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**The US-Pakistan relationship in South Asia,
2001-2012: A case study of Afghanistan**

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Abstract. The bilateral relationship between Pakistan and the US created since independence in 1947 to 2012 Pakistan. This anxiety assisted Pakistan to examination partners in world politics and produced alignment with the US. US concentration in South Asia was to comprehending the USSR to thwart communist enlargement towards the Middle East. Pakistan amalgamated the US alliance arrangement to getting military aid and military cooperation. Pakistan was predictable as key US confederate and acknowledged bulky quantities of military aid. In the Indo-Pakistan War US did not buttressed it in contradiction of India and Pakistan turned to China. When India tested nuclear and Pakistan to hasten its own nuclear programme in contradiction of the non-proliferation intentions of the US. When USSR Confronted on Afghanistan and both states came closer. In the Afghan civil wars, Pakistan subsidized the pro-Pakistan Taliban and tried to admittance gas in Central Asia and encompass Iranian inspiration. After 9/11 instance US bequeathed Pakistan good aid compendium in contradiction of al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Later Pakistan was acknowledged non-NATO assistant. The US attacked with drones created anti-American feeling in Pakistan military. Other side Osama bin Laden was found in the Pakistani territory. . Notwithstanding all these difficulties, relations never penniless down entirely and US continuous to bounce aid to the Pakistan.

Keywords. Aid, Convergent, Divergent, Pakistan, Terrorism, US.

JEL. C53, E27, F41, F47.

1. Introduction

The bilateral relationship between Pakistan and the US are with full of contradictions. Since independence in 1947 to 2012 Pakistan establish trends and cycles and to examine their causes and legacies. Pakistan came into being in 1947. This insecurity helped Pakistan to search allies in world politics and created alignment with the US. US interest in South Asia was to containing the USSR to prevent communist expansion towards the Middle East. Because India failed due to non-aligned policy (Boone & Beaumont, 2013).

In 1954, Pakistan joined the US alliance system, to receiving military aid and military cooperation. The US armed Pakistan against the USSR. But Pakistan's prime concern was India and Kashmir issue. Pakistan was

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recognized as key US ally and received large amounts of military aid. In the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War, Pakistan Bitterly disappointed because US not supported it against India, now Pakistan turned to China for alternative arms supplies but worried from the USSR. Very soon East Pakistan became Bangladesh. In 1974, India tested nuclear and Pakistan to accelerate its own nuclear programme against the non-proliferation aims of the US. Due to This US suspended aid and Pakistan withdraw from CENTO. In 1979 USSR Attacked on Afghanistan, and both states came closer ([Clarke, 2004](#), p.17).

When the USSR withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the US suspending aid once again. The US accused Pakistan of sponsoring terrorists in Kashmir and Bosnia. In the Afghan civil wars, Islamabad sponsored the pro-Pakistan Taliban. And access to new gas fields in Central Asia and to contain Iranian influence. In 1998, Pakistan responded to India's nuclear tests. The Musharraf's 1999 military coup drew additional sanctions. After 9/11 incident US gave Pakistan a \$2.64bn aid package in return for joining Washington in clearing al-Qaeda and the Taliban from Afghanistan. In 2004, Pakistan was declared non-NATO ally. The Taliban and other militant groups moved to the Pakistan border areas from where they attacked NATO in Afghanistan. The US attacked with drones and anti-American feeling existed in Pakistan military. The Osama bin Laden was found in the Pakistani territory in 2011. Despite all these problems, relations never broke down completely and the US continued to give aid to the Pakistan ([Gallman, 1964](#), p.43).

In 1979, Pakistan-US relations changed because in that time 9/11 incident took place and the US-led invasion in Afghanistan against al-Qaeda, due to this Taliban moved into Pakistan. Now between two states became divergent, then Pakistan became ally of US. During ally the US policy was how mutual frustration, disappointment and suspicion to Pakistan. It increase high when Pakistan supported Afghan Taliban and who attacks on NATO and the Afghan regime ([Hali, 2012](#)).

2. Musharraf, “a leader of courage and vision”

He became President in January 2001, with minority of the popular vote. He was unknown about the foreign affairs, defense and security. The president mostly rely on the states of the Middle East, Russia and China. And did not consider non-state terrorism to be an immediate danger. When he was soldier at the head of the Pakistani military he deals collective experience and understanding about regional politics and security interests. For India he not changed general policy towards its neighbor and wanted to undermine India's influence in Kashmir and Afghanistan. US foreign policy admire Musharraf as a leader of courage and vision. After 9/11 the implications for US foreign and security policy were transformational to Pakistan and its activities in Afghanistan. President Bush signaled that both al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime are enemy. In that time US government given five demands.

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- (1) hand over al-Qaeda leaders;
- (2) close all terrorist camps;
- (3) give the US full verification access;
- (4) release all detained foreigners;
- (5) Guarantee protection for all foreign journalists and aid workers.

But the Taliban refused under leadership of Mullah Omar. On 7th October, the US attacked on Afghan territory to capture bin Laden. In this operation bombing and ground attacks from Special Forces were used in the north of Afghanistan. The people of northern united as the Northern Alliance under influence of India, Russia, Iran and Tajikistan. The Taliban leader fled with bin Laden to the Tora Bora caves of the Eastern Mountains. When US bombardment on the torabora, bin Laden and Mullah Omar evaded and disappeared into the porous Afghan-Pakistan boundary areas. On 11 September 2001, Bush's National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, planned to make a speech, in this speech she said, "Russia is not security threat to the US because President Putin of Russia was first foreign leaders who phoned the White House and offered to support. In that time US felt need from southern access of Afghanistan and the border areas through Pakistan. During attack Pakistan's ISI Director, General Mahmood Ahmed, he was in Washington he with Pakistan's US Ambassador, Maleeha Lodi, met the US Deputy Defense Secretary, Richard Armitage. Who offered Pakistan "You are either 100% with us or 100% against us. Later US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, telephoned Musharraf for full support. (Haque, 2005).

3. Armitage and powell drew up a list of no less than seven explicit demands for Pakistan

1. First, the interception of al-Qaeda operatives and supplies;
2. Second, the granting of blanket over-flight and landing rights;
3. Third, territorial access for US and allied personnel;
4. Fourth, the sharing of intelligence and immigration data;
5. Fifth, public condemnation of anti-American terrorism and the curbing of domestic support for it;
6. Sixth an end of supplies to the Taliban;
7. Finally, stopping diplomatic support for the Taliban if they continued to harbor al-Qaeda.

However, according to Musharraf, these demands were also accompanied by a crude threat from Armitage. On 16th September 2001, Musharraf announced that Pakistan would join the US-led coalition. Musharraf's decision came very quickly. Without consulting in the interests of the country. Powell's call to Musharraf was considered as general ultimatum, because in this ultimatum Armitage said you are with the US or against it. As a result of demands Pakistan also send demands to US.

(a) Narrow corridor of air-space, instead of permission to fly over the whole country,

(b) The use of two bases, instead of territorial access across all of Pakistan.

Washington acknowledged that the Pakistan Army and ISI have vast knowledge about Afghanistan (Kalinovsky, 2011).

4. The aim of US in war of terrorism

1. First, the problem of al-Qaeda could be resolved without recourse to war;
2. Second, al-Qaeda and the Taliban were different and posed a different kind of threat; and
3. Third, the Northern Alliance should not be allowed to take over in Kabul.

The US adopted a traditional, state-centric view of the crisis which did not fit the threat posed by al-Qaida. Washington lifted all sanctions and provided \$2.64 billion aid for three years. On 13 February 2002, Bush warmly welcomed Musharraf as a leader of "great courage and vision." (Boone & Beaumont, 2013).

5. Post 9/11: Disappointment and double-dealing

In four months, American got victory in Afghanistan as

1. America great coalition,
2. captured, arrested and rid the thousands of terrorists,
3. and destroyed Afghanistan's terrorist training camps,
4. Saved a people from starvation and freed a country from brutal oppression.

After that the next American policy was to engage the "axis of evil" that was North Korea, Iran and Iraq. Afghanistan is about 7,000 miles away, across oceans and continents a mountain tops land. due to war Taliban got refuge in the Afghan-Pakistan border. In Pakistan, thousands of Islamic radicals came out on the streets in major cities. 13 November 2001, the US forces set up number of military bases in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan the peacekeeping force, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established from the UN under NATO. In addition, it gave Pakistan a political strangle-hold, it was used on occasions to pressure the US over disputes. This led the US to develop alternative supply routes through Russia and Central Asia, Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea known as the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) these were much slower, more expensive and complex than the Pakistani route. Pakistan actively captured and killing militants fleeing across the border and handed over to the United States (Moore & Khan, 2011).

6. Pakistan's problems with the northern alliance

The Northern Alliance was mostly non-Pashtun and wholly anti-Taliban ethnic Groups and supported from India.

When Northern Alliance captured Kabul the Taliban were retreated in the mountains in the south. The Northern Alliance were in hostile Pashtun

territory. In 2002, ISAF forces faced guerrilla warfare. Taliban came in FATA, it is a semi-autonomous region which consists seven tribal agencies: 1. Khyber, 2. Kurram, 3. Orakzai, 4. Mohmand, 5. Bajaur, 6. North Waziristan 7. South Waziristan. There are three million inhabitants, about 60% are Pashtun tribes. This area is underdeveloped, poor medical facilities, transport, and has limited access to clean water. At least 60 percent of the total population lives under the poverty line. Pakistan control over FATA was always limited. In north and central NWFP, there are seven former princely states and tribal territories which are governed as Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA), including Chitral, Swat, and Dir they were assimilated into Pakistan in 1960 (Moore & Khan, 2011 p.35).

In 2010 NWFP was renamed Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) in recognition of majority Pashtun identity but this led to violent protests from non-Pashtuns demanding a province of their own. 13th December 2001, suicide attack on the Indian Parliament. Blame was swiftly placed - Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e Mohammad. In 2003 both sides declared a ceasefire along the Line of Control. These groups were dominated by network led by a former Taliban minister, Jalal Uddin Haqqani, he was close to the ISI and CIA during the 1980s and joined Taliban in 1994 and Haqqani fled to North Waziristan and became the first anti-US commander in FATA. In 2002, from South Waziristan foreign fighters were cleared (Kalinovsky, 2011 p.37).

7. The issue of nuclear proliferation

When US attacked on Afghanistan, the Musharraf redeployed his nuclear weapons to at least six different secret locations, he feared that might cause the US to strip Pakistan of its nuclear assets. Then he came under pressure from the US on the nuclear issue.

7.1. India and the US

When Pakistan feel insecure over the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, then US formed strategic alliance with India. And visited India in March 2005. He said, India and the US were “global leaders”. The main purpose of the visit was to finalize the framework for a mutual defense agreement and I deal on civil nuclear co-operation. After visiting India, Bush went to Pakistan where he offered similar nuclear deal.

7.2. Obama and the “Afghanistan -Pak strategy”

In 2009, President Bush left office and Obama came in power. In foreign policy, Obama’s prime concern was to find ways of ending the Iraqi war and finishing the fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Obama and Gilani solved the complexities of Afghanistan and the Pakistan border areas. And cut the all roots of terrorism in the tribal areas. This led to the formulation of the America’s so-called, “Af-Pak” strategy, it was announced in March 2009, in this strategy there were two fronts.

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1. The first time, differentiated clearly between al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Al-Qaeda.

For Pakistan, the Kerry-Lugar Berman Act was proposed in September 2009 to provide \$7.5 billion civilian assistance over five years (Boone & Beaumont, 2013, p.23).

7.3. The issue of nuclear security

In the last months of the Bush administration the instability in Pakistan was started over the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. Fear was that the possibility of them falling into the hands of terrorists. In September 2008, the US Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, reported, that the weapons were secure, and had remained.

7.4. The controversy over drones

The complex and covert nature of US-Pakistan relations is well illustrated from the issue of drones over Pakistan territory. The government co-operated with the US military over the drone strikes. The unmanned aircraft for bombing and missile attacks were started in Pakistan in 2004 during the Bush administration. The US drone programme led the problems with the Pakistani government and aggravated anti-US sentiment in the country (Greenwood, 2013).

7.5. Reasons of controversy

The feeling that the drones violated Pakistani sovereignty and killed innocent lives. Islamabad denounced the drone programme and requested the US to reconsider it. Prime Minister Gilani protested that action against terrorists inside Pakistan was the sovereign right and responsibility of his government.

7.6. Duplicity and the Haqqani network

2011, US-Pakistan relation came under tensions and suspicions. The main reason was US frustration over the resurgent Taliban who were seriously disrupting their plans for troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014. In particular, Washington was angered from anti-US militants sheltering in Pakistan and on the Haqqani Network. The other hand Pakistan frustrated from the unreliability of the US and its proxy influence in Afghanistan. When challenged over Haqqani involvement, Pakistani military spokesman shifted the blame to NATO (Moore & Khan, 2011).

7.7. The US-Pakistan relationship faces crisis

After ten years of 9/11 attack in Abbottabad compound where bin Laden was present from five years, it was half a kilometer from Pakistan's premier military academy and 35 kilometers away from the capital Islamabad.

1. US demand was Pakistan protected Osama bin Laden and provided them safe refuge
2. The ISI, had been unable to find him despite his proximity to a very sensitive military base.

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Ali Soufan, he was former US counter-terrorism agent, who pointed out that the town where bin Laden's compound was located ([Kalinovsky, 2011](#). p.44).

7.8. Strategic outcomes for the US and Pakistan

In 2002, Bush administration adopted a National Security Strategy in September. In which strategy they set their aims and objectives and serves to assess the relations to their successes, unprecedented and unequalled strength and influence to make the whole world a safer and better place.

1. First was to disrupt and destroy global terrorism.
2. Other parts of the strategy was related to Pakistan and South Asia
3. Strengthening non-proliferation efforts to prevent rogue states and terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction; defusing the Indo Pakistani conflict; and promoting market-based democracy.

Due to insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan this policy failed. The enemy became not just al-Qaeda and the Taliban but a complex and multi-layered network of militant groups. Bush's subsequent inability to control the Northern Alliance take-over of Kabul and the prominence of its leaders in the new government then undermined much of the strategic motivation for Pakistan to abandon the Taliban ([Greenwood, 2013](#). p.11).

7.9. Implications for the relationship

The 9/11 created gulf in interests between the US and Pakistan. First, as a potential conduit for Central Asian resources and then as a hostile center of al-Qaeda activity which turned into a primary threat to be eliminated along with the Taliban regime. Pakistan's interests remained constant against India and maintaining strategic depth in Afghanistan through supporting the Taliban. Thus, 9/11 found Pakistan on the wrong side as far as the US was concerned, so co-operation had to be conscripted. Musharraf's early willingness to help indicated his eagerness to get the benefits of US partnership, in legitimacy and aid, rather than a dramatic re-orientation of his strategic interests ([Moore & Khan, 2011](#). p.33).

8. Conclusion

The bilateral relationship between Pakistan and the US created since independence in 1947 to 2012 Pakistan. This insecurity helped Pakistan to search allies in world politics and created alignment with the US. US interest in South Asia was to containing the USSR to prevent communist expansion towards the Middle East. Pakistan joined the US alliance system, to receiving military aid and military cooperation. Pakistan was recognized as key US ally and received large amounts of military aid. In the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War, Pakistan Bitterly disappointed because US not supported it against India and Pakistan turned to China. In 1974, India tested nuclear and Pakistan to accelerate its own nuclear programme against the non-

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