of using readily available fleshy plants. Such minor differences confuse children and they require a lot of help to fully understand the Cambridge curriculum.

Learners' confusion about the curricular switching happens at different levels, depending on how long they have been doing ZIMSEC. A learner who was doing ZIMSEC longer is likely to be more confused because he/she is used to localised information. A geography teacher gave an example of a student who experienced learning through ZIMSEC longer than the Cambridge curriculum. The teacher said:

One student joined the school from Zimbabwe a few months before writing Cambridge examinations. He did not do well in the geography examination although he had all the notes that he got from his teachers in Zimbabwe. He did not know that he was supposed to have a broader view since it was going to be Cambridge he was going to sit for.

Another teacher challenged the view that learners with a long experience of ZIMSEC are likely to find it more difficult at Chitate Street School. The teacher argued that ZIMSEC is more challenging than Cambridge. Hence, a child who did ZIMSEC longer is likely to find Cambridge easier as long as he understands contextual differences, which exist between the two curricula. In some instances, it was noted that major curricula differences, which children were experiencing, were as a result of the content.

3.1.1.2. Learners' experiences of curricula content

Refugee children experienced a slight change of content when they changed curriculum from ZIMSEC to Cambridge. There are some minor differences, which exist between ZIMSEC and Cambridge curricula in terms of content. There are some topics that are in ZIMSEC but not in the Cambridge curriculum. Sometimes both curricula may have a common topic, but the depth of content would be different.

A science teacher said:

A challenge that Zimbabwean children had is that when they first see a topic that the teacher was going to teach, they think that it will be easy and it contains everything that they were doing in their country. Some children may say that they had already covered the topics and may not take the lesson seriously because they had the background. But, when I did a revision with them, they began to wonder and ask where some of the unfamiliar information was coming from. An example of this is, children used to work out only word equations in the ZIMSEC syllabus, but they are required to work out both word and chemical equations in Cambridge. That confuses learners. They wonder where some unfamiliar topics and concepts were emerging from.

The transition of curricula from ZIMSEC to Cambridge is a big challenge to learners because they were used to studying basic ideas about specific topics. This is different from the Cambridge approach, which is emphatic on some themes. Sometimes learners would not know the areas that they have to study in-depth. One learner said:

I find it difficult to understand the topics which we have to go into greater detail with. Sometimes we would think that we exhausted the question in a test, but we score low. Teachers guide us to provide more details and international examples.

Teachers observed that Zimbabwean learners were sometimes failing to score higher in tests. This was not because they were not studying hard, but they misunderstood the Cambridge syllabus. One teacher said:

At first, learners from Zimbabwe struggled with the Cambridge because they thought it was exactly the same as ZIMSEC which they were familiar with. But, as time lapsed, they began to understand the slight differences which exist. Despite the fact that learners know that there are slight differences between the two curricula, some of them still made some errors of writing examples which apply to the ZIMSEC.

The Cambridge curriculum is very challenging to learners. One learner said: "I find the Zimbabwean curriculum easier than the Cambridge. It is not easy to adjust to the Cambridge, but I am coping because we have Zimbabwean teachers. We understand their English and they understand us very well".

Zimbabwean learners encountered subject content, which was different from what they were familiar with in their home country. In the Religious Studies subject, a learner explained content differences: "I used to do synoptic gospels at school (Gospels of Matthew, Mark and Luke) during Bible knowledge studies. But here, the curriculum allows us to do only one gospel (Gospel according to Luke) and Acts of the Apostles". The Bible knowledge teacher similarly argues that children from Zimbabwe are faced with the challenge of doing a new book of the Bible (Acts of the Apostles). They find it challenging because they were used to only doing synoptic gospels.

Learners were acquainted with the ZIMSEC curriculum, which offered a variety of subjects including practicals. They showed a great desire for practical subjects, which are not offered at a refugee school in South Africa. One learner said: "We do not have practical subjects (in our current curriculum) which we used to do back home. These subjects include technical graphics, woodwork, metalwork, fashion and fabrics, food and nutrition and building studies". Another learner said: "The school does not offer technical graphics which I was very good at in Zimbabwe. I do not have any practical subject which I am doing at the moment except computers".

3.1.1.3. Learners' conceptual experiences of the curricula

Teachers unanimously pointed out that the ZIMSEC and Cambridge curricula have conceptual differences, which make it difficult for children to understand. The two curricula treat similar concepts differently. For example, a history teacher said:

The conceptualisation of Stone Age and Iron Age in ZIMSEC and Cambridge curricula is different. Learners used to understand Stone Age and Iron Age from an African point of view which is not the same as a Western perspective in the Cambridge. Similarly, children were acquainted with the topic of empires from the Afrocentric perspective in the ZIMSEC. Afrocentric empires in the ZIMSEC are arranged in a way that the King would be at the top, chiefs would be underneath and sub-chiefs at the bottom. Although the Eurocentric empireship is arranged hierarchically (like African), it has completely different concepts from the Afrocentric. Empireship in Europe is arranged in such a way that an Emperor would be at the top. Underneath, there would be lords and knights would be at the bottom.

Children find it challenging to understand the Eurocentric approach, which is different from the Afrocentric approach. The switch of curricula has impacted on children's learning. Learners find their experience of curriculum switching confusing. They are confused by some minor differences, which exist between ZIMSEC and Cambridge. A form four learner who has been at Chitate Street School for two terms said:

Some of the Cambridge information is very confusing. It is difficult to remember what principle to apply which is needed by Cambridge. We may end up confusing Cambridge and ZIMSEC. Sometimes I fail tests not because I did not study hard, but I get confused by the ZIMSEC and Cambridge concepts.

4. Discussion

The content, contextual and conceptual differences, which refugee children experienced at Chitate Street School form part of the microsystem in the Social Ecological Model. The microsystem entails a developing child interacting with proximal settings including the school and curricula [23]. Refugee learners interacted with teachers on a different subject matter and with the entire environment. This resonates with Schubert's conceptualisation of curriculum as the continuous interaction among the four common places: teachers, learners, subject matter and the milieu [24]. Interaction of refugee children with the people in their surroundings is inevitable during curriculum transition. Children will consult different school stakeholders about content of the new curriculum.

Content is considered a central concern in curriculum transition [1]. It is selected in terms of the readiness and interest level of the learners [25]. Pinar et al. looked at curriculum content as learning experiences, which have to be meticulously selected in order to attain stipulated objectives [2]. The content of the curriculum at a refugee school in South Africa was meticulously selected by parents, teachers and the community. When parents, teachers and the community decide a curriculum for children to learn, this forms the mesosystem, which, according to Bronfenbrenner, occurs when there is an interaction of microsystems between parents and teachers [15].

The involvement of a community in deciding a curriculum to adopt at a refugee school is a fundamental component of an exosystem in the Social Ecological Model. When a community makes decisions, which directly or indirectly impact on the education of refugee children, that would form an exosystem [26]. Although a community might not have direct communication with school children, its influence is greatly felt all the times [13].

The way in which the curriculum decision was made by the school and refugee community resonates with the ideas of Marsh and Willis who state that there are two focal points around which decisions about curricula can be made [27]. The first focal point is the nature of society. The curriculum takes into consideration the nature of the society so that it covers them in order to make students learn more about what is happening in their environments. The second focal point around which decisions about curricula can be made is the question raised by Marsh and Willis of whether the curriculum caters for the needs and interests of individual learners [27]. Cambridge was pointed out as the right curriculum for children because of potential benefits that it had for every learner. The curriculum is comprehensive in terms of its content, aims and objectives, and assessment standards [28].

The view of the principal of Chitate Street School that Cambridge was chosen because the Zimbabwean population, which constituted the dominant group was in favour of it, concurs with literature. The school curriculum at any one time reflects the values of the dominant group in society and thus tends to serve this group while marginalising the others [29]. The Cambridge curriculum was supported mainly because at the schools' inception, it had only Zimbabwean learners and teachers. The curricular transition which was experienced by Zimbabwean learners forms the macrosystem in the Bronfenbrenner's model. The macrosystem is formed by the way children experienced a change of curricula at the national level from ZIMSEC offered in Zimbabwe to the Cambridge, which is used at a refugee school in South Africa. The time period during which refugee children arrived in the host country and began to negotiate a new curriculum is an element of the chronosystem. The chronosystem among refugee children occurs when they are in the host country and encountering new educational experiences [26].

5. Conclusion

Refugee children seldom triumph in African schools. This is not because they are not diligent but they lack basic support to ensure smooth curricular transition in the host country. There is a strong need for schools to support refugee children [10]. This constitutes inclusive education. Providing education to refugee children without giving them necessary support, which is needed for them to adapt to a new curriculum, is tantamount to setting them up for a failure.

Author details

Lawrence Meda

Address all correspondence to: medalawrence@gmail.com

Cape Peninsula University of Technology, South Africa

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